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l)DEAL OR NO DEAL? DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK IN A LARGE-STAKE TV GAME
SHOW AND RELATED EXPERIMENTS
Risky choice is fundamental to virtually every branch of economics. Unfortunately,
empirical testing of theories developed in this field has proven to be difficult because of
limited budgets in experiments and joint hypothesis problems outside the laboratory.
The first two chapters of this thesis analyze the risky choices of contestants in a TV game
show named “Deal or No Deal” (DOND). DOND provides a unique opportunity to study risk
behavior, because it is characterized by very large and wide-ranging stakes, by a sim ple
probability distribution, and by stop-go decisions that require minimal skill or strate gy.
The results are hard to reconcile with expected utility theory and point to reference-depen -
dent alternatives such as prospect theory. The first chapter uses editions from the
Netherlands, Germany and the US. In each sample, the choices of contestants can be
explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aver sion
decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or
surpassed by favorable outcomes. The second chapter not only studies risk behavior in
individual editions, but also compares across editions. We demonstrate that risky choice is
highly sensitive to the context, as defined by the initial prizes in the game. Even though
the initial stakes of the various editions are widely different, contestants respond in a
similar way to the stakes relative to their initial level.
The third chapter of this thesis analyzes random task incentive systems (RTISs), using
experiments that mimic DOND. RTISs are commonly applied in economic experiments to
implement real incentives when research budgets are limited and to avoid income effects.
We find that caution is warranted when applying RTISs.
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Introduction 
 
This thesis analyzes the decisions of subjects in a TV game show named “Deal or 
No Deal” (DOND). This show has received substantial attention from researchers, 
because it has such desirable features that it almost appears to be designed to be a risky 
choice experiment rather than a TV game show. 
Risky choice is fundamental to virtually every branch of economics. A wide range 
of theories of have been developed in this field, including the normative expected utility 
theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and the descriptive prospect theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Unfortunately, empirical testing has proven to be 
difficult. 
Early tests of theories of risky choice were mostly based on either thought 
experiments or answers to hypothetical questions. With the rising popularity of 
experimental economics, risky choice experiments with real monetary stakes have 
become more popular, but because of limited budgets most experiments are still limited 
to small stakes. Outside the laboratory, empirical research is typically plagued by what 
amounts to “joint hypothesis” problems. Researchers cannot directly observe risk 
preferences for most real-life problems, because the true probability distribution is not 
known to the subjects and the subjects’ beliefs are not known to the researcher. 
Despite the short history of DOND, it is already widely recognized as a natural 
laboratory for studying risky choice behavior. We discovered DOND and its prospects 
at the time the format was on the eve of an international breakthrough. DOND is 
developed by Endemol, a Dutch production company. It was first aired in the 
Netherlands in December 2002. In 2003, it was successfully exported to Australia, and 
in the following years, the game show was launched in dozens of other countries. By 
2006, DOND was aired in a total of 46 countries. The stakes in DOND are very high 
and wide-ranging: contestants can go home as multimillionaires or practically empty-
handed. Analyzing risky choice in TV game shows is not new, but unlike other game 
shows, DOND involves only simple stop-go decisions (“Deal” or “No Deal”) that 
require minimal skill, knowledge or strategy, and the probability distribution is simple 
and known with near-certainty. Also, the game show involves multiple rounds, and 
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consequently seems particularly interesting for analyzing path-dependence, or the role 
of earlier outcomes. 
Of course, the behavior of contestants in game shows cannot always be 
generalized to what an ordinary person does in her everyday life when making risky 
decisions. While the contestants have to make decisions in just a few minutes in front of 
millions of viewers, many real-life decisions involving large sums of money are neither 
made in a hurry nor in the limelight. Still, we believe that the choices in this particular 
game show are worthy of study, because the decision problems are simple and well-
defined, and the amounts at stake are very large. Furthermore, prior to the show, 
contestants have had considerable time to think about what they might do in various 
situations, and during the show they are encouraged to discuss those contingencies with 
a friend or relative who sits in the audience. In this sense, the choices may be more 
deliberate and considered than might appear at first glance. Indeed, it seems plausible 
that our contestants have given more thought to their choices on the show than to some 
of the other financial choices they have made in their lives such as selecting a mortgage 
or retirement savings investment strategy. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis examines the risky choices of 151 contestants from the 
Netherlands (51), Germany (47) and the United States (53), and of 80 students in related 
classroom experiments. To analyze their “Deal or No Deal” decisions, we use, among 
others, structural choice models and a maximum-likelihood methodology. For each 
sample, a simple implementation of prospect theory explains the choices substantially 
better than expected utility does. The biggest losers and the biggest winners appear to 
have an abnormally low degree of risk aversion, consistent with the “break-even” and 
“house-money” effects that occur when the reference point sticks to earlier expectations 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990). Although “Deal or No Deal” contestants never have to pay 
money out of their own pockets, they can suffer significant “paper” losses if they 
eliminate the largest prizes (causing the expected winnings to fall), and we find that 
such losses influence their subsequent choices. Many losers even appear to be risk 
seeking by rejecting bank offers that exceed the average remaining prize. The results 
point in the direction of reference-dependent choice theories, such as prospect theory, 
and indicate that path-dependence is relevant, even when large real monetary amounts 
are at stake. This first chapter is based on the paper “Deal or No Deal? Decision Making 
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under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show”, co-authored by Thierry Post, Guido 
Baltussen and Richard H. Thaler, and published in the American Economic Review. 
Chapter 2 examines how risky choices in DOND depend on the context of the 
initial set of prizes in the game. It uses a much larger data set of ten editions, with large 
differences in the set of initial prizes. The ten editions originate from seven different 
countries and together cover approximately 6,400 risky choices from over 1,100 
different contestants. The large data set and the differences in the set of prizes at the 
start of a game allow us to analyze framing effects by analyzing choices across editions, 
and reduces the need for fully specified structural models such as those employed in 
Chapter 1. Using probit regression analysis, we compare how the absolute and relative 
magnitudes of the amounts at stake affect risky choice. Our analyses within and across 
the different editions suggest that risky choice is highly sensitive to the context, as 
defined by the initial set of prizes in the game. Decisions are mainly driven by the 
relative size of the stakes rather than the absolute monetary size. For a given edition of 
DOND, changes in the amounts at stake have a strong effect on risk attitudes and choice 
behavior, but differences in the initial amounts across the shows have only a weak 
effect. Our results suggest that amounts are primarily evaluated in proportion to a 
subjective frame of reference rather than in terms of their absolute monetary value. This 
chapter is based on the paper “Risky Choice and the Relative Size of Stakes”, co-
authored by Guido Baltussen and Thierry Post. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of random task incentive systems (RTISs). A RTIS 
is an incentive method that is often applied in economic experiments, where only one 
randomly selected task is played for real. The laboratory experiments in this chapter 
mimic the game of DOND. We perform three different treatments, where the only factor 
that we vary is the incentive system that is used. In the first, or guaranteed-payment 
treatment, each subject plays the game once and for real. In the second, or within-
subjects RTIS treatment, subjects play the game ten times, of which one is randomly 
selected for real payment. In the third, or between-subjects RTIS treatment, each subject 
plays the game once, with a ten percent chance of real payment. We investigate three 
potential effects that can occur in a RTIS experiment: biased risk aversion, increased 
decision errors, and carry-over effects from outcomes of previously performed tasks. 
The properties of DOND allow us to study the three effects on the basis of this single 
12
 12
type of task. Our results suggest that caution is warranted when applying RTIS designs. 
In the RTIS treatments, we find a significant frequency of errors that are unrelated to the 
characteristics of the choice problem. Subjects appear to have lapses of concentration 
and/or refrain from efforts to seriously evaluate the decision problem, resulting in 
choices that seem to be completely at random. Furthermore, in the within-subjects RTIS 
design, we also observe strong carry-over effects of prior tasks: risk aversion increases 
after unfavorable outcomes in the two most recent previous games, and decreases after 
favorable outcomes. On average, risk aversion in the within-subjects RTIS experiment 
is not significantly different from that in the guaranteed-payment design. The between-
subjects RTIS design is based on one task per subject and therefore avoids carry-over 
effects from prior tasks altogether. However, in this design, risk aversion is substantially 
lower than in the guaranteed-payment treatment, suggesting a serious bias. This chapter 
is based on the paper “Random Task Incentive Systems in Risky Choice Experiments”, 
co-authored by Guido Baltussen, Thierry Post, and Peter P. Wakker. 
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Chapter 1: 
Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk 
in a Large-Payoff Game Show1 
 
Abstract 
We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show “Deal 
or No Deal” and related classroom experiments. Contrary to the traditional view of 
expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes 
experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have 
been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. Our 
results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and 
suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple 
and well-defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A wide range of theories of risky choice have been developed, including the 
normative expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and the 
descriptive prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Although risky choice is 
fundamental to virtually every branch of economics, empirical testing of these theories 
has proven to be difficult. 
Many of the earliest tests such as those by Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961), and the 
early work by Kahneman and Tversky were based on either thought experiments or 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on the paper “Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff 
Game Show”, co-authored by Thierry Post, Guido Baltussen and Richard H. Thaler, and published in the 
American Economic Review. We thank Nick Barberis, Ingolf Dittmann, Glenn Harrison, Phil Maymin 
and Peter Wakker, conference participants at BDRM X 2006 Santa Monica, FUR XII 2006 Rome, EFA 
XXXIII 2006 Zurich, EEA XXI 2006 Vienna and EWGFM XL 2007 Rotterdam, seminar participants at 
the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the University of Zurich, the University of Groningen, the 
University of Amsterdam and the University of Lugano, and anonymous referees for useful comments 
and suggestions. We thank Monique de Koning, Endemol, TROS and Sat.1 for providing us with 
information and/or recordings of “Deal or No Deal”, Marc Schauten for acting as game show host in the 
experiments, and Nick de Heer and Jan-Hein Paes for their skillful research assistance. The support by 
Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus Research Institute of Management and Erasmus Center for Financial 
Research is gratefully acknowledged. 
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answers to hypothetical questions. With the rising popularity of experimental 
economics, risky choice experiments with real monetary stakes have become more 
popular, but because of limited budgets most experiments are limited to small stakes. 
Some experimental studies try to circumvent this problem by using small nominal 
amounts in developing countries, so that the subjects face large amounts in real terms; 
see, for example, Binswanger (1980, 1981), and Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992). Still, 
the stakes in these experiments are typically not larger than one month’s income and 
thus do not provide evidence about risk attitudes regarding prospects that are significant 
in relation to lifetime wealth. 
Nonexperimental empirical research is typically plagued by what amounts to 
“joint hypothesis” problems. Researchers cannot directly observe risk preferences for 
most real-life problems, because the true probability distribution is not known to the 
subjects and the subjects’ beliefs are not known to the researcher. For example, to infer 
the risk attitudes of investors from their investment portfolios, one needs to know what 
their beliefs are regarding the joint return distribution of the relevant asset classes. Were 
investors really so risk averse that they required an equity premium of 7 percent per 
year, or were they surprised by an unexpected number of favorable events or worried 
about catastrophic events that never occurred? An additional complication arises 
because of the possible difference between risk and uncertainty: real-life choices rarely 
come with precise probabilities. 
In order to circumvent these problems, some researchers analyze the behavior of 
contestants in TV game shows, for example “Card Sharks” (Gertner, 1993), “Jeopardy!” 
(Metrick, 1995), “Illinois Instant Riches” (Hersch and McDougall, 1997), “Lingo” 
(Beetsma and Schotman, 2001), “Hoosier Millionaire” (Fullenkamp, Tenorio and 
Battalio, 2003) and “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” (Hartley, Lanot and Walker, 
2006). The advantage of game shows is that the amounts at stake are larger than in 
experiments and that the decision problems are often simpler and better defined than in 
real life. 
The game show we use in this study, “Deal or No Deal”, has such desirable 
features that it almost appears to be designed to be an economics experiment rather than 
a TV show. Here is the essence of the game. A contestant is shown 26 briefcases which 
each contain a hidden amount of money, ranging from €0.01 to €5,000,000 (in the 
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Dutch edition). The contestant picks one of the briefcases and then owns its unknown 
contents. Next, she selects 6 of the other 25 briefcases to open. Each opened briefcase 
reveals one of the 26 prizes that are not in her own briefcase. The contestant is then 
presented a “bank offer” – the opportunity to walk away with a sure amount of money – 
and asked the simple question: “Deal or No Deal?” If she says “No Deal”, she has to 
open five more briefcases, followed by a new bank offer. The game continues in this 
fashion until the contestant either accepts a bank offer, or rejects all offers and receives 
the contents of her own briefcase. The bank offers depend on the value of the unopened 
briefcases; if, for example, the contestant opens high-value briefcases, the bank offer 
falls. 
This game show seems well-suited for analyzing risky choice. The stakes are very 
high and wide-ranging: contestants can go home as multimillionaires or practically 
empty-handed. Unlike other game shows, “Deal or No Deal” involves only simple stop-
go decisions (“Deal” or “No Deal”) that require minimal skill, knowledge or strategy, 
and the probability distribution is simple and known with near-certainty (the bank offers 
are highly predictable, as discussed later). Finally, the game show involves multiple 
game rounds, and consequently seems particularly interesting for analyzing path-
dependence, or the role of earlier outcomes. Thaler and Johnson (1990) conclude that 
risky choice is affected by prior outcomes in addition to incremental outcomes due to 
decision makers incompletely adapting to recent losses and gains. Although “Deal or 
No Deal” contestants never have to pay money out of their own pockets, they can suffer 
significant “paper” losses if they open high-value briefcases (causing the expected 
winnings to fall), and such losses may influence their subsequent choices. (Throughout 
this thesis we will use the term “outcomes” to indicate not only monetary pay-offs, but 
also new information or changed expectations.) 
We examine the games of 151 contestants from the Netherlands, Germany and the 
United States in 2002 – 2007. The game originated in the Netherlands and is now 
broadcast around the world. Although the format of “Deal or No Deal” is generally 
similar across all editions, there are some noteworthy differences. For example, in the 
daily versions from Italy, France and Spain, the banker knows the amounts in the 
briefcases and may make informative offers, leading to strategic interaction between the 
banker and the contestant. In the daily edition from Australia, special game options 
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known as “Chance” and “Supercase” are sometimes offered at the discretion of the 
game-show producer after a contestant has made a “Deal”. These options would 
complicate our analysis, because the associated probability distribution is not known, 
introducing a layer of uncertainty in addition to the pure risk of the game. For these 
reasons, we limit our analysis to the games played in the Netherlands, Germany and the 
United States. 
The three editions have a very similar game format, apart from substantial 
variation in the amounts at stake. While the average prize that can be won in the Dutch 
edition is roughly €400,000, the averages in the German and US edition are roughly 
€25,000 and €100,000, respectively. At first sight, this makes the pooled data set useful 
for separating the effect of the amounts at stake from the effect of prior outcomes. 
(Within one edition, the stakes are strongly confounded with prior outcomes.) However, 
cross-country differences in culture, wealth and contestant selection procedure could 
confound the effect of stakes across the three editions. To isolate the effect of stakes on 
risky choice, we therefore conduct classroom experiments with a homogeneous student 
population. In these experiments, we vary the prizes with a factor of ten, so that we can 
determine if, for example, €100 has the same subjective value when it lies below or 
above the initial expectations. 
Our findings are difficult to reconcile with expected utility theory. The 
contestants’ choices appear to be driven in large part by the previous outcomes 
experienced during the game. Risk aversion seems to decrease after earlier expectations 
have been shattered by opening high-value briefcases, consistent with a “break-even 
effect”. Similarly, risk aversion seems to decrease after earlier expectations have been 
surpassed by opening low-value briefcases, consistent with a “house-money effect”. 
The orthodox interpretation of expected utility of wealth theory does not allow for 
these effects, because subjects are assumed to have the same preferences for a given 
choice problem, irrespective of the path traveled before arriving at this problem. Our 
results point in the direction of reference-dependent choice theories, such as prospect 
theory, and indicate that path-dependence is relevant, even when large real monetary 
amounts are at stake. We therefore propose a version of prospect theory with a path-
dependent reference point as an alternative to expected utility theory. 
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Of course, we must be careful with rejecting expected utility theory and 
embracing alternatives like prospect theory. Although the standard implementation of 
expected utility theory is unable to explain the choices of losers and winners, a better fit 
could be achieved with a nonstandard utility function that has convex segments (as 
proposed by, for example, Friedman and Savage, 1948, and Markowitz, 1952), and 
depends on prior outcomes. Therefore, this study does not reject or accept any theory. 
Rather, our main finding is the important role of reference-dependence and path-
dependence, phenomena that are not standard in typical implementations of expected 
utility, but common in prospect theory. Any plausible explanation of the choice 
behavior in the game will have to account for these phenomena. A theory with static 
preferences cannot explain why variation of the stakes due to the subject’s fortune 
during the game has a much stronger effect than variation in the initial stakes across 
different editions of the TV show and experiments. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we describe 
the game show in greater detail. Section 1.3 discusses the data we use. Section 1.4 
provides a first analysis of the risk attitudes in “Deal or No Deal” by examining the 
bank offers and the contestants’ decisions to accept (“Deal”) or reject (“No Deal”) these 
offers. Section 1.5 analyzes the decisions using expected utility theory with a general, 
flexible-form expo-power utility function. Section 1.6 analyzes the decisions using 
prospect theory with a simple specification that allows for partial adjustment of the 
subjective reference point that separates losses from gains. This implementation of 
prospect theory explains a material part of what expected utility theory leaves 
unexplained. Section 1.7 reports results from classroom experiments in which students 
play “Deal or No Deal”. The experiments confirm the important role of previous 
outcomes and suggest that the isolated effect of the amounts at stake is limited 
compared to the isolated effect of previous outcomes. Section 1.8 offers concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future research. Finally, in Section 1.9, an epilogue gives a 
synopsis of other “Deal or No Deal” studies that became available after the study in this 
chapter was first submitted to the American Economic Review in October 2005. 
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1.2 Description of the Game Show 
The TV game show “Deal or No Deal” was developed by the Dutch production 
company Endemol and was first aired in the Netherlands in December 2002. The game 
show soon became very popular and was exported to dozens of other countries, 
including Germany and the United States. The following description applies to the 
Dutch episodes of “Deal or No Deal”. Except for the monetary amounts, the structure of 
the main game is similar in the German and US versions used in this study. 
Each episode consists of two parts: an elimination game based on quiz questions 
in order to select one finalist from the audience, and a main game in which this finalist 
plays “Deal or No Deal”. Audience members have not been subjected to an extensive 
selection procedure: tickets are randomly distributed to players in the national lottery 
sponsoring the show. Only the main game is the subject of our study. Except for 
determining the identity of the finalist, the elimination game does not influence the 
course of the main game. The selected contestant has not won any prize before entering 
the main game. 
The main game starts with a fixed and known set of 26 monetary amounts ranging 
from €0.01 to €5,000,000, which have been randomly allocated over 26 numbered and 
closed briefcases. One of the briefcases is selected by the contestant and this briefcase is 
not to be opened until the end of the game. 
The game is played over a maximum of nine rounds. In each round, the finalist 
chooses one or more of the other 25 briefcases to be opened, revealing the prizes inside. 
Next, a “banker” tries to buy the briefcase from the contestant by making her an offer. 
Contestants have a few minutes to evaluate the offer and to decide between “Deal” and 
“No Deal”, and may consult a friend or relative who sits nearby.2 The remaining prizes 
and the current bank offer are displayed on a scoreboard and need not be memorized by 
the contestant. If the contestant accepts the offer (“Deal”), she walks away with this sure 
amount and the game ends; if the contestant rejects the offer (“No Deal”), the game 
continues and she enters the next round. 
In the first round, the finalist has to select six briefcases to be opened, and the first 
bank offer is based on the remaining 20 prizes. The numbers of briefcases to be opened 
                                                 
2 In the US version and in the second German series, three or four friends and/or relatives sit on stage 
nearby the contestant. In the Dutch version and in the first German series, only one person accompanies 
the contestant. 
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in the maximum of eight subsequent rounds are 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, and 1. Accordingly, 
the number of prizes left in the game decreases to 15, 11, 8, 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2. If the 
contestant rejects all nine offers she receives the prize in her own briefcase. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the basic structure of the main game. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Flow chart of the main game. In each round, the finalist chooses a number of 
briefcases to be opened, each giving new information about the unknown prize in the 
contestant’s own briefcase. After the prizes in the chosen briefcases are revealed, a “bank 
offer” is presented to the finalist. If the contestant accepts the offer (“Deal”), she walks 
away with the amount offered and the game ends; if the contestant rejects the offer (“No 
Deal”), play continues and she enters the next round. If the contestant decides “No Deal” in 
the ninth round, she receives the prize in her own briefcase. The flow chart applies to the 
Dutch and US editions and the second German series. The first German series involves one 
fewer game round and starts with 20 briefcases. 
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To provide further intuition for the game, Figure 1.2 shows a typical example of 
how the main game is displayed on the TV screen. A close-up of the contestant is 
shown in the center and the original prizes are listed to the left and the right of the 
contestant. Eliminated prizes are shown in a dark color and remaining prizes are in a 
bright color. The bank offer is displayed at the top of the screen. 
As can be seen on the scoreboard, the initial prizes are highly dispersed and 
positively skewed. During the course of the game, the dispersion and the skewness 
generally fall as more and more briefcases are opened. In fact, in the ninth round, the 
distribution is perfectly symmetric, because the contestant then faces a 50/50 gamble 
with two remaining briefcases. 
 
 
 
 € 13,000  
 
€ 0.01 € 7,500 
€ 0.20 € 10,000 
€ 0.50 € 25,000 
€ 1 € 50,000 
€ 5 € 75,000 
€ 10 € 100,000 
€ 20 € 200,000 
€ 50 € 300,000 
€ 100 € 400,000 
€ 500 € 500,000 
€ 1,000 € 1,000,000 
€ 2,500 € 2,500,000 
€ 5,000 
 
€ 5,000,000 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Example of the main game as displayed on the TV screen. A close-up of the 
contestant is shown in the center of the screen. The possible prizes are listed in the columns 
to the left and right of the contestant. Prizes eliminated in earlier rounds are shown in a dark 
color and remaining prizes are in a bright color. The top bar above the contestant shows the 
bank offer. This example demonstrates the two options open to the contestant after opening 
six briefcases in the first round: accept a bank offer of €13,000 or continue to play with the 
remaining 20 briefcases, one of which is the contestant’s own. This example reflects the 
prizes in the Dutch episodes. 
 
 
--------------------
close-up of the 
contestant is 
shown here 
--------------------
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Bank Behavior 
Although the contestants do not know the exact bank offers in advance, the banker 
behaves consistently according to a clear pattern. Four simple rules of thumb summarize 
this pattern: 
Rule 1. Bank offers depend on the value of the unopened briefcases: when the 
lower (higher) prizes are eliminated, the average remaining prize 
increases (decreases) and the banker makes a better (worse) offer. 
Rule 2. The offer typically starts at a low percentage (usually less than 10 
percent) of the average remaining prize in the first round and gradually 
increases to 100 percent in the later rounds. This strategy obviously 
serves to encourage contestants to continue playing the game and to 
gradually increase excitement. 
Rule 3. The offers are not informative, that is, they cannot be used to determine 
which of the remaining prizes is in the contestant’s briefcase. Only an 
independent auditor knows the distribution of the prizes over the 
briefcases. Indeed, there is no correlation between the percentage bank 
offer and the relative value of the prize in the contestant’s own briefcase. 
Rule 4. The banker is generous to losers by offering a relatively high percentage 
of the average remaining prize. This pattern is consistent with path-
dependent risk attitudes. If the game-show producer understands that risk 
aversion falls after large losses, he may understand that high offers are 
needed to avoid trivial choices and to keep the game entertaining to 
watch. Using the same reasoning, we may also expect a premium after 
large gains; this, however, does not occur, perhaps because with large 
stakes, the game is already entertaining. 
 
Section 1.4 gives descriptive statistics on the bank offers in the sample and 
Section 1.5 presents a simple model that captures the rules of thumb noted above. The 
key finding is that the bank offers are highly predictable. 
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1.3 Data 
We examine all “Deal or No Deal” decisions of 151 contestants appearing in 
episodes aired in the Netherlands (51), Germany (47), and the United States (53). 
The Dutch edition of “Deal or No Deal” is called “Miljoenenjacht” (or “Chasing 
Millions”). The first Dutch episode was aired on December 22, 2002 and the last in the 
sample used in this chapter dates from January 1, 2007. In this time span, the game 
show was aired 51 times, divided over eight series of weekly episodes and four 
individual episodes aired on New Year’s Day, with one contestant per episode. A 
distinguishing feature of the Dutch edition is the high amounts at stake: the average 
prize equals roughly €400,000 (€391,411 in episode 1 – 47 and €419,696 in episode 
48 – 51). Contestants may even go home with €5,000,000. The fact that the Dutch 
edition is sponsored by a national lottery probably explains why the Dutch format has 
such large prizes. The large prizes may also have been preferred to stimulate a 
successful launch of the show and to pave the way for exporting the formula abroad. 
Part of the 51 shows were recorded on videotape by the authors and tapes of the 
remaining shows were obtained from the Dutch broadcasting company TROS. 
In Germany, a first series of “Deal or No Deal – Die Show der GlücksSpirale” 
started on June 23, 2005 and a second series began on June 28, 2006.3 Apart from the 
number of prizes, the two series are very similar. The first series uses 20 prizes instead 
of 26 and is played over a maximum of 8 game rounds instead of 9. Because these 8 
rounds are exactly equal to round 2 – 9 of the regular format in terms of the number of 
remaining prizes and in terms of the number of briefcases that have to be opened, we 
can analyze this series as if the first round has been skipped. Both series have the same 
maximum prize (€250,000) and the averages of the initial set of prizes are practically 
equal (€26,347 versus €25,003 respectively). In the remainder of the chapter we will 
consider the two German series as one combined subsample. The first series was 
broadcast weekly and lasted for 10 episodes, each with two contestants playing the 
game sequentially. The second series was aired either once or twice a week and lasted 
for 27 episodes, with one contestant per episode, bringing the total number of German 
contestants in our sample to 47. Copies of the first series were obtained from TV station 
                                                 
3 An earlier edition called “Der MillionenDeal” started on May 1, 2004. The initial average prize was 
€237,565 and the largest prize was €2,000,000. This edition however lasted for only 6 episodes and is 
therefore not included here. 
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Sat.1 and from Endemol’s local production company Endemol Deutschland. The second 
series was recorded by a friend of the authors. 
In the United States, the game show debuted on December 19, 2005, for five 
consecutive nights and returned on TV on February 27, 2006. This second series lasted 
for 34 episodes until early June 2006. The 39 episodes combined covered the games of 
53 contestants, with some contestants starting in one episode and continuing their game 
in the next. The regular US format has a maximum initial prize of $1,000,000 (roughly 
€800,000) and an average of $131,478 (€105,182). In the games of six contestants, 
however, the top prizes and averages were larger to mark the launch and the finale of 
the second series. All US shows were recorded by the authors. US Dollars are translated 
into Euros by using a single fixed rate of €0.80 per $ (the actual exchange rate was 
within 5 percent of this rate for both the 2005 and 2006 periods). 
For each contestant, we collected data on the eliminated and remaining prizes, the 
bank offers, and the “Deal or No Deal” decisions in every game round, leading to a 
panel data set with a time-series dimension (the game rounds) and a cross-section 
dimension (the contestants). 
We also collected data on each contestant’s gender, age and education. Age and 
education are often revealed in an introductory talk or in other conversations during the 
game. The level of education is coded as a dummy variable, with a value of 1 assigned 
to contestants with a bachelor degree level or higher (including students) or equivalent 
work experience. Although a contestant’s level of education is usually not explicitly 
mentioned, it is often clear from the stated profession. We estimate the missing values 
for age based on the physical appearance of the contestant and information revealed in 
the introductory talk, for example, the age of children. However, age, gender and 
education do not have significant explanatory power in our analysis. In part or in whole, 
this may reflect a lack of sampling variation. For example, during the game, the 
contestant is permitted to consult with friends, family members, or spouse, and therefore 
decisions in this game are in effect taken by a couple or a group, mitigating the role of 
the individual contestant’s age, gender or education. For the sake of brevity, we will pay 
no further attention to the role of contestant characteristics. Moreover, prior outcomes 
are random and unrelated to characteristics and therefore the characteristics probably 
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would not affect our main conclusions about path-dependence, even if they would affect 
the level of risk aversion. 
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for our sample. Compared to the German and 
US contestants, the Dutch contestants on average accept lower percentage bank offers 
(76.3 percent versus 91.8 and 91.4 percent) and play roughly three fewer game rounds 
(5.2 versus 8.2 and 7.7 rounds). These differences may reflect unobserved differences in 
risk aversion due to differences in wealth, culture or contestant selection procedure. In 
addition, increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) may help to explain the differences. 
As the Dutch edition involves much larger stakes than the German and US editions, a 
modest increase in relative risk aversion suffices to yield sizeable differences in the 
accepted percentages. Furthermore, the observed differences in the number of rounds 
played are inflated by the behavior of the banker. The percentage bank offer increases 
with relatively small steps in the later game rounds and consequently a modest increase 
in relative risk aversion can yield a large reduction in the number of game rounds 
played. Thus, the differences between the Dutch contestants on the one hand and the 
German and US contestants on the other hand are consistent with moderate IRRA. 
 
Cross-Country Analysis 
Apart from the amounts at stake, the game show format is very similar in the three 
countries. Still, there are some differences in how contestants are chosen to play that 
may create differences in the contestant pool. In the Dutch and German episodes in our 
sample there is a preliminary game in which contestants answer quiz questions, the 
winner of which gets to play the main game we study. One special feature of the Dutch 
edition is the existence of a “bail-out offer” at the end of the elimination game: just 
before a last, decisive question, the two remaining contestants can avoid losing and 
leaving empty-handed by accepting an unknown prize that is announced to be worth at 
least €20,000 (approximately 5 percent of the average prize in the main game) and 
typically turns out to be a prize such as a world trip or a car. If the more risk-averse pre-
finalists are more likely to exit the game at this stage, the Dutch finalists might be 
expected to be less risk averse on average. In the United States, contestants are not 
selected based on an elimination game but rather the producer selects each contestant 
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics. The table shows descriptive statistics for our sample of 
151 contestants from the Netherlands (51; panel A), Germany (47; panel B) and the United 
States (53; panel C). The contestants’ characteristics age and education are revealed in an 
introduction talk or in other conversations between the host and the contestant. Age is 
measured in years. Gender is a dummy variable with a value of one assigned to females. 
Education is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for contestants with a bachelor 
degree or higher (including students) or equivalent work experience. Stop Round is the 
round number in which the bank offer is accepted. The round numbers from the first series 
of German episodes are adjusted by +1 to correct for the lower initial number of briefcases 
and game rounds; for contestants who played the game to the end, the stop round is set 
equal to 10. Best Offer Rejected is the highest percentage bank offer the contestant chose to 
reject (“No Deal”). Offer Accepted is the percentage bank offer accepted by the contestant 
(“Deal”), or 100 percent for contestants who rejected all offers. Amount Won equals the 
accepted bank offer in monetary terms, or the prize in the contestant’s own briefcase for 
contestants who rejected all offers. 
 
 Mean Stdev Min Median Max
A. Netherlands (N = 51) 
Age (years) 45.31 11.51 21.00 43.00 70.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Stop Round 5.22 1.75 3.00 5.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 55.89 32.73 10.17 55.32 119.88
Offer Accepted (%) 76.27 30.99 20.77 79.29 165.50
Amount Won (€) 227,264.90 270,443.20 10.00 148,000.00 1,495,000.00
B. Germany (N = 47) 
Age (years) 36.47 8.17 20.00 35.00 55.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.34 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 8.21 1.53 5.00 8.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 89.07 33.90 37.31 88.22 190.40
Offer Accepted (%) 91.79 19.15 52.78 95.99 149.97
Amount Won (€) 20,602.56 25,946.69 0.01 14,700.00 150,000.00
C. United States (N = 53) 
Age (years) 34.98 10.03 22.00 33.00 76.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 7.70 1.29 5.00 8.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 80.98 17.57 44.04 83.52 112.00
Offer Accepted (%) 91.43 15.31 49.16 97.83 112.50
Amount Won ($) 122,544.58 119,446.18 5.00 94,000.00 464,000.00
 
 
individually, and the selection process appears to be based at least in part on the 
appearance and personalities of the contestants. (The Web site for the show tells 
prospective contestants to send a video of themselves and their proposed accompanying 
friends and relatives. The show also conducts open “casting calls”.) Contestants (and 
their friends) thus tend to be attractive and lively. Another concern is that richer and 
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more risk-seeking people may be more willing to spend time attempting to get onto 
large-stake editions than onto small-stake editions. To circumvent these problems, 
Section 1.7 complements the analysis of the TV shows with classroom experiments that 
use a homogeneous student population. 
 
1.4 Preliminary Analysis 
To get a first glimpse of the risk preferences in “Deal or No Deal”, we analyze the 
offers made by the banker and the contestants’ decisions to accept or reject these offers. 
Several notable features of the game can be seen in Table 1.2. First, the banker 
becomes more generous by offering higher percentages as the game progresses (“Rule 
2”). The offers typically start at a small fraction of the average prize and approach 100 
percent in the later rounds. The strong similarity between the percentages in the Dutch 
edition (panel A), the German edition (panel B) and the US edition (panel C) suggest 
that the banker behaves in a similar way across the three editions. (A spokesman from 
Endemol, the production company, confirmed that the guidelines for bank offers are the 
same for all three editions included in our sample.) The number of remaining 
contestants in every round clearly shows that the Dutch contestants tend to stop earlier 
and accept relatively lower bank offers than the German and US contestants do. Again, 
this may reflect the substantially larger stakes in the Dutch edition, or, alternatively, 
unobserved differences in risk aversion due to differences in wealth, culture or 
contestant selection procedure. Third, the contestants generally exhibit what might be 
called only “moderate” risk aversion. In the US and German sample, all contestants 
keep playing until the bank offer is at least half the expected value of the prizes in the 
unopened briefcases. In round 3 in the Netherlands, 20 percent of the contestants (10 out 
of 51) do accept deals that average only 36 percent of the expected value of the 
unopened briefcases, albeit at stakes that exceed €400,000. Many contestants turn down 
offers of 70 percent or more of amounts exceeding €100,000. Fourth, there can be wide 
discrepancies, even within a country, in the stakes that contestants face. In the Dutch 
show, contestants can be playing for many hundreds of thousands of Euros, down to a 
thousand or less. In the later rounds, the contestant is likely to face relatively small 
stakes, as a consequence of the skewness of the initial set of prizes. 
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Table 1.2: Bank offers and contestants’ decisions. The table shows summary statistics 
for the percentage bank offers and contestants’ decisions in our sample of 151 contestants 
from the Netherlands (51; panel A), Germany (47; panel B) and the United States (53; 
panel C). The average bank offer as a percentage of the average remaining prize (%BO), 
the average remaining prize in Euros (Stakes) and the number of contestants (No.) are 
reported for each game round (r = 1,⋅⋅⋅,9). The statistics are also shown separately for 
contestants accepting the bank offer (“Deal”) and for contestants rejecting the bank offer 
(“No Deal”). The round numbers from the first series of German episodes are adjusted by 
+1 to correct for the lower initial number of briefcases and game rounds. 
 
 Unconditional “Deal” “No Deal” 
Round %BO Stakes No. %BO Stakes No. %BO Stakes No. 
A. Netherlands (N = 51) 
1 6% 387,867 51 - - 0 6% 387,867 51 
2 14% 376,664 51 - - 0 14% 376,664 51 
3 34% 369,070 51 36% 409,802 10 33% 359,135 41 
4 61% 348,820 41 69% 394,860 11 58% 331,939 30 
5 77% 317,618 30 82% 557,680 7 76% 244,555 23 
6 88% 234,877 23 90% 237,416 12 87% 232,107 11 
7 98% 243,868 11 104% 414,106 6 91% 39,582 5 
8 96% 50,376 5 100% 78,401 3 90% 8,338 2 
9 106% 11,253 2 91% 17,500 1 120% 5,005 1 
B. Germany (N = 47) 
1 8% 24,277 27 - - 0 8% 24,277 27 
2 15% 24,915 47 - - 0 15% 24,915 47 
3 34% 23,642 47 - - 0 34% 23,642 47 
4 46% 21,218 47 - - 0 46% 21,218 47 
5 59% 22,304 47 59% 29,976 2 59% 21,963 45 
6 72% 20,557 45 67% 48,038 7 73% 15,494 38 
7 88% 15,231 38 85% 21,216 5 88% 14,324 33 
8 98% 15,545 33 91% 28,813 10 101% 9,776 23 
9 103% 14,017 23 109% 13,925 11 99% 14,101 12 
C. United States (N = 53) 
1 11% 152,551 53 - - 0 11% 152,551 53 
2 21% 151,885 53 - - 0 21% 151,885 53 
3 36% 147,103 53 - - 0 36% 147,103 53 
4 50% 148,299 53 - - 0 50% 148,299 53 
5 62% 148,832 53 79% 118,517 1 61% 150,434 52 
6 73% 150,549 52 74% 139,421 9 73% 152,879 43 
7 88% 154,875 43 91% 204,263 15 86% 128,416 28 
8 92% 114,281 28 96% 183,917 14 88% 44,644 14 
9 98% 39,922 14 99% 53,825 8 97% 21,384 6 
 
 
It is not apparent from this table what effect the particular path a player takes can 
have on the choices she makes. To give an example of the decisions faced by an 
unlucky player, consider poor Frank, who appeared in the Dutch episode of January 1, 
2005 (see Table 1.3). 
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Table 1.3: Example “Frank”. The table shows the gambles presented to a Dutch contes-
tant named Frank and the “Deal or No Deal” decisions made by him in game rounds 1 – 9. 
This particular episode was broadcast on January 1, 2005. For each game round, the table 
shows the remaining prizes, the average remaining prize, the bank offer, the percentage 
bank offer and the “Deal or No Deal” decision. Frank ended up with a prize of €10. 
 
Game Round (r) 
Prize (€) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0.01 X X        
0.20 X X        
0.50 X X X X X X X   
1 X X X X X     
5          
10 X X X X X X X X X 
20 X X X X X X X X  
50          
100          
500          
1,000 X         
2,500 X X X       
5,000 X X        
7,500          
10,000 X X X X X X X X X 
25,000 X X        
50,000 X X X X      
75,000 X X X       
100,000 X X X       
200,000 X X X X      
300,000 X         
400,000 X         
500,000 X X X X X X    
1,000,000 X         
2,500,000          
5,000,000 X         
Average (€) 383,427 64,502 85,230 95,004 85,005 102,006 2,508 3,343 5,005 
Offer (€) 17,000 8,000 23,000 44,000 52,000 75,000 2,400 3,500 6,000 
Offer (%) 4% 12% 27% 46% 61% 74% 96% 105% 120% 
Decision No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal
 
 
In round 7, after several unlucky picks, Frank opened the briefcase with the last 
remaining large prize (€500,000) and saw the expected prize tumble from €102,006 to 
€2,508. The banker then offered him €2,400, or 96 percent of the average remaining 
prize. Frank rejected this offer and play continued. In the subsequent rounds, Frank 
deliberately chose to enter unfair gambles, to finally end up with a briefcase worth only 
€10. Specifically, in round 8, he rejected an offer of 105 percent of the average 
remaining prize; in round 9, he even rejected a certain €6,000 in favor of a 50/50 
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gamble of €10 or €10,000. We feel confident to classify this last decision as risk-
seeking behavior, because it involves a single, simple, symmetric gamble with thou-
sands of Euros at stake. Also, unless we are willing to assume that Frank would always 
accept unfair gambles of this magnitude, the only reasonable explanation for his choice 
behavior seems to be a reaction to his misfortune experienced earlier in the game. 
In contrast, consider the exhilarating ride of Susanne, an extremely fortunate 
contestant who appeared in the German episode of August 23, 2006 (see Table 1.4). 
 
Table 1.4: Example “Susanne”. The table shows the gambles presented to a German 
contestant named Susanne and the “Deal or No Deal” decisions made by her in game 
rounds 1 – 9. This particular episode was broadcast on August 23, 2006. For each game 
round, the table shows the remaining prizes, the average remaining prize, the bank offer, 
the percentage bank offer, and the “Deal or No Deal” decision. Susanne ended up with a 
prize of €150,000. 
 
Game Round (r) 
Prize (€) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0.01 X X X X      
0.20 X X X       
0.50 X X X X X X X   
1          
5          
10          
20 X X        
50 X X        
100 X X X X      
200          
300 X X X       
400 X         
500          
1,000 X X X X X X X X  
2,500 X X X X X X    
5,000 X         
7,500          
10,000 X X        
12,500 X X X       
15,000 X         
20,000 X X        
25,000 X X X X X     
50,000 X         
100,000 X X X X X X X X X 
150,000 X X X X X X X X X 
250,000 X         
Average (€) 32,094 21,431 26,491 34,825 46,417 50,700 62,750 83,667 125,000
Offer (€) 3,400 4,350 10,000 15,600 25,000 31,400 46,000 75,300 125,000
Offer (%) 11% 20% 38% 45% 54% 62% 73% 90% 100% 
Decision No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal
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After a series of very lucky picks, she eliminated the last small prize of €1,000 in 
round 8. In round 9, she then faced a 50/50 gamble of €100,000 or €150,000, two of the 
three largest prizes in the German edition. While she was concerned and hesitant in the 
earlier game rounds, she decidedly rejected the bank offer of €125,000, the expected 
value of the gamble; a clear display of risk-seeking behavior and one that proved 
fortuitous in this case as she finally ended up winning €150,000. 
Thus both unlucky Frank and lucky Susanne exhibit very low levels of risk 
aversion, even risk-seeking, whereas most of the contestants in the shows are at least 
moderately risk averse. Frank’s behavior is consistent with a “break-even” effect, a 
willingness to gamble in order to get back to some perceived reference point. Susanne’s 
behavior is consistent with a “house-money” effect, an increased willingness to gamble 
when someone thinks she is playing with “someone else’s money”. 
To systematically analyze the effect of prior outcomes such as the extreme ones 
experienced by Frank and Suzanne, we first develop a rough classification of game 
situations in which the contestant is classified as a “loser” or a “winner”, and analyze 
the decisions of contestants in these categories separately. 
Our classification takes into account the downside risk and upside potential of 
rejecting the current bank offer. A contestant is a loser if her average remaining prize 
after opening one additional briefcase is low, even if the best-case scenario of 
eliminating the lowest remaining prize would occur. Using rx  for the current average, 
the average remaining prize in the best-case scenario is: 
 
(1.1) 
1
min
−
−=
r
rrr
r n
xxnBC  
 
where rn  stands for the number of remaining briefcases in game round 9,,1L=r  and 
min
rx  for the smallest remaining prize. Similarly, winners are classified by the average 
remaining prize in the worst-case scenario of eliminating the largest remaining prize, 
max
rx : 
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(1.2) 
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More specifically, we classify a contestant in a given game round as a “loser” if 
rBC  belongs to the worst one-third for all contestants in that game round and as a 
“winner” if rWC  belongs to the best one-third.
4 Game situations that satisfy neither of 
the two conditions (or both in rare occasions) are classified as “neutral”. 
Of course, there are numerous ways one could allocate players into winner and 
loser categories. The results we show are robust to other classification schemes, 
provided that the classification of winners accounts for the downside risk of continuing 
play: the house-money effect – a decreased risk aversion after prior gains – is weak if 
incremental losses can exceed prior gains. For example, partitioning on just the current 
average ( rx ) does not distinguish between situations with different dispersion around 
that average, and therefore takes no account of the downside risk of continuing play. 
Table 1.5 illustrates the effect of previous outcomes on the contestants’ choice 
behavior. We see that, compared to contestants who are in the neutral category, both 
winners and losers have a stronger tendency to continue play. While 31 percent of all 
“Deal or No Deal” choices in the neutral group are “Deal” in the Dutch sample, the 
“Deal” percentage is only 14 percent for losers – despite the generous offers they are 
presented (“Rule 4”). The low “Deal” percentage for losers suggests that risk aversion 
decreases when contestants have been unlucky in selecting which briefcases to open. In 
fact, the strong losers in our sample generally exhibit risk-seeking behavior by rejecting 
bank offers in excess of the average remaining prize. 
The low “Deal” percentage could be explained in part by the smaller stakes faced 
by losers and a lower risk aversion for small stakes, or increasing relative risk aversion 
(IRRA). However, the losers generally still have at least thousands or tens of thousands 
of Euros at stake and gambles of this magnitude are typically associated with risk 
aversion in other empirical studies (including other game show studies and experimental 
studies). Also, if the stakes explained the low risk aversion of losers, we would expect a 
 
                                                 
4 To account for the variation in the initial set of prizes within an edition (see Section 1.3), BCr and BWr 
are scaled by the initial average prize. 
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Table 1.5: “Deal or No Deal” decisions after bad and good fortune. The table 
summarizes the “Deal or No Deal” decisions for our sample of 151 contestants from the 
Netherlands (51; panel A), Germany (47; panel B) and the United States (53; panel C). The 
samples are split based on the fortune experienced by contestants during the game. A 
contestant is classified as a “loser” if her average remaining prize after eliminating the 
lowest remaining prize is among the worst one-third for all contestants in the same game 
round; she is a “winner” if the average after eliminating the largest remaining prize is 
among the best one-third. For each category and game round, the table displays the percen-
tage bank offer (%BO), the number of contestants (No.) and the percentage of contestants 
choosing “Deal” (%D). The round numbers from the first series of German episodes are 
adjusted by +1 to correct for the lower initial number of briefcases and game rounds. 
 
 Loser Neutral Winner 
Round %BO No. %D %BO No. %D %BO No. %D 
A. Netherlands (N = 51) 
1 6% 17 0% 6% 17 0% 6% 17 0% 
2 15% 17 0% 12% 17 0% 15% 17 0% 
3 40% 17 12% 29% 17 41% 31% 17 6% 
4 69% 14 14% 58% 13 46% 54% 14 21% 
5 82% 10 10% 71% 10 20% 78% 10 40% 
6 94% 8 50% 85% 7 43% 86% 8 63% 
7 99% 4 25% 97% 3 67% 99% 4 75% 
8 105% 1 0% 91% 3 67% 100% 1 100% 
9 120% 1 0% - 0 - 91% 1 100% 
2 - 9  72 14% 70 31% 72 25% 
B. Germany (N = 47) 
1 7% 9 0% 7% 9 0% 8% 9 0% 
2 16% 16 0% 13% 15 0% 14% 16 0% 
3 35% 16 0% 33% 15 0% 33% 16 0% 
4 46% 16 0% 44% 15 0% 47% 16 0% 
5 65% 16 0% 54% 15 13% 57% 16 0% 
6 83% 15 0% 67% 15 20% 66% 15 27% 
7 107% 13 0% 80% 12 25% 76% 13 15% 
8 117% 11 0% 89% 11 55% 86% 11 36% 
9 107% 8 38% 106% 7 57% 98% 8 50% 
2 - 9  111 3% 105 17% 111 13% 
C. United States (N = 53) 
1 9% 18 0% 10% 17 0% 13% 18 0% 
2 19% 18 0% 19% 17 0% 25% 18 0% 
3 41% 18 0% 29% 17 0% 39% 18 0% 
4 57% 18 0% 42% 17 0% 51% 18 0% 
5 69% 18 0% 55% 17 6% 62% 18 0% 
6 78% 18 11% 68% 16 31% 73% 18 11% 
7 92% 15 27% 87% 13 23% 84% 15 53% 
8 94% 9 22% 95% 10 70% 87% 9 56% 
9 92% 4 50% 101% 6 67% 99% 4 50% 
2 - 9  118 8% 113 18% 118 14% 
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higher risk aversion for winners. However, risk aversion seems to decrease when 
contestants are lucky and have eliminated low-value briefcases. The “Deal” percentage 
for winners is 25 percent, below the 31 percent for the neutral group. 
Interestingly, the same pattern arises in all three countries. The overall “Deal” 
percentages in the German and US editions are lower than in the Dutch edition, 
consistent with moderate IRRA and the substantially smaller stakes. Within every 
edition, however, the losers and winners have relatively low “Deal” percentages. 
These results suggest that prior outcomes are an important determinant of risky 
choice. This is inconsistent with the traditional interpretation of expected utility theory 
in which the preferences for a given choice problem do not depend on the path traveled 
before arriving at the choice problem. By contrast, path-dependence can be incorporated 
quite naturally in prospect theory. The lower risk aversion after misfortune is 
reminiscent of the break-even effect, or decision makers being more willing to take risks 
due to incomplete adaptation to previous losses. Similarly, the relatively low “Deal” 
percentage for winners is consistent with the house-money effect, or a lower risk 
aversion after earlier gains. 
Obviously, this preliminary analysis of “Deal” percentages is rather crude. It does 
not specify an explicit model of risky choice and it does not account for the precise 
choices (bank offers and remaining prizes) the contestants face. Furthermore, there is no 
attempt at statistical inference or controlling for confounding effects at this stage of our 
analysis. The next two sections use a structural choice model and a maximum-
likelihood methodology to analyze the “Deal or No Deal” choices in greater detail. 
 
1.5 Expected Utility Theory 
This section analyzes the observed “Deal or No Deal” choices with the standard 
expected utility of wealth theory. The choice of the appropriate class of utility functions 
is important, because preferences are evaluated on an interval from cents to millions. 
We do not want to restrict our analysis to a classical power or exponential utility 
function, because it seems too restrictive to assume constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) or constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) for this interval. To allow for the 
plausible combination of increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) and decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA), we employ a variant of the flexible expo-power family 
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of Saha (1993) that was used by Abdellaoui, Barrios and Wakker (2007) and by Holt 
and Laury (2002): 
 
(1.3) α
α β ))(exp(1)(
1−+−−= xWxu  
 
In this function, three parameters are unknown: the risk aversion coefficients α 
and β, and the initial wealth parameter W. The classical CRRA power function arises as 
the limiting case where 0→α  and the CARA exponential function arises as the special 
case where β = 0. Theoretically, the correct measure of wealth should be lifetime 
wealth, including the present value of future income. However, lifetime wealth is not 
observable and it is possible that contestants do not integrate their existing wealth with 
the payoffs of the game. Therefore, we include initial wealth as a free parameter in our 
model. 
We will estimate the three unknown parameters using a maximum likelihood 
procedure that measures the likelihood of the observed “Deal or No Deal” decisions 
based on the “stop value,” or the utility of the current bank offer, and the “continuation 
value,” or the expected utility of the unknown winnings when rejecting the offer. In a 
given round r, )( rxB  denotes the bank offer as a function of the set of remaining prizes 
rx . The stop value is simply: 
 
(1.4) ))(()( rr xBuxsv =  
 
Analyzing the continuation value is more complicated. We elaborate on the 
continuation value, the bank offer model and the estimation procedure below.  
 
Continuation Value 
The game involves multiple rounds and the continuation value has to account for 
the bank offers and optimal decisions in all later rounds. In theory, we can solve the 
entire dynamic optimization problem by means of backward induction, using Bellman’s 
principle of optimality. Starting with the ninth round, we can determine the optimal 
“Deal or No Deal” decision in each preceding game round, accounting for the possible 
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scenarios and the optimal decisions in subsequent rounds. This approach assumes, 
however, that the contestant takes into account all possible outcomes and decisions in 
all subsequent game rounds. Studies on backward induction in simple alternating-offers 
bargaining experiments suggest that subjects generally do only one or two steps of 
strategic reasoning and ignore further steps of the backward induction process; see, for 
example, Johnson et al. (2002) and Binmore et al. (2002). This pleads for assuming that 
the contestants adopt a simplified mental frame of the game. 
Our video material indeed suggests that contestants generally look only one round 
ahead. The game-show host tends to stress what will happen to the bank offer in the 
next round should particular briefcases be eliminated and the contestants themselves 
often comment that they will play “just one more round” (although they often change 
their minds and continue to play later on). We therefore assume a simple “myopic” 
frame. Using this frame, the contestant compares the current bank offer with the 
unknown offer in the next round, and ignores the option to continue play thereafter. 
Given the current set of prizes ( rx ), the statistical distribution of the set of prizes 
in the next round ( 1+rx ) is known: 
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for any given subset y of 1+rn  elements from rx . In words, the probability is simply one 
divided by the number of possible combinations of 1+rn  out of rn . Thus, using )( rxΧ  
for all such subsets, the continuation value for a myopic contestant is given by: 
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Given the cognitive burden of multi-stage induction, this frame seems the 
appropriate choice for this game. However, as a robustness check, we have also 
replicated our estimates using the rational model of full backward induction and have 
found that our parameter estimates and the empirical fit did not change materially. In 
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the early game rounds, when backward induction appears most relevant, the myopic 
model underestimates the continuation value. Still, the myopic model generally 
correctly predicts “No Deal”, because the expected bank offers usually increase 
substantially during the early rounds, so even the myopic continuation value is generally 
greater than the stop value. In the later game rounds, backward induction is of less 
importance, because fewer game rounds remain to be played and because the rate of 
increase in the expected bank offers slows down. For contestants who reach round nine, 
such as Frank and Susanne, the decision problem involves just one stage and the myopic 
model coincides with the rational model. The low propensity of losers and winners in 
later game rounds to “Deal” is therefore equally puzzling under the assumption of full 
backward induction. 
 
Bank Offers 
To apply the myopic model, we need to quantify the behavior of the banker. 
Section 1.2 discussed the bank offers in a qualitative manner. For a contestant who 
currently faces remaining prizes rx  and percentage bank offer rb  in game round 
9,,1L=r , we quantify this behavior using the following simple model: 
 
(1.7) 111 )( +++ = rrr xbxB  
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where ρ , 10 ≤≤ ρ , measures the speed at which the percentage offer goes to 100 
percent. Since myopic contestants are assumed to look just one round ahead, the model 
predicts the offer in the next round only. The bank offer in the first round needs not be 
predicted, because it is shown on the scoreboard when the first “Deal or No Deal” 
choice has to be made. 1010 )( xxB =  and 110 =b  refer to the prize in the contestant’s 
own briefcase. 
The model does not include an explicit premium for losers. However, before 
misfortune arises, the continuation value is driven mostly by the favorable scenarios and 
the precise percentage offers for unfavorable scenarios do not materially affect the 
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results. After bad luck, the premium is included in the current percentage and 
extrapolated to the next game round. 
For each edition, we estimate the value of ρ by fitting the model to the sample of 
percentage offers made to all contestants in all relevant game rounds using least squares 
regression analysis. The resulting estimates are very similar for each edition: 0.832 for 
the Dutch edition, 0.815 for the first German series, 0.735 for the second German series 
and 0.777 for the US shows. The model gives a remarkably good fit. Figure 1.3 
illustrates the goodness-of-fit by plotting the predicted bank offers against the actual 
offers. The results are highly comparable for the three editions in our study and 
therefore the figure shows the pooled results. For each individual sample, the model 
explains well over 70 percent of the total variation in the individual percentage offers. 
The explanatory power is even higher for monetary offers, with an R-squared of roughly 
95 percent for each sample. Arguably, accurate monetary offers are more relevant for 
accurate risk aversion estimates than accurate percentage offers, because the favorable 
scenarios with high monetary offers weigh heavily on expected utility. On the other 
hand, to analyze risk behavior following the elimination of the largest prizes, accurate 
estimates for low monetary offers are also needed. It is therefore comforting that the fit 
is good in terms of both percentages and monetary amounts. In addition, if ρ is used as a 
free parameter in our structural choice models, the optimal values are approximately the 
same as our estimates, further confirming the goodness. 
Since the principle behind the bank offers becomes clear after seeing a few shows, 
the bank offer model (7) – (8) is treated as deterministic and known to the contestants. 
Using a stochastic bank offer model would introduce an extra layer of uncertainty, 
yielding lower continuation values. For losers, the bank offers are hardest to predict, 
making it even more difficult to rationalize why these contestants continue play. 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
In the spirit of Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963), and Hey and Orme (1994), 
we assume that the “Deal or No Deal” decision of a given contestant Ni ,,1L=  in a 
given game round 9,,1L=r  is based on the difference between the continuation value 
and the stop value, or )()( ,, riri xsvxcv − , plus some error. The errors are treated as 
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A. Percentage bank offers 
 
 
 
B. Monetary bank offers 
 
 
Figure 3: Predicted bank offers versus actual bank offers. The figure displays the 
goodness of our bank offer model by plotting the predicted bank offers versus the actual 
bank offers for all relevant game rounds in our pooled sample of 151 contestants from the 
Netherlands, Germany and the United States. Panel A shows the fit for the percentage bank 
offers and panel B shows the fit for the monetary bank offers (in Euros). A 45-degree line 
(perfect fit) is added for ease of interpretation. 
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independent, normally distributed random variables with zero mean and standard 
deviation ri,σ . Arguably, the error standard deviation should be higher for difficult 
choices than for simple choices. A natural indicator of the difficulty of a decision is the 
standard deviation of the utility of the outcomes used to compute the continuation value: 
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We assume that the error standard deviation is proportional to this indicator, that 
is, σδσ )( ,, riri x= , where σ is a constant noise parameter. As a result of this 
assumption, the simple choices effectively receive a larger weight in the analysis than 
the difficult ones. We also investigated the data without weighting. The (unreported) 
results show that the overall fit in the three samples deteriorates. In addition, without 
weighting, the estimated noise parameters in the three editions strongly diverge, with 
the Dutch edition having a substantially higher noise level than the German and US 
editions. The increase in the noise level seems to reflect the higher difficulty of the 
decisions in the Dutch edition relative to the German and US editions; contestants in the 
Dutch edition typically face (i) larger stakes because of the large initial prizes and (ii) 
more remaining prizes because they exit the game at an earlier stage. The standard 
deviation of the outcomes (9) picks up these two factors. The deterioration of the fit and 
the divergence of the estimated noise levels provide additional, empirical arguments for 
our weighting scheme. 
Given these assumptions, we may compute the likelihood of the “Deal or No 
Deal” decision as: 
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where )(⋅Φ  is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.5 
Aggregating the likelihood across contestants, the overall log-likelihood function 
of the “Deal or No Deal” decisions is given by: 
 
(1.11) ∑∑
= =
=
N
i
R
r
ri
i
xlL
1 2
, ))(ln()ln(  
 
where Ri is the last game round played by contestant i. 
To allow for the possibility that the errors of individual contestants are correlated, 
we perform a cluster correction on the standard errors (see, for example, Wooldridge, 
2003). Note that the summation starts in the second game round (r = 2). The early 
German episodes with only eight game rounds effectively start in this game round and 
in order to align these episodes with the rest of the sample, we exclude the first round 
(r = 1) of the editions with nine game rounds. Due to the very conservative bank offers, 
the choices in the first round are always trivial (no contestant in our sample ever said 
“Deal”); including these choices does not affect the results, but it would falsely make 
the early German episodes look more “noisy” than the rest of the sample. 
The unknown parameters in our model (α, β, W, and σ) are selected to maximize 
the overall log-likelihood. To determine if the model works significantly better than a 
naïve model of risk neutrality, we perform a likelihood ratio test. 
 
Results 
Table 1.6 summarizes our estimation results. Apart from coefficient estimates and 
p-values, we have also computed the implied certainty equivalent as a fraction of the 
expected value, or certainty coefficient (CC), for 50/50 gambles of €0 or €10z, z = 
1,···,6. These values help to interpret the coefficient estimates by illustrating the shape 
of the utility function. Notably, the CC can be interpreted as the critical bank offer (as a 
fraction of the expected value of the 50/50 gamble) that would make the contestant 
                                                 
5 This error model allows for violations of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). The probability of 
“Deal” is predicted to be larger than zero and smaller than unity, even when the bank offer is smaller than 
the smallest outcome (“No Deal” dominates “Deal”) or larger than the largest outcome (“Deal” dominates 
“No Deal”). As pointed out by an anonymous referee, a truncated error model can avoid such violations 
of FSD. In our data set, however, the bank offer is always substantially larger than the smallest and 
substantially smaller than the largest outcome, and violations of FSD do not occur. 
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indifferent between “Deal” and “No Deal”. If CC = 1, the contestant is risk neutral. 
When CC > 1, the contestant is risk seeking, and as CC approaches zero, the contestant 
becomes extremely risk averse. To help interpret the goodness of the model, we have 
added the “hit percentage”, or the percentage of correctly predicted “Deal or No Deal” 
decisions. 
In the Dutch sample, the risk aversion parameters α and β are both significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that IRRA and DARA are relevant and the classical 
CRRA power function and CARA exponential function are too restrictive to explain the 
choices in this game show. The estimated wealth level of €75,203 significantly exceeds 
zero. Still, given that the median Dutch household income is roughly €25,000 per 
annum, the initial wealth level seems substantially lower than lifetime wealth and inte-
gration seems incomplete. This deviates from the classical approach of defining utility 
over wealth and is more in line with utility of income or the type of narrow framing that 
is typically assumed in prospect theory. A low wealth estimate is also consistent with 
Rabin’s (2000) observation that plausible risk aversion for small and medium outcomes 
implies implausibly strong risk aversion for large outcomes if the outcomes are 
integrated with lifetime wealth. Indeed, the estimates imply near risk neutrality for small 
stakes, witness the CC of 0.994 for a 50/50 gamble of €0 or €1,000, and increasing the 
wealth level would imply near risk neutrality for even larger gambles. 
Rabin’s point is reinforced by comparing our results for large stakes with the 
laboratory experiments conducted by Holt and Laury (2002) using the lower stakes 
typical in the lab. Holt and Laury’s subjects display significant risk aversion for modest 
stakes, which, as Rabin notes, implies extreme risk aversion for much larger stakes – 
behavior our contestants do not display. Indeed, contestants with Holt and Laury’s 
parameter estimates for the utility function would generally accept a “Deal” in the first 
game round, in contrast to the actual behavior we observe. We conclude, agreeing with 
Rabin, that expected utility of wealth models have difficulty explaining behavior for 
both small and large stakes. 
The model also does not seem flexible enough to explain the choices for losers 
and winners simultaneously. The estimated utility function exhibits very strong IRRA, 
leading to an implausibly low CC of 0.141 for a 50/50 gamble of €0 or €1,000,000. 
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Table 1.6: Expected utility theory results. The table displays the estimation results of 
expected utility theory for our sample of 151 contestants from The Netherlands (51), 
Germany (47) and the United States (53). Shown are maximum likelihood estimators for 
the α and β parameters and the wealth level (W, in Euros) of the utility function (3), and the 
noise parameter σ. The table also shows the overall mean log-likelihood (MLL), the 
likelihood ratio (LR) relative to the naïve model of risk neutrality, the percentage of 
correctly predicted “Deal or No Deal” decisions (Hits), and the total number of “Deal or No 
Deal” decisions in the sample (No.). Finally, the implied certainty coefficient (CC; certainty 
equivalent as a fraction of the expected value) is shown for 50/50 gambles of €0 or €10z, 
z = 1,···,6. p-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Netherlands Germany United States 
α 0.424 (0.000) 1.58e-5 (0.049) 4.18e-5 (0.000) 
β 0.791 (0.000) 0.000 (1.000) 0.171 (0.000) 
W 75,203 (0.034) 544 (0.481) 101,898 (0.782) 
σ 0.428 (0.000) 0.467 (0.000) 0.277 (0.000) 
MLL -0.365  -0.340  -0.260  
LR 24.29 (0.000) 3.95 (0.267) 15.10 (0.002) 
Hits 76% 85% 89%  
No. 214  327  349  
CC (0/101) 1.000 1.000 1.000  
CC (0/102) 0.999 1.000 1.000  
CC (0/103) 0.994 0.996 0.998  
CC (0/104) 0.946 0.960 0.984  
CC (0/105) 0.637 0.640 0.859  
CC (0/106) 0.141 0.088 0.302  
 
 
Indeed, the model errs by predicting that winners would stop earlier than they actually 
do. If risk aversion increases with stakes, winners are predicted to have a stronger 
propensity to accept a bank offer, the opposite of what we observe; witness for example 
the “Deal” percentages in Table 1.5. However, strong IRRA is needed in order to 
explain the behavior of losers, who reject generous bank offers and continue play even 
with tens of thousands of Euros at stake. Still, the model does not predict risk seeking at 
small stakes; witness the CC of 0.946 for a 50/50 gamble of €0 or €10,000 – roughly 
Frank’s risky choice in round 9. Thus, the model also errs by predicting that losers 
would stop earlier than they actually do. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients for the German edition are quite different 
from the Dutch values. The optimal utility function reduces to the CARA exponential 
function (β = 0) and the estimated initial wealth level becomes insignificantly different 
from zero. Still, on the observed domain of prizes, the two utility functions exhibit a 
similar pattern of unreasonably strong IRRA and high risk aversion for winners. Again, 
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the model errs by predicting that losers and winners would stop earlier than they 
actually do. These errors are so substantial in this edition that the fit of the expected 
utility model is not significantly better than the fit of a naive model that assumes that all 
contestants are risk neutral and simply “Deal” whenever the bank offer exceeds the 
average remaining prize. 
Contrary to the Dutch and German utility functions, the US utility function 
approximates the limiting case of the CRRA power function (α ≈ 0). The CC is again 
very high for small stakes. For larger stakes, the coefficient decreases but at a slower 
pace than in the other two countries, reflecting the relatively low propensity to “Deal” 
for US contestants with relatively large amounts at stake. The decreasing pattern stems 
from the estimated initial wealth level of €101,898, which yields near risk neutrality for 
small stakes. Still, initial wealth is not significantly different from zero, because a 
similar pattern can be obtained if we lower the value of beta relative to alpha and move 
in the direction of the CARA exponential function. 
To further illustrate the effect of prior outcomes, Table 1.7 shows separate results 
for losers and winners (as defined in Section 1.4). Confirming the low “Deal” percen-
tages found earlier, the losers and winners are less risk averse and have higher CCs than 
the neutral group. The losers are in fact best described by a model of risk seeking, which 
is not surprising given that the losers in our sample often reject bank offers in excess of 
the average remaining prize. The same pattern arises in each of the three editions, 
despite sizeable differences in the set of prizes. For example, the Dutch losers on 
average face larger stakes than the contestants in the US and German neutral groups. 
Still, risk seeking (CC > 1) arises only in the loser group. Overall, these results suggest 
that the expected utility model fails to capture the strong effect of previous outcomes. 
 
1.6 Prospect Theory 
In this section, we use prospect theory to analyze the observed “Deal or No Deal” 
choices. Contestants are assumed to have a narrow focus and evaluate the outcomes in 
the game without integrating their initial wealth – a typical assumption in prospect 
theory. Furthermore, we will again use the myopic frame that compares the current bank 
offer with the unknown offer in the next round. Although myopia is commonly assumed 
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Table 1.7: Path dependence. The table shows the maximum likelihood estimation results 
of expected utility theory for our sample of 151 contestants from the Netherlands (51; panel 
A), Germany (47; panel B) and the United States (53; panel C). The samples are split based 
on the fortune experienced during the game. A contestant is classified as a “loser” 
(“winner”) if her average remaining prize after eliminating the lowest (highest) remaining 
prize is among the worst (best) one-third for all contestants in the same game round. The 
results are presented in a format similar to the full-sample results in Table 1.6. 
 
 Loser Neutral Winner 
A. Netherlands 
α -244.904 (0.022) 0.044 (0.204) 0.125 (0.831) 
β 0.993 (0.000) 0.687 (0.000) 0.736 (0.011) 
W 0 (1.000) 304 (0.671) 3,061 (0.824) 
σ 0.627 (0.000) 0.323 (0.000) 0.309 (0.000) 
MLL -0.300  -0.383  -0.325  
Hits 89%  81%  83%  
No. 72  70  72  
CC (0/101) 1.330 0.994 0.999  
CC (0/102) 1.338 0.945 0.992  
CC (0/103) 1.347 0.723 0.928  
CC (0/104) 1.355 0.392 0.630  
CC (0/105) 1.363 0.150 0.216  
CC (0/106) 1.371 0.032 0.035  
B. Germany 
α -7.914 (0.117) 0.364 (0.000) 0.087 (0.000) 
β 0.814 (0.000) 0.759 (0.000) 0.651 (0.000) 
W 930 (0.825) 50,926 (0.481) 113,582 (0.180) 
σ 0.659 (0.000) 0.241 (0.000) 0.454 (0.000) 
MLL -0.276  -0.257  -0.278  
Hits 90%  87%  88%  
No. 111  105  111  
CC (0/101) 1.012 1.000 1.000  
CC (0/102) 1.113 0.999 0.999  
CC (0/103) 1.584 0.990 0.995  
CC (0/104) 1.823 0.911 0.949  
CC (0/105) 1.891 0.485 0.614  
CC (0/106) 1.929 0.072 0.101  
C. United States 
α -203.512 (0.006) 1.96e-5 (0.000) 0.938 (0.000) 
β 0.995 (0.000) 0.086 (0.000) 0.998 (0.000) 
W 54 (0.691) 934,904 (0.331) 29,468 (0.107) 
σ 0.193 (0.000) 0.308 (0.000) 0.326 (0.000) 
MLL -0.194  -0.275  -0.253  
Hits 92%  86%  91%  
No. 118  113  118  
CC (0/101) 1.004 1.000 1.000  
CC (0/102) 1.023 1.000 0.999  
CC (0/103) 1.054 0.999 0.992  
CC (0/104) 1.071 0.986 0.927  
CC (0/105) 1.081 0.863 0.646  
CC (0/106) 1.089 0.252 0.289  
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in prospect theory, the choice of the relevant frame in this game is actually more 
important than for expected utility theory. As discussed in Section 1.5, the myopic 
frame seems appropriate for expected utility theory. For prospect theory, however, it 
can be rather restrictive. Prospect theory allows for risk-seeking behavior when in the 
domain of losses and risk seekers have a strong incentive to look ahead multiple game 
rounds to allow for the possibility of winning the largest remaining prize. Indeed, 
contestants who reject high bank offers often explicitly state that they are playing for the 
largest remaining prize (rather than a large amount offered by the banker offer in the 
next round). Preliminary computations revealed that prospect theory generally performs 
better if we allow contestants to look ahead multiple game rounds. The improvements 
are limited, however, because risk seeking typically arises at the end of the game. At 
that stage, only a few or no further game rounds remain and the myopic model then 
gives a good approximation. Thus, we report only the results with the myopic model in 
order to be consistent with the previous analysis using expected utility theory. 
The stop value and continuation value for prospect theory are defined in the same 
way as for expected utility theory, with the only difference that the expo-power utility 
function (1.3) is replaced by the prospect theory value function, which is defined on 
changes relative to some reference point: 
 
(1.12) 
⎩⎨
⎧
>−
≤−−=
RPxRPx
RPxxRP
RPxv α
αλ
)(
)(
)|(  
 
where 0>λ  is the loss-aversion parameter, RP  is the reference point that separates 
losses from gains, and 0>α  measures the curvature of the value function. The original 
formulation of prospect theory allows for different curvature parameters for the domain 
of losses ( RPx ≤ ) and the domain of gains ( RPx > ). To reduce the number of free 
parameters, we assume here that the curvature is equal for both domains.6 
 
                                                 
6 Empirical curvature estimates are often very similar for gains and losses. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), for example, find a median value of 0.88 for both domains. Furthermore, the curvature needs to 
be the same for both domains in order to be consistent with the definition of loss aversion; see Köbberling 
and Wakker (2005). 
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Reference Point Specification 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) original treatment of prospect theory equates the 
reference point with the status quo. Since “Deal or No Deal” contestants never have to 
pay money out of their own pockets, the reference point would then equal zero and 
contestants would never experience any losses. Kahneman and Tversky recognize, 
however, that “there are situations in which gains and losses are coded relative to an 
expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo” (286). They point out 
that “a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that 
would be unacceptable to him otherwise” (287). This point is elaborated by Thaler and 
Johnson (1990), though neither team offers a formal model of how the reference point 
changes over time. One recent effort along these lines is by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 
2007). 
The specification of the subjective reference point (or the underlying set of 
expectations) and how it varies during the game is crucial for our analysis, as it 
determines whether outcomes enter as gain or loss in the value function and with what 
magnitude. Slow adjustment or stickiness of the reference point can yield break-even 
and house-money effects, or a lower risk aversion after losses and after gains. If the 
reference point adjusts slowly after losses, relatively many remaining outcomes are 
placed in the domain of losses, where risk seeking applies. Similarly, if the reference 
point sticks to an earlier, less favorable value after gains, relatively many remaining 
prizes are placed in the domain of gains, reducing the role of loss aversion. 
Figure 1.4 illustrates these two effects using a 50/50 gamble of €25,000 or 
€75,000. Contestants in “Deal or No Deal” face this type of gamble in round 9. The 
figure shows the value function using the parameter estimates of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), or α = 0.88 and λ = 2.25, and three alternative specifications for the 
reference point. In a neutral situation without prior outcomes, the reference point may 
equal the expected value (RPN = €50,000). In this case, the contestant frames the gamble 
as losing €25,000 (€50,000 − €25,000) or winning €25,000 (€75,000 − €50,000). The 
certainty equivalent of the gamble is CEN = €44,169, meaning that bank offers below 
this level would be rejected and higher offers would be accepted. The risk premium of 
€5,831 is caused by loss aversion, which assigns a larger weight to losses than to gains. 
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Figure 1.4: Break-even and house-money effects in prospect theory. The figure displays 
the prospect value function (1.12) for three different levels of the reference point (RP) and 
the associated certainty equivalents (CEs) for a 50/50 gamble of €25,000 or €75,000. Value 
function vN(x|50,000) refers to a neutral situation with RPN = €50,000 and CEN = €44,169, 
vW(x|25,000) to a winner with RPW = €25,000 and CEW = €47,745, and vL(x|75,000) to a 
loser with RPL = €75,000 and CEL = €52,255. All three value functions are based on the 
parameter estimates of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), or α = 0.88 and λ = 2.25. The 
crosses indicate the certainty equivalents for the 50/50 gamble. 
 
 
Now consider contestant L, who initially faced much larger stakes than €50,000 
and incurred large losses before arriving at the 50/50 gamble in round 9. Suppose that L 
slowly adjusts to these earlier losses and places his reference point at the largest 
remaining prize (RPL = €75,000). In this case, L does not frame the gamble as losing 
€25,000 or winning €25,000 but rather as losing €50,000 (€75,000 – €25,000) or 
breaking even (€75,000 – €75,000). Both prizes are placed in the domain of losses 
where risk seeking applies. Indeed, L would reject all bank offers below the certainty 
equivalent of the gamble, CEL = €52,255, which implies a negative risk premium of 
€2,255. 
x
v (x )
75,00025,000
v W (x| 25,000)
v N (x |50,000)
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Finally, consider contestant W, who initially faced much smaller stakes than 
€50,000 and incurred large gains before arriving at the 50/50 gamble. Due to slow 
adjustment, W employs a reference point equal to the smallest remaining prize (RPW = 
€25,000) and places both remaining prizes in the domain of gains. In this case, W 
frames the gamble as one of either breaking even (€25,000 – €25,000) or gaining 
€50,000 (€75,000 – €25,000). Since loss aversion does not apply in the domain of gains, 
the risk aversion of W is lower than in the neutral case and W would reject all bank 
offers below CEW = €47,745, implying a risk premium of €2,255, less than the value of 
€5,831 in the neutral case. 
It should be clear from the examples above that a proper specification of the 
reference point and its dynamics is essential for our analysis. In fact, without slow 
adjustment, prospect theory does not yield the path-dependence found in this study. 
Unfortunately, the reference point is not directly observable and prospect theory alone 
provides minimal guidance for selecting the relevant specification. We therefore need to 
give the model some freedom and rely on the data to inform us about the relevant 
specification. To reduce the risk of data mining and to simplify the interpretation of the 
results, we develop a simple structural model based on elementary assumptions and 
restrictions for the reference point. 
If contestants were confronted with the isolated problem of choosing between the 
current bank offer and the risky bank offer in the next round, it would seem natural to 
link the reference point to the current bank offer. The bank offer represents the sure 
alternative and the opportunity cost of the risky alternative. Furthermore, the bank offer 
is linked to the average remaining prize and therefore to current expectations regarding 
future outcomes. A simple specification would be RPr = θ1 B(xr). If θ1 = 0, then the 
reference point equals the status quo (RPr = 0) and all possible outcomes are evaluated 
as gains; if θ1 > 0, the reference point is strictly positive and contestant may experience 
(paper) losses, even though they never have to pay money out of their own pockets. A 
reference point below the current bank offer, or θ1 < 1, is conservative (pessimistic) in 
the sense that relatively few possible bank offers in the next round are classified as 
losses and relatively many possible outcomes are classified as gains. By contrast, an 
“optimistic” reference point, or θ1 > 1, involves relatively many possible losses and few 
possible gains. 
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The actual game is dynamic and the bank offer changes in every round, 
introducing the need to update the reference point. Due to slow adjustment, however, 
the reference point may be affected by earlier game situations. We may measure the 
effect of outcomes after earlier round j, 0 ≤ j < r, by the relative increase in the average 
remaining prize, or rjrjr xxxd /)()( −= . For j = 0, )( jrd  measures the change relative to 
the initial average, or 0x . 
Ideally, our model would include this measure for all earlier game rounds (and 
possibly also interaction terms). However, due to the strong correlation between the 
lagged terms and the limited number of observations, we have to limit the number of 
free parameters. We restrict ourselves to just two terms: )2( −rrd  and )0(rd . The term 
)2( −r
rd  is the longest fixed lag that can be included for all observations (our analysis 
starts in the second round) and measures recent changes; )0(rd , or the longest variable 
lag, captures all changes relative to the initial game situation. Adding these two lagged 
terms to the static model, our dynamic model for the reference point is: 
 
(1.13) )()( )0(3)2(21 rrrrr xBddRP θθθ ++= −  
 
In this model, θ2 < 0 or θ3 < 0 implies that the reference points sticks to earlier 
values and that it is higher than the neutral value θ1B(xr) after decreases in the average 
remaining prize and lower after increases. 
It is not immediately clear how strong the adjustment would be, or if the 
adjustment parameters would be constant, but it seems realistic to assume that the 
adjustment is always sufficiently strong to ensure that the reference point is feasible in 
the next round, i.e., not lower than the smallest possible bank offer and not higher than 
the largest possible bank offer. We therefore truncate the reference point at the 
minimum and maximum bank offer, i.e. )(max)(min
)()(
yBRPyB
rr xy
rxy Χ∈Χ∈
≤≤ . This truncation 
improves the empirical fit of our model and the robustness to the specification of the 
reference point and its dynamics. 
Our complete prospect theory model involves five free parameters: loss aversion 
λ, curvature α, and the three parameters of the reference point model θ1, θ2 and θ3. We 
estimate these parameters and the noise parameter σ with the same maximum likelihood 
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procedure used for the expected utility analysis. We also apply the same bank offer 
model. 
Our analysis ignores subjective probability transformation and uses the true 
probabilities as decision weights. The fit of prospect theory could improve if we allow 
for probability transformation. If losers have a sticky reference point and treat all 
possible outcomes as losses, they will overweight the probability of the smallest 
possible loss, strengthening the risk seeking that stems from the convexity of the value 
function in the domain of losses. For example, applying the Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) weighting function and parameter estimates to a gamble with two equally likely 
losses, the decision weight of the smallest loss is 55 percent rather than 50 percent. Still, 
we prefer to focus on the effect of the reference point in this study and we ignore 
probability weighting for the sake of parsimony. This simplification is unlikely to be 
material, especially in the most important later rounds, when the relevant probabilities 
are medium to large and the decision weights would be relatively close to the actual 
probabilities (as illustrated by the 50/50 gamble). 
 
Results 
Table 1.8 summarizes our results. For the Dutch edition, the curvature and loss 
aversion parameters are significantly different from unity. The curvature of the value 
function is needed to explain why some contestants reject bank offers in excess of the 
average remaining prize; loss aversion explains why the average contestant accepts a 
bank offer below the average prize. Both parameters take values that are comparable 
with the typical results in experimental studies. Indeed, setting these parameters equal to 
the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) parameter values does not change our conclusions. 
The parameter θ1 is significantly larger than zero, implying that contestants do 
experience (paper) losses, consistent with the idea that the reference point is based on 
expectations and that diminished expectations represent losses. The parameter is also 
significantly smaller than unity, indicating that the reference point generally takes a 
conservative value below the current bank offer. 
The adjustment parameters θ2 and θ3 are significantly smaller than zero, meaning 
that the reference point tends to stick to earlier values and is higher than the neutral 
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Table 1.8: Prospect theory results. The table shows the estimation results of prospect 
theory for our sample of 151 contestants from The Netherlands (51), Germany (47) and the 
United States (53). Shown are maximum likelihood estimators for the loss aversion (λ) and 
curvature (α) of the value function, the three parameters of the reference point model θ1, θ2 
and θ3, and the noise parameter σ. The table also shows the overall mean log-likelihood 
(MLL), the likelihood ratio (LR) relative to the naïve model of risk neutrality, the 
percentage of correctly predicted “Deal or No Deal” decisions (Hits), and the total number 
of “Deal or No Deal” decisions in the sample (No.). p-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Netherlands Germany United States 
λ 2.375 (0.013) 4.501 (0.008) 4.528 (0.001) 
α 0.516 (0.000) 0.486 (0.000) 0.836 (0.000) 
θ1 0.474 (0.000) 1.096 (0.000) 1.163 (0.000) 
θ2 -0.285 (0.000) -0.026 (0.000) 0.031 (0.329) 
θ3 -0.028 (0.000) -0.052 (0.000) -0.093 (0.023) 
σ 0.345 (0.000) 0.533 (0.000) 0.193 (0.000) 
MLL -0.309  -0.303  -0.228  
LR 48.41 (0.000) 27.44 (0.000) 37.28 (0.000) 
Hits 85% 89% 91%  
No. 214  327  349  
 
 
value after losses and lower after gains. In magnitude, θ2 is much larger than θ3, 
suggesting that the effect of recent outcomes is much stronger than the effect of initial 
expectations. However, the changes in the average remaining prize during the last two 
game rounds are generally much smaller than the changes during the entire game, 
limiting the effect of the parameter value. In addition, in case of large changes, the 
reference point often falls outside the range of feasible outcomes. In these cases, the 
reference point is set equal to the smallest or largest possible bank offer (see above), 
further limiting the effect of the parameter value. 
The slow adjustment of the reference point lowers the propensity of losers and 
winners to “Deal”. Not surprisingly, the prospect theory model yields substantially 
smaller errors for losers and winners and the overall log-likelihood is significantly 
higher than for the expected utility model. While the expected utility model correctly 
predicted 76 percent of the “Deal or No Deal” decisions, the hit percentage of the 
prospect theory model is 85 percent. 
The results for the German and US samples are somewhat different from the 
results for the Dutch sample, but still confirm the important role of slow adjustment. 
The difference seems related to the relatively large stakes and the associated high 
propensity to “Deal” in the Dutch edition. In the German and US samples, the reference 
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point is substantially higher in relative terms than in the Dutch sample. The relatively 
high reference point helps explain why the German and US contestants stop in later 
rounds and demand higher percentage bank offers than the Dutch contestants. Relatively 
many outcomes are placed in the domain of losses, where risk seeking applies. In such a 
situation, a relatively strong loss aversion is needed to explain “Deals”. Indeed, the loss 
aversion estimates are substantially higher than for the Dutch sample. Again, stickiness 
is highly significant. However, the most recent outcomes seem less important and the 
reference point now sticks primarily to the initial situation. This seems related to the 
German and US contestants on average playing more game rounds than the Dutch con-
testants. In later rounds, many briefcases have already been opened, but relatively few 
briefcases have been opened in the last few rounds. The last two game rounds played in 
the German and US edition therefore generally reveal less information than in the Dutch 
edition. The model again materially reduces the errors for losers and winners and fits 
the data significantly better than the expected utility model in these two samples. 
The results are consistent with our earlier finding that the losers and winners have 
a low propensity to “Deal” (see Table 1.5). Clearly, prospect theory with a dynamic but 
sticky reference point is a plausible explanation for this path-dependent pattern. Still, we 
stress that our analysis of prospect theory serves merely to explore and illustrate one 
possible explanation, and that it leaves several questions unanswered. For example, we 
have assumed homogeneous preferences and no subjective probability transformation. 
The empirical fit may improve even further if we would allow for heterogeneous 
preferences and probability weighting. Further improvements may come from allowing 
for a different curvature in the domains of losses and gains, from allowing for different 
partial adjustment after gains and losses, and from stakes-dependent curvature and loss 
aversion. We leave these issues for further research. 
 
1.7 Experiments 
The previous sections have demonstrated the strong effect of prior outcomes or 
path-dependence of risk attitudes. Also, the amounts at stake seem to be important, with 
a stronger propensity to deal for larger stakes levels. Prior outcomes and stakes are, 
however, highly confounded within every edition of the game show: unfavorable 
outcomes (opening high-value briefcases) lower the stakes and favorable outcomes 
(opening low-value briefcases) raise the stakes. The stronger the effect of stakes, the 
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easier it is to explain the weak propensity to “Deal” of losers, but the more difficult it is 
to explain the low “Deal” percentage of winners. To analyze the isolated effect of the 
amounts at stake, we conduct a series of classroom experiments in which students at 
Erasmus University play “Deal or No Deal”. We consider two variations to the same 
experiment that use monetary amounts that differ by a factor of ten, but draw from the 
same student population. 
Both experiments use real monetary payoffs to avoid incentive problems (see, for 
example, Holt and Laury, 2002). In order to compare the choices in the experiments 
with those in the original TV show and to provide a common basis for comparisons 
between the two experiments, each experiment uses the original scenarios from the 
Dutch edition.7 At the time of the experiments, only the first 40 episodes are available. 
The original monetary amounts are scaled down by a factor of 1,000 or 10,000, with the 
smallest amounts rounded up to one cent. Despite the strong scaling, the resulting stakes 
are still unusually high for experimental research. Although the scenarios are 
predetermined, the subjects are not “deceived” in the sense that the game is not 
manipulated to encourage or avoid particular situations or behaviors. Rather, the 
subjects are randomly assigned to a scenario generated by chance at an earlier point in 
time (in the original episode). The risk that the students would recognize the original 
episodes seems small, because the scenarios are not easy to remember and the original 
episodes are broadcast at least six months earlier. Indeed, the experimental “Deal or No 
Deal” decisions are statistically unrelated to which of the remaining prizes is in the 
contestant’s own briefcase. 
We replicate the original game show as closely as possible in a classroom, using a 
game show host (a popular lecturer at Erasmus University) and live audience (the 
student subjects and our research team). Video cameras are pointed at the contestant, 
recording all her actions. The game situation (unopened briefcases, remaining prizes 
and bank offers) is displayed on a computer monitor in front of the stage (for the host 
and the contestant) and projected on a large screen in front of the classroom (for the 
audience). This setup is intended to create the type of distress that contestants must 
experience in the TV studio. Our approach seems effective, because the audience is very 
                                                 
7 Original prizes and offers are not available when a subject continues play after a “Deal” in the TV 
episode. The “missing outcomes” for the prizes are selected randomly (but held constant across the 
experiments), and the bank offers are set according to the pattern observed in the original episodes. 
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excited and enthusiastic during the experiment, applauding and shouting hints, and most 
contestants show clear symptoms of distress. 
All our subjects are students, about 20 years of age. A total of 160 business or 
economics students are randomly selected from a larger population of students at 
Erasmus University who applied to participate in experiments during the academic year 
2005 – 2006. Although each experiment requires only 40 subjects, 80 students are 
invited to guarantee a large audience and to ensure that a sufficient number of subjects 
are available in the event that some subjects do not show up. Thus, approximately half 
of the students are selected to play the game. To control for a possible gender effect, we 
ensure that the gender of the subjects matches the gender of the contestants in the 
original episodes. 
At the beginning of both experiments we hand out the instructions to each subject, 
consisting of the original instructions to contestants in the TV show plus a cover sheet 
explaining our experiment. Next, the games start. Each individual game lasts about 5 to 
10 minutes, and each experiment (40 games) lasts roughly 5 hours, equally divided in an 
afternoon session with one half of the subjects and games, and an evening session with 
the other half. 
 
Small-Stake Experiment 
In the first experiment, the original prizes and bank offers from the Dutch edition 
are divided by 10,000, resulting in an average prize of roughly €40 and a maximum 
prize of €500. 
The overall level of risk aversion in this experiment is lower than in the original 
TV show. Contestants on average stop later (round 6.9 versus 5.2 for the TV show) and 
reject higher percentage bank offers. Still, the changes seem modest given that the 
initial stakes are 10,000 times smaller than in the TV show. In the TV show, contestants 
generally become risk neutral or risk seeking when “only” thousands or tens of 
thousands of Euros remain at stake. In the experiment, the stakes are much smaller, but 
the average contestant is clearly risk averse. This suggests that the effect of stakes on 
risk attitudes in this game is relatively weak. By contrast, the effect of prior outcomes is 
very strong; witness for example the (untabulated) “Deal” percentages (for round 2 – 9 
combined) of 3, 21 and 19 for “loser”, “neutral” and “winner”, respectively. 
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The first column of Table 1.9 shows the maximum likelihood estimation results. 
The estimated utility function exhibits the same pattern of extreme IRRA as for the 
original shows, but now at a much smaller scale. See, for example, the CC of 0.072 for a 
50/50 gamble of €0 or €1,000. It follows from Rabin’s (2000) observation that plausible 
levels of risk aversion require much lower initial wealth levels for small-stake gambles 
than for large-stake gambles. Indeed, initial wealth is estimated to be €11 in this 
experiment, roughly a factor of 10,000 lower than for the original TV sample. As for the 
original episodes, the model errs by predicting that the losers and winners would stop 
earlier than they actually do. Prospect theory with a sticky reference point fits the data 
substantially better than the expected utility model, both in terms of the log-likelihood 
and in terms of the hit percentage.  
 
Large-Stake Experiment 
The modest change in the choices in the first experiment relative to the large-stake 
TV show suggests that the effect of stakes is limited in this game. Of course, the 
classroom experiment is not directly comparable with the TV version, because, for 
example, the experiment is not broadcast on TV and uses a different type of contestant 
(students). Our second experiment therefore investigates the effect of stakes by 
replicating the first experiment with larger stakes. 
The experiment uses the same design as before, with the only difference being 
that the original monetary amounts are divided by 1,000 rather than by 10,000, resulting 
in an average prize of roughly €400 and a maximum prize of €5,000 – extraordinarily 
large amounts for experiments. For this experiment, 80 new subjects were drawn from 
the same population, excluding students involved in the first experiment. 
Based on the strong IRRA in the first experiment, the expected utility model 
would predict a much higher risk aversion in this experiment. However, the average 
stop round is exactly equal to the average for the small-stake experiment (round 6.9), 
and subjects reject similar percentage bank offers (the highest rejected bank offer 
averages 82.5 percent versus 82.4 percent for the small-stake experiment). Therefore, 
the isolated effect of stakes seems much weaker than suggested by the estimated IRRA 
in the individual experiments. 
56
 56
Table 1.9: Experimental results. The table shows the maximum likelihood estimation 
results for our choice experiments. The first column (Small stakes) displays the results for 
the experiment with the original monetary amounts in the Dutch TV format of “Deal or No 
Deal” divided by 10,000, the second column (Large stakes) displays the results for the 
experiment with prizes scaled down by a factor of 1,000, and the third column (Pooled) 
displays the results for the two samples combined. Panel A shows the results for expected 
utility theory. Panel B shows the results for prospect theory. The results are presented in the 
same format as the results in Table 1.6 and Table 1.8, respectively. 
 
 Small stakes Large stakes Pooled 
A. Expected utility theory 
α 0.019 (0.000) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 
β 0.000 (1.000) 0.000 (1.000) 0.000 (1.000) 
W 11 (0.920) 50 (0.930) 0 (1.000) 
σ 0.306 (0.000) 0.294 (0.000) 0.354 (0.000) 
MLL -0.342  -0.337  -0.351  
LR 10.17 (0.017) 10.14 (0.017) 9.37 (0.025) 
Hits 81% 83% 80%  
No. 231  234  465  
CC (0/101) 0.953  0.995  0.995  
CC (0/102) 0.583  0.953  0.953  
CC (0/103) 0.072  0.588  0.586  
CC (0/104) 0.007  0.074  0.074  
CC (0/105) 0.001  0.007  0.007  
CC (0/106) 0.000  0.001  0.001  
B. Prospect theory 
λ 2.307 (0.000) 2.678 (0.000) 2.518 (0.000) 
α 0.732 (0.000) 0.695 (0.000) 0.693 (0.000) 
θ1 1.045 (0.000) 1.024 (0.000) 1.023 (0.000) 
θ2 -0.119 (0.000) 0.019 (0.000) 0.013 (0.250) 
θ3 -0.086 (0.000) -0.046 (0.000) -0.049 (0.000) 
σ 0.267 (0.000) 0.196 (0.000) 0.218 (0.000) 
MLL -0.275  -0.265  -0.272  
LR 40.94 (0.000) 44.04 (0.000) 83.29 (0.000) 
Hits 87% 88% 87%  
No. 231  234  465  
 
 
The second column of Table 1.9 displays the maximum likelihood estimation 
results. With increased stakes but similar choices, the expected utility model needs a 
different utility function to rationalize the choices. In fact, the estimated utility function 
seems scaled in proportion to the stakes, so that the 50/50 gamble of €0 or €1,000 now 
involves approximately the same CC as the 50/50 gamble of €0 or €100 in the small-
stake experiment. By contrast, for prospect theory, the estimated parameters are roughly 
the same as for the small-stake version and a substantially better fit is achieved relative 
to the implementation of expected utility theory. 
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In both experiments, risk aversion is strongly affected by prior outcomes, which 
are strongly related to the level of stakes within the experiments, but the stakes do not 
materially affect risk aversion across the experiments. Since the stakes are increased by 
a factor of ten and all other conditions are held constant, the only plausible explanation 
seems that prior outcomes rather than stakes are the main driver of risk aversion in this 
game. 
 
Pooled Sample 
The last column of Table 1.9 shows the results for the pooled sample of the two 
experiments. As noted above, the choice behavior in the two samples is very similar, 
despite the large differences in the stakes. The important role of the stakes in the 
individual samples and the weak role across the two samples lead to two very different 
utility functions. Stakes appear to matter more in relative terms than in absolute terms. 
Combining both samples will cause problems for the expected utility model, since the 
model assigns an important role to the absolute level of stakes. Using a single utility 
function for the pooled sample indeed significantly worsens the fit relative to the 
individual samples. The prospect theory model does not suffer from this problem 
because it attributes the low “Deal” propensity of losers and winners in each sample to 
the slow adjustment of a reference point that is proportional to the stakes in each 
sample. In this way, the model relies on changes in the relative level of the stakes rather 
than the absolute level of the stakes. Whether outcomes are gains or losses depends on 
the context. An amount of €100 is likely to be placed in the domain of gains in the 
small-stake experiment (where the average prize is roughly €40), but the same amount 
is probably placed in the domain of losses in the large-stake experiment (with an 
average prize of roughly €400). 
 
1.8 Conclusions 
The behavior of contestants in game shows cannot always be generalized to what 
an ordinary person does in her everyday life when making risky decisions. While the 
contestants have to make decisions in just a few minutes in front of millions of viewers, 
many real-life decisions involving large sums of money are neither made in a hurry nor 
in the limelight. Still, we believe that the choices in this particular game show are 
worthy of study, because the decision problems are simple and well-defined, and the 
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amounts at stake are very large. Furthermore, prior to the show, contestants have had 
considerable time to think about what they might do in various situations, and during 
the show they are encouraged to discuss those contingencies with a friend or relative 
who sits in the audience. In this sense, the choices may be more deliberate and 
considered than might appear at first glance. Indeed, it seems plausible that our 
contestants have given more thought to their choices on the show than to some of the 
other financial choices they have made in their lives such as selecting a mortgage or 
retirement savings investment strategy. 
What does our analysis tell us? First, we observe, on average, what might be 
called “moderate” levels of risk aversion. Even when hundreds of thousands of Euros 
are at stake, many contestants are rejecting offers in excess of 75 percent of the 
expected value. In an expected utility of wealth framework, this level of risk aversion 
for large stakes is hard to reconcile with the same moderate level of risk aversion found 
in small-stake experiments – both ours, and those conducted by other experimentalists. 
Second, although risk aversion is moderate on average, the offers people accept vary 
greatly among the contestants; some demonstrate strong risk aversion by stopping in the 
early game rounds and accepting relatively conservative bank offers, while others 
exhibit clear risk-seeking behavior by rejecting offers above the average remaining 
prize and thus deliberately entering “unfair gambles”. While some of this variation is 
undoubtedly due to differences in individual risk attitudes, a considerable part of the 
variation can be explained by the outcomes experienced by the contestants in the 
previous rounds of the game. Most notably, risk aversion generally decreases after prior 
expectations have been shattered by eliminating high-value briefcases or after earlier 
expectations have been surpassed by opening low-value briefcases. This path-dependent 
pattern occurs in all three editions of the game, despite sizeable differences in the initial 
stakes across the editions. “Losers” and “winners” generally have a weaker propensity 
to “Deal” than their “neutral” counterparts. 
The relatively low risk aversion of losers and winners is hard to explain with 
expected utility theory and points in the direction of reference-dependent choice 
theories such as prospect theory. Indeed, our findings seem consistent with the break-
even effect (losers becoming more willing to take risk due to incomplete adaptation to 
prior losses), and the house-money effect (a low risk aversion for winners due to 
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incomplete adaptation to prior gains). A simple version of prospect theory with a sticky 
reference point explains the “Deal or No Deal” decisions substantially better than 
expected utility theory. These findings suggest that reference-dependence and path-
dependence are important, even when the decision problems are simple and well-
defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake. 
Of course, we must be careful with rejecting expected utility theory and 
embracing prospect theory. We use the flexible expo-power utility function, which 
embeds the most popular implementations of expected utility theory, and find that this 
function is unable to provide an explanation for the choices of losers and winners in this 
game show. However, a (nonstandard) utility function that has risk seeking segments 
and depends on prior outcomes could achieve a better fit. Such exotic specifications blur 
the boundary between the two theories, and we therefore do not reject or accept one of 
the two. 
Our main finding is the important role of reference-dependence and path-
dependence, phenomena that are often ignored in implementations of expected utility 
theory. Previous choice problems are a key determinant of the framing of a given choice 
problem. An amount is likely to be considered as “large” in the context of a game where 
it lies above prior expectations, but the same amount is probably evaluated as “small” in 
a game where it lies below prior expectations. For contestants who expected to win 
hundreds of thousands, an amount of €10,000 probably seems “small”; the same amount 
is likely to appear much “larger” when thousands or tens of thousands were expected. 
To isolate the effect of the amounts at stake, we conducted two series of choice 
experiments that use a homogeneous student population and mimic the TV show as 
closely as possible in a classroom. We find that a tenfold increase of the initial stakes 
does not materially affect the choices. Moreover, the choices in the experiments are 
remarkably similar to those in the original TV show, despite the fact that the 
experimental stakes are only a small fraction of the original stakes. Consistent with the 
TV version, the break-even effect and the house-money effect also emerge in the 
experiments. These experimental findings reinforce our conclusion that choices are 
strongly affected by previous outcomes. The combination of (i) a strong effect of 
variation in stakes caused by a subject’s fortune within a game and (ii) a weak effect of 
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variation in the initial stakes across games calls for a choice model that properly 
accounts for the context of the choice problem and its dynamics. 
This study has focused on episodes from the Netherlands, Germany, and the 
United States, because these episodes have a very similar game format. For further 
research, it would be interesting to collect more international data in order to obtain 
more degrees of freedom to analyze the effect of prior outcomes in greater detail and to 
examine the role of the cultural, social or economic background of the contestant. It 
would also be interesting to further extend our choice experiments. While the stakes are 
much smaller, experiments do allow the researcher to control contestant characteristics, 
rules and situations, and to more closely monitor contestants and their behavior. Our 
experiments were designed to mimic the TV studio and used real monetary payoffs, but 
further experiments may also take place in the behavioral laboratory and employ some 
sort of random-lottery incentive system to reduce the costs. 
 
1.9 Epilogue 
Following the success of “Deal or No Deal” in the Netherlands, the game show 
was sold to dozens of countries worldwide. Other research groups have investigated 
episodes of editions other than those used in this chapter. Their analyses employ not 
only different data sets, but also different research methodologies and different 
(implementations of) decision theories, and the results sometimes seem contradictory. 
Reconciling the seemingly disparate results will be a valuable exercise, but is beyond 
the scope of this study. We will limit ourselves at this point to a synopsis of the 
available studies, which are presented below in alphabetical order, and some concluding 
remarks. 
Using the UK edition, Andersen et al. (2006a) estimate various structural choice 
models, assuming a homoskedastic error structure and accounting for forward-looking 
behavior. Their expected utility estimates suggest CRRA and initial wealth roughly 
equal to average annual UK income; their rank-dependent expected utility estimates 
indicate modest probability weighting along with a concave utility function; their 
prospect theory estimates indicate no loss aversion and modest probability weighting for 
gains, using several plausible specifications of the reference point. Andersen et al. 
(2006b) study the UK television shows and related lab experiments using a mixture 
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model in which decision makers use two criteria: one is essentially rank-dependent 
expected utility, and the other is essentially a probabilistic income threshold. They find 
evidence that both criteria are used in the game show and that lab subjects place a much 
greater weight on the income threshold. 
Baltussen, Post and Van den Assem (2007) compare various editions of DOND. 
Their sample includes editions from the same country that employ very different initial 
sets of prizes. Comparing editions from the same country can separate the effect of 
current stakes and prior outcomes without introducing cross-country effects, in the same 
way as changing the initial stakes in our experiments. Consistent with reference-
dependence and path-dependence, they find that contestants in large- and small-stake 
editions respond in a similar way to the stakes relative to their initial level, even though 
the initial stakes are widely different across the various editions. 
Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2007a) show that Italian and UK contestants do not 
exhibit lower risk aversion when the probability of a large prize is small, and they 
interpret this as evidence against the overweighting of small probabilities. Blavatskyy 
and Pogrebna (2007b) find that the fit and relative performance of alternative decision 
theories depends heavily on the assumed error structure in the Italian and UK data sets. 
Pogrebna (2008) finds that Italian contestants generally do not follow naïve advice from 
the audience. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006a) analyze the UK, French and Italian 
editions, which sometimes include a swap option that allows contestants to exchange 
their briefcase for another unopened briefcase. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006b) 
conduct a nonparametric test of ten popular decision theories using the UK and Italian 
edition. 
Bombardini and Trebbi (2007) use the Italian edition to estimate a structural 
dynamic CRRA expected utility model and find that the risk aversion is moderate on 
average and shows substantial variation across individual contestants. They also find 
that contestants are practically risk neutral when faced with small stakes and risk averse 
when faced with large stakes. Accounting for strategic interaction between the banker 
and the contestant (the Italian banker knows the contents of the unopened briefcases) 
does not change their conclusions. 
Botti et al. (2007) estimate various structural expected utility models for the 
Italian edition, assuming that contestants ignore subsequent bank offers and compare the 
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current bank offer with the set of remaining prizes. They find that the CARA 
specification fits the data significantly better than the CRRA and expo-power 
specifications, and they also report a gender effect (males are more risk averse) and 
substantial unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion. 
Deck, Lee and Reyes (2008) estimate structural CRRA and CARA expected 
utility models for Mexican episodes of “Deal or No Deal”. They consider both forward-
looking contestants and myopic contestants who look forward only one game round, 
and they vary the level of forecasting sophistication by the contestants. They find a 
moderate level of average risk aversion and considerable individual variation in risk 
attitudes, with some contestants being extremely risk averse while others are risk 
seeking. 
Using the Australian edition, De Roos and Sarafidis (2006) estimate structural 
dynamic CARA and CRRA expected utility models using random effects and random 
coefficients models. Their models produce plausible estimates of risk aversion, and 
suggest substantial heterogeneity in decision making, both between contestants and 
between decisions made by the same contestant. They also find that rank-dependent 
expected utility substantially improves the explanatory power. In addition to these main-
game results, they also investigate contestants’ choices in special “Chance” and 
“Supercase” game rounds, which are specific for the Australian edition. Risk attitudes 
elicited in these additional game rounds seem to be similar to risk attitudes elicited in 
the main game. Also using Australian data, Mulino et al. (2006) estimate a structural 
dynamic CRRA expected utility model. Their estimates reveal moderate risk aversion 
on average and considerable variation across contestants. They also find that risk 
aversion depends on contestant characteristics such as age and gender, but not on 
wealth. Like De Roos and Sarafidis, they investigate the choices in the “Chance” and 
“Supercase” rounds, but they do find a difference in risk attitudes between these special 
rounds and the main game. 
Clearly, “Deal or No Deal” can be studied for several research purposes and with 
a variety of methodologies and theories, and different studies can lead to different, 
sometimes opposing conclusions. Some final remarks may be useful to evaluate the 
existing studies and to guide further research. First, to analyze risk attitudes without the 
confounding effect of ambiguity and strategic insight, it is useful to analyze the basic 
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version of the game. Of course, the more exotic versions with special game options and 
informative bank offers are interesting for other purposes, as demonstrated in some of 
the above studies. Second, to disentangle the effect of the amounts at stake and the 
effect of previous outcomes, it is useful to analyze multiple game show editions or 
choice experiments with different initial amounts at stake. Within one edition or 
experiment, current stakes and prior outcomes are perfectly correlated, and the two 
effects cannot be separated. Third, when using parametric structural models, it seems 
important to analyze the robustness for the assumed mental frame and error structure. 
For example, we found a relatively poor fit for models that assume that contestants 
focus on the set of remaining prizes rather than the next round’s bank offer, and also for 
models that assume that the error variance is equal for all choice problems, irrespective 
of the level of the stakes or the variation in the prizes. 
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Chapter 2: 
Risky Choice and the Relative Size of Stakes8 
 
Abstract 
We examine framing effects by analyzing how risky choice depends on the 
absolute and relative size of the amounts at stake, using an extensive sample of choices 
from ten different editions of the large-stake TV game show “Deal or No Deal”. Our 
analyses within and across the samples suggest that risky choice is highly sensitive to 
the context, as defined by the initial set of prizes in the game. In each sample, 
contestants respond in a similar way to the stakes relative to their initial level, even 
though the initial level differs widely across the various editions. Amounts therefore 
appear to be primarily evaluated in proportion to a subjective frame of reference rather 
than in terms of their absolute monetary value. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Normative theories of judgment and decision making assume that the context in 
which a decision occurs does not affect the choice. However, a wealth of experimental 
evidence, starting with the early work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981), suggests that decision makers deviate from normative behavior 
by making decisions that depend on subjective anchors or reference points such as 
earlier expectations or aspirations. In many cases also real-life decision making can only 
be understood by accounting for the decision maker’s subjective frame of reference. For 
example, Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006) show that movers arriving from more 
expensive cities spend more money on housing than movers to the same city arriving 
from cheaper cities, controlling for wealth and other confounding effects. We add to the 
                                                 
8 This chapter is based on the paper “Risky Choice and the Relative Size of Stakes”, co-authored by 
Guido Baltussen and Thierry Post. We thank conference participants at AEA 2008 New Orleans, BDRM 
2008 San Diego, and FUR 2008 for useful comments and suggestions. We are very grateful to the people 
at Endemol, TROS, VTM, Sat.1, Endemol Southern Star, Seven Network and Schweizer Fernsehen and 
to Monique de Koning and Chris Powney for providing us with information and/or recordings of “Deal or 
No Deal”, and to Sylvie Nahuijs and Jan-Hein Paes for their skillful research assistance. The support by 
Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus Research Institute of Management and Erasmus Center for Financial 
Research is also gratefully acknowledged. 
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literature on this subject by analyzing context effects in risky-choice behavior across 
various editions of the large-stake TV game show “Deal or No Deal” (DOND). 
The problems in this game show resemble the simple and well-defined problems 
in laboratory choice experiments, but the stakes are substantially larger. Not 
surprisingly, DOND has recently attracted substantial research interest as a natural 
laboratory for analyzing risky choice; see for example the survey in Post, Van den 
Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008; henceforth PVBT). The game show originated in 
the Netherlands in 2002 and is now broadcast in dozens of countries.9 The rules are 
similar in each edition. The game is played over several rounds by one single contestant, 
and starts with a known set of twenty or more monetary prizes that are randomly 
distributed over the same number of closed cases (boxes or briefcases). One of these 
cases is set aside for the contestant, who then “owns” the unknown prize it contains. At 
the beginning of each game round, the contestant opens one or more of the other cases, 
thereby revealing which prizes are not in her own case. Next, a “banker” offers a 
riskless amount of money to buy the contestant’s case. If the contestant says “Deal”, the 
game ends there. A contestant who says “No Deal” enters the next round and has to 
open additional cases, followed by a new offer. The game continues in this way until the 
contestant either accepts the banker’s offer, or until all the cases have been opened and 
the contestant wins the contents of her own case. Although the game format is similar 
all over the world, the set of prizes that is distributed over the cases varies 
substantially.10 
In a recent study of Dutch, German, US and experimental samples of DOND, 
PVBT find strong indications of the reference dependence of risk attitudes. For each 
sample, a simple implementation of prospect theory explains the choices substantially 
better than expected utility does. The biggest losers and the biggest winners appear to 
have an abnormally low degree of risk aversion, consistent with the “break-even” and 
“house-money” effects that occur when the reference point sticks to earlier expectations 
                                                 
9 According to an official press release by production company Endemol (February 22, 2007), DOND 
was aired in a total of 46 countries in 2006. In some countries, DOND is known by a local name. The 
original Dutch edition, for example, is named “Miljoenenjacht” (“Chasing Millions”). We will refer to the 
game show by the Anglo-Saxon name, the name that is most used worldwide. 
10 In all editions, the statistical distribution of the prizes is typically strongly positively skewed. The 
original Dutch version involves the largest stakes, with an average prize of roughly €400,000 and a top 
prize of €5,000,000. 
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(Thaler and Johnson, 1990). Many losers even appear to be risk seeking by rejecting 
bank offers that exceed the average remaining prize. It seems difficult to explain these 
choices without taking the context into account, because the losers generally still have 
thousands or tens of thousands of Euros at stake. In other empirical studies (including 
other game show studies and experimental studies), gambles of this magnitude are 
typically associated with risk aversion. In the context of a game that commences with an 
average prize of hundreds of thousands however, amounts of thousands or tens of 
thousands may seem small and are probably relatively easily put at risk in an attempt to 
escape from the uneasy feelings of experiencing a loss. Still, the PVBT results provide 
only indirect evidence for such a framing effect. Like other DOND studies, PVBT 
analyze choices within individual editions; within a given edition, the initial set of 
prizes is fixed and one can only analyze its effect by assuming a structural choice model 
that forwards the relevant specification of the reference point, introducing a risk of 
specification error. 
This study examines how risky choices in DOND depend on the context of the 
initial set of prizes in a game. To compare how the absolute and relative magnitudes of 
the amounts at stake affect risky choice, we analyze ten editions of DOND with large 
differences in the set of initial prizes, originating from seven different countries: the 
Netherlands (2), Belgium (2), Australia (2), the US, the UK, Germany and 
Switzerland.11 The ten samples together cover approximately 6,400 risky choices from 
over 1,100 different contestants. The differences in the set of prizes at the start of a 
game allow us to analyze framing effects by analyzing choices across editions, and 
reduces the need for fully specified structural models. 
We first pay attention to our samples from the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Australia. In each of these three countries, both a large-stake version and a small-stake 
version of the game show are broadcast. Using editions with different stakes from the 
same country may allow for a more appropriate comparison than using editions from 
different countries, because it controls for systematic differences between countries in, 
for example, wealth and culture. Nevertheless, we will conclude this study with a large 
cross-country analysis. 
                                                 
11 Some of these editions are also used in other studies. The small-stake version from Australia is 
analyzed by Brooks et al. (2008a, 2008b) and De Roos and Sarafidis (2006); the UK version is analyzed 
by Andersen et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b). 
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Our probit estimation results suggest that the average contestant in each sample is 
roughly equally sensitive to changes in the relative level of the amounts at stake (the 
current average remaining prize relative to the initial average), even though the absolute 
level of the stakes (the current average remaining prize in monetary terms) is very 
different. For a given edition of DOND, changes in the amounts at stake have a strong 
effect on risk attitudes and choice behavior, but differences in the initial amounts across 
the shows have only a weak effect. We therefore conclude that risk aversion in DOND 
depends strongly on the context of the initial set of prizes. In contrast to normative 
theories of risky choice, amounts appear to be primarily evaluated in proportion to a 
subjective frame of reference rather than in terms of their absolute monetary value. A 
contestant who may initially expect to win tens of thousands in one edition will consider 
an amount of, say, €50,000, to be a larger amount than a contestant in another edition 
who may expect to win hundreds of thousands, and will behave accordingly. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe 
the editions of DOND from the Netherlands, Belgium and Australia, and we present a 
summary of our data from these countries. Section 2.3 analyzes how contestant 
characteristics and game situations affect the risky choices in DOND using probit 
regression analyses for each individual edition separately and for the combination of 
each pair of editions from the same country. Section 2.4 adds analyses of samples from 
the US, the UK, Germany and Switzerland, and shows the results of probit regression 
analysis for the large, pooled sample of all ten international editions. Finally, Section 
2.5 contains concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.2 Descriptions of Editions and Data 
The general setup of DOND as described in the introduction applies to all editions 
worldwide. There are however some noteworthy differences. This section discusses the 
details of the six Dutch, Belgian and Australian versions of DOND, explains the sample 
periods, and presents summary statistics for each of the six samples. The four editions 
from the US, the UK, Germany and Switzerland will be discussed in Section 2.4, where 
we include the samples from these countries in a large cross-country analysis. 
The Dutch large-stake edition is called “Miljoenenjacht” (or “Chasing Millions”), 
and starts off with 26 cases. The prizes in the cases range from €0.01 to €5,000,000 with 
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an average prize of roughly €400,000. A game is played over a maximum of 9 rounds, 
and the number of cases opened each round is 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1 and 1, respectively, 
reducing the number of remaining cases from 26 to 20, 15, 11, 8, 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2 in the 
last round. Figure 2.1 presents a schematic overview of the course of the game.  
 
 
 Figure 2.1: Flow chart of the Australian editions and the large-stake editions from the 
Netherlands and Belgium. In each round, the contestant chooses a number of cases to be 
opened, each opened case giving new information about the unknown prize in the 
contestant’s own case. After the prizes in the chosen cases are revealed, a “bank offer” is 
made. If the contestant accepts the offer (“Deal”), she walks away with the amount offered 
and the game ends; if the contestant rejects the offer (“No Deal”), play continues and she 
enters the next round. If the contestant opts for “No Deal” in the last round, she receives the 
prize in her own case. 
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Contestants are selected from an audience composed of 500 prospects by means 
of an elimination game that precedes the main game and that is based on quiz questions. 
As in most editions, the actual game is played by one contestant per episode. We use an 
updated sample of the Dutch large-stake episodes analyzed in PVBT, consisting of all 
the 56 episodes (292 choice observations) aired up to June 3, 2007. Because the €7,500 
prize was replaced with a €750,000 prize after episode 47, the average prize is not 
exactly constant across all episodes, and equals €391,411 in episodes 1 – 47 and 
€419,696 in episodes 48 – 56. There were no further material changes. 
The Dutch small-stake edition uses only 20 prizes instead of 26. The prizes are 
considerably smaller than in the large-stake edition, and range from €1 to €250,000 with 
an average prize of €31,629. The game starts with 20 potential contestants, all randomly 
assigned a case with one of the 20 prizes hidden inside. A multiple choice question 
determines which contestants qualify for a pool from which one contestant is then 
randomly chosen to play the game. The 19 contestants that are not selected return in the 
subsequent episode (together with one new contestant), to form the group from which 
the next episode’s contestant is chosen. The small-stake edition has a maximum of 5 
rounds. In the first round, 6 cases are opened, followed by 3 cases in each subsequent 
round. Figure 2.2 presents an overview of the small-stake game. 
 
 
 Figure 2.2: Flow chart of the small-stake edition from the Netherlands. 
14 cases 
11 cases 
8 cases 
5 cases 
2 cases 
bank offer 3 
bank offer 4 
bank offer 5 
bank offer 2 
20 cases 
open contestant’s case 
bank offer 1 
open 6 cases 
open 3 cases 
open 3 cases 
open 3 cases 
open 3 cases 
open 1 case 
71
 71
The first season of the small-stake edition started on August 27, 2006 and 
episodes were then aired nearly every weekday until June 8, 2007. Our sample consists 
of the full set of 204 episodes (904 choice observations) aired during this first season. 
All the episodes were recorded by the authors. There were no changes to the game 
format during the sample period. An occasional special feature in the small-stake 
edition is the “swap option”. In the fifth game round of 24 episodes, when two cases or 
prizes are left, the contestant was offered the opportunity to swap her case for the other 
remaining case. Whenever this option was offered, it was always offered in addition to 
and not instead of a regular bank offer. In most instances (16), the contestant preferred 
to stick with her own case. Obviously, the opportunity to swap cases does not change 
the contestant’s optimal strategy, because she has no information about which of the 
two remaining prizes is her own case, and therefore we do not pursue this option 
further. 
The Belgian large-stake edition is named after the Dutch large-stake edition, or 
“Miljoenenjacht”. The game uses 26 prizes with an average value of €85,972, including 
a top prize of €1,000,000. The game is played in exactly the same manner as the Dutch 
large-stake version (see also Figure 2.1). Contestant selection also occurs in the same 
way, although the elimination game starts with only 150 prospects in the audience. The 
Belgian large-stake version was aired 19 times, in two seasons of weekly episodes. The 
first series of 11 shows was launched on October 16, 2004 and the second series of 8 
shows started on October 15, 2005. Copies of the 19 shows (114 choice observations) 
were obtained from Endemol’s local production company Endemol België. 
A small-stake Belgian version called “Te Nemen of Te Laten” was launched on 
August 21, 2006 and aired on most weekdays until April 12, 2007. Unlike other 
editions, in this edition the contestant has to split her winnings with an anonymous 
viewer. After adjustment, the top prize is €100,000 and the average €11,492. Games are 
played over a maximum of 6 rounds, during which the number of cases, 22 at the start 
of the game, decreases to 16, 13, 10, 7, 4, and finally 2; see Figure 2.3. The contestant is 
randomly selected from a pool of 22 potential contestants, and, as in the Dutch small-
stake version, contestants that are not selected return in the subsequent episode to form 
part of the group from which the next episode’s contestant is selected. A typical feature 
of the Belgian small-stake game is that, at some point during the game, most contestants 
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are offered the opportunity to exchange their case for any other remaining case. 
Contrary to the swap option in the Dutch small-stake version, the offer to swap cases 
replaces the regular bank offer for that particular round of the game. It is the decision of 
the game-show producer as to if and when this offer is made. As a result, contestants in 
the Belgian small-stake version may experience some ambiguity beyond the normal risk 
of the game. A Belgian colleague of the authors recorded all the 130 episodes. We 
deliberately excluded one contestant from our sample (a Belgian celebrity playing on 
behalf of a charitable institution on New Year’s Day; inclusion would not have affected 
our results), leaving a sample size of 129 contestants (613 choice observations). 
 
 
 Figure 2.3: Flow chart of the small-stake edition from Belgium. 
 
 
In Australia, DOND made its debut on July 13, 2003. The first season consisted of 
14 weekly episodes, covering the games of 16 contestants (the games of some 
contestants started in one episode and continued in the next). The top prize of the 26 
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the same as that of the large-stake versions in the Netherlands and Belgium (see also 
Figure 2.1), and the contestant is selected in a similar way (by means of quiz questions) 
from a large group of prospects (200) in the audience. Four additional Australian shows 
with large prizes were aired as “special episodes” in August and September 2004. We 
have added two of these shows to our sample: one with a couple playing the game and 
one with an unlucky contestant from an earlier episode. A special episode with 
hypothetical stakes (a former, lucky contestant playing on behalf of an anonymous, ex-
post selected viewer) and a show named “test of the psychics” (where decisions were 
based primarily on clairvoyance) have been intentionally omitted, although their 
inclusion would not affect our results. Our Australian large-stake sample totals 18 
contestants (100 choice observations); copies of the episodes were obtained from an 
Australian game-show collector. 
DOND returned to Australian TV on February 2, 2004, but as a shorter, daily 
edition with considerably reduced prizes. The structure of the game remained 
unchanged, but the top prize and the average prize were scaled down to A$200,000 
(€120,000) and A$19,112 (€11,467), respectively. The contestant is selected from a 
group of 26 by means of three multiple choice quiz questions. Our sample covers the 
complete set of 140 episodes (993 choice observations) aired up to August 13, 2004. 
After that date, game options known as “Chance” and “Supercase” were introduced. 
These options add ambiguity to the game that we prefer to avoid. We are grateful to 
Endemol Southern Star and TV station Seven for providing us with the recordings. 
For all episodes analyzed in this study, we collected data on the eliminated and 
remaining prizes, the bank offers and the DOND decisions. We also collected data on 
each contestant’s gender, age and education. Gender and education are coded as dummy 
variables, with a value of 1 assigned to females, and to contestants with either a 
bachelor degree level of education or higher (including students) or equivalent work 
experience, respectively. The contestant characteristics are in some instances obtained 
from the producer, but mostly extracted from the introductory talk, from other 
conversations between the host and the contestants, or from a short movie about the life 
of the contestant at the beginning of some editions. The contestant’s level of education 
is usually not explicitly mentioned, but this characteristic can often be inferred from her 
stated profession. Missing values for the contestant’s age are estimated on the basis of 
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both the contestant’s physical appearance and other helpful information such as the age 
of children. 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the six samples. The average age of the 
contestants varies from 32 (Australian large-stake edition) to 46 (Dutch large-stake 
edition), the proportion of women in the samples varies from 21 (Belgian large-stake 
edition) to 67 percent (Belgian small-stake edition), and the average percentage of 
highly-educated contestants ranges between 26 (Belgian large-stake edition) and 72 
(Australian large-stake edition). Despite some differences in the composition of the 
samples, the variation within each sample is large, and the next section shows that the 
contestant characteristics do not have a systematic and significant effect across the 
different analyses. 
Apart from one single exception in the Australian large-stake edition, contestants 
always reject the first two offers. Since the bank offer is only a small fraction of the 
average remaining prize in the first rounds (as illustrated in Table 2.2 discussed below), 
the choices in these rounds are generally trivial. Statistics on the round in which 
contestants accept the bank offer in each sample cannot be directly compared due to 
differences in the maximum number of rounds in each edition. However, contestants 
generally play for longer both in editions with smaller stakes and in editions with fewer 
cases to open per round. The same pattern emerges in comparisons of the percentage 
bank offers that contestants choose to reject and accept, suggesting a pattern of 
increased risk aversion for larger stakes.12 In the next sections, we will show that this 
pattern across editions is rather weak compared to the strong pattern of increased risk 
aversion for larger stakes within each edition. 
Performing the natural experiment with the same monetary prizes in the lab would 
far exceed any experimental research budget as the combined total prize money in the 
six samples equals nearly €85 million. The biggest winner is a Dutch contestant named 
Helma: in the episode aired on November 13, 2005, she accepted a bank offer of 
€1,495,000 in round 7, while amounts of €1,000, €75,000, €2,500,000 and €5,000,000 
were remaining. Her case turned out to contain €1,000. 
                                                 
12 In Table 2, the average percentage bank offer accepted in the Australian small-stake edition is heavily 
influenced by one extremely appealing offer of 2,963 percent. Omitting this one observation reduces the 
average from 111.54 to 91.03 percent. In Table 3, omission reduces the reported average bank offer for 
round 9 from 198 to 103 percent. 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics. The table shows descriptive statistics for our six samples 
from the Netherlands (Panel A and B), Belgium (C and D) and Australia (E and F). Age is 
measured in years. Gender is a dummy variable with a value of 1 assigned to females. 
Education is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for contestants with bachelor-degree 
level or higher (including students) or equivalent work experience. Stop Round is the 
number of the round in which the bank offer is accepted, or the maximum number of 
rounds + 1 for contestants who rejected all offers. Best Offer Rejected is the highest 
percentage bank offer the contestant chose to reject (“No Deal”). Offer Accepted is the 
percentage bank offer accepted by the contestant (“Deal”), or 100 percent for contestants 
who rejected all offers. Amount Won equals the accepted bank offer in Euros, or the prize 
in the contestant’s own case for those contestants who rejected all offers. Australian Dollars 
are converted into Euros by using a single fixed exchange rate of €0.60 per A$. 
 
 Mean Stdev Min Median Max
A. Dutch large-stake edition (56 contestants) 
Age (years) 45.80 11.53 21.00 43.50 70.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Stop Round 5.23 1.73 3.00 5.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 54.62 32.46 10.17 53.76 119.88
Offer Accepted (%) 74.68 30.92 20.77 79.23 165.50
Amount Won (€) 231,241.25 261,212.29 10.00 156,500.00 1,495,000.00
B. Dutch small-stake edition (204 contestants) 
Age (years) 34.42 10.57 19.00 33.00 67.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 4.74 0.95 3.00 4.00 6.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 41.83 33.54 7.95 26.50 223.48
Offer Accepted (%) 64.82 34.60 9.51 53.69 188.94
Amount Won (€) 11,762.09 12,350.22 1.00 9,140.00 69,000.00
C. Belgian large-stake edition (19 contestants) 
Age (years) 41.89 10.11 30.00 42.00 65.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.21 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.26 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 6.11 2.00 4.00 6.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 55.96 26.56 20.70 49.83 114.29
Offer Accepted (%) 65.48 23.69 37.22 62.76 100.00
Amount Won (€) 50,263.16 48,886.88 500.00 30,000.00 200,000.00
D. Belgian small-stake edition (129 contestants) 
Age (years) 32.43 9.03 19.00 30.00 59.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 5.71 1.11 4.00 6.00 7.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 54.41 41.48 11.39 43.00 346.90
Offer Accepted (%) 74.08 28.50 14.56 79.79 140.00
Amount Won (€) 5,134.75 6,154.72 0.01 3,750.00 37,500.00
 
76
 76
 Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 Mean Stdev Min Median Max
E. Australian large-stake edition (18 contestants) 
Age (years) 32.33 6.32 20.00 32.50 43.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.72 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00
Stop Round 5.78 2.39 2.00 5.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 63.53 47.55 8.99 53.70 178.09
Offer Accepted (%) 92.92 63.32 14.51 70.90 228.01
Amount Won (€) 56,922.00 83,917.34 3.00 27,075.00 309,000.00
F. Australian small-stake edition (140 contestants) 
Age (years) 36.04 11.89 18.00 35.00 75.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Stop Round 7.20 1.71 3.00 7.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 77.38 30.15 15.69 75.59 184.62
Offer Accepted (%) 111.54 245.13 26.72 88.53 2.962.96
Amount Won (€) 9,899.96 12,766.19 0.30 6,783.00 120,000.00
 
 
Table 2.2 summarizes the offers made by the banker and the contestants’ 
decisions to accept or reject the offers in the various rounds. The offers are related to the 
set of remaining prizes and typically start at a small fraction of the average prize and 
approach 100 percent in the later rounds. As the offers become more generous, more 
and more contestants are persuaded to accept them (“Deal”) and exit the game. The 
bank offers in the last few rounds of the Dutch and Belgian small-stake editions are 
relatively conservative compared to those in the other editions. For example, in round 6 
of the Dutch large-stake edition and in round 4 of the Dutch small-stake edition, five 
cases remain unopened. While in the large-stake edition the banker on average offers 87 
percent of the average remaining prize, this percentage is only 41 in the small-stake 
edition. This difference may reflect the fact that contestants in the small-stake edition 
generally face more risk, because they have to open more cases. (For example, in round 
4, three out of five remaining cases have to be opened after a “No Deal” decision, while 
this is only one out of five in round 6 of the large-stake edition.) Alternatively, if there 
are fewer rounds and smaller stakes, there may be more incentive for the producer to 
discourage a “Deal” in order to enhance the show’s entertainment value. 
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Table 2.2: Bank offers, stakes and decisions. The table summarizes the percentage bank 
offers, the stakes and contestants’ decisions for our six samples from the Netherlands 
(Panel A and B), Belgium (C and D) and Australia (E and F). The number of unopened 
cases when the bank offer is presented (Cases), the average bank offer as a percentage of 
the average remaining prize (%BO), the average remaining prize in Euros (Stakes), the 
number of contestants in the given round (No.), the number of those contestants that accept 
the bank offer (“D”) and the number of those contestants that reject the bank offer (“ND”) 
are reported for each round. Australian Dollars are converted into Euros by using a single 
fixed rate of €0.60 per A$. Observations with no bank offer (which occasionally occur 
when only insignificant amounts remain or due to a substituting swap offer) are excluded. 
 
Round Cases %BO Stakes No. “D” “ND” 
A. Dutch large-stake edition 
0 26 - 396,001 56 - - 
1 20 6% 397,392 56 0 56 
2 15 14% 386,686 56 0 56 
3 11 33% 384,339 56 10 46 
4 8 58% 360,429 46 13 33 
5 6 75% 316,743 33 8 25 
6 5 87% 238,631 25 13 12 
7 4 96% 268,389 12 6 6 
8 3 94% 139,341 6 4 2 
9 2 106% 11,253 2 1 1 
B. Dutch small-stake edition 
0 20 - 31,629 204 - - 
1 14 6% 30,888 204 0 204 
2 11 12% 30,138 204 0 204 
3 8 21% 30,473 204 11 193 
4 5 41% 29,835 193 92 101 
5 2 80% 18,203 99 40 59 
C. Belgian large-stake edition 
0 26 - 85,972 19 - - 
1 20 6% 85,299 19 0 19 
2 15 17% 79,160 19 0 19 
3 11 34% 79,785 19 0 19 
4 8 48% 87,566 19 5 14 
5 6 60% 84,975 14 4 10 
6 5 70% 73,546 10 3 7 
7 4 78% 88,542 7 3 4 
8 3 93% 5,809 4 1 3 
9 2 101% 4,883 3 1 2 
D. Belgian small-stake edition 
0 22 - 11,492 129 - - 
1 16 7% 11,441 129 0 129 
2 13 16% 11,480 129 0 129 
3 10 30% 11,482 127 0 127 
4 7 39% 11,558 104 23 81 
5 4 62% 10,205 71 34 37 
6 2 87% 7,031 53 29 24 
 
78
 78
Table 2.2 (continued) 
 
Round Cases %BO Stakes No. “D” “ND” 
E. Australian large-stake edition 
0 26 - 92,934 18 - - 
1 20 9% 84,804 18 0 18 
2 15 15% 92,287 18 1 17 
3 11 27% 107,131 17 2 15 
4 8 65% 97,144 15 3 12 
5 6 87% 109,683 12 4 8 
6 5 95% 125,259 8 1 7 
7 4 94% 112,308 7 3 4 
8 3 120% 4,335 3 1 2 
9 2 140% 2,254 2 1 1 
F. Australian small-stake edition 
0 26 - 11,467 140 - - 
1 20 10% 11,132 140 0 140 
2 15 22% 11,089 140 0 140 
3 11 31% 11,678 140 1 139 
4 8 49% 11,850 139 10 129 
5 6 62% 11,557 129 14 115 
6 5 78% 11,338 115 19 96 
7 4 86% 11,447 96 32 64 
8 3 102% 10,543 64 34 30 
9 2 198% 9,649 30 15 15 
 
 
The next section uses probit regression analysis to analyze the DOND choices in 
greater detail. We will perform regressions for each edition separately, and for the 
combination of each pair of editions from the same country. Comparing two editions 
from one country circumvents the problems that may arise as a result of using editions 
from different countries, like differences in wealth and culture. Although the small-
stake editions in both the Netherlands and Belgium have a somewhat different structure 
than their large-stake counterparts, the effect of the differences on the risk of continuing 
play are simple to model. The next section shows that the choices in the various editions 
are not significantly different after correcting for the percentage bank offers and the risk 
of continuing play. 
In addition to differences in the structure, there are also the possible differences in 
the contestant pools. One concern is that richer and less risk-averse people may be more 
willing to spend time attempting to get onto a large-stake show than onto a small-stake 
one. Also, small-stake editions generally feature contestants that are explicitly selected 
on an individual basis by the producer, whereas chance plays a larger role in selecting 
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the people that play the elimination game in a large-stake show. In the Dutch large-stake 
version for example, a national lottery sponsors the show and the original 500 people in 
the audience are randomly invited lottery players. Indeed, as shown above, the 
contestant characteristics show non-trivial variation across the various editions. To 
account for the contestant pool, we included these characteristics as control variables in 
the regressions. The characteristics do not however show a systematic and significant 
effect on the risk attitudes within the editions and it therefore seems unlikely that they 
have a material effect across the editions. 
 
2.3 Probit Regression Analysis 
This section uses probit regression analysis to explain the DOND choices within 
and across the various samples.13 The DOND choices of the different contestants in 
different editions, different games and different rounds cannot be directly compared 
without accounting for differences in game situations and contestant characteristics. 
Therefore, earlier DOND-based studies like PVBT use structural choice models. The 
results of these models are however sensitive to their precise specifications (for 
example, the shape of the utility function and the dynamics of the reference point). To 
avoid this problem, we estimate reduced-form models using probit regression analysis 
rather than full-blown structural models, allowing for a more compact presentation and 
more robust results. 
The dependent variable is the contestant’s decision, with a value of 1 for “Deal” 
and 0 for “No Deal”. We try to explain the decisions we observed with the following set 
of contestant- and game-related variables: 
 
- Age; 
- Gender (0 = male, 1 = female); 
- Education (0 = low, 1 = high); 
- EV/105: absolute stakes, measured as the current average remaining prize in 
Euros divided by 100,000; 
- EV/EV0: relative stakes, measured as the current average remaining prize 
divided by the initial average; 
                                                 
13 Using logit instead of probit yields similar results. 
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- BO/EV: percentage bank offer, or bank offer divided by the average remaining 
prize; 
- Stdev/EV: standard deviation ratio, or standard deviation of the distribution of 
the average remaining prize in the next round divided by the average remaining 
prize. 
 
The standard deviation ratio measures the risk of continuing play (“No Deal”) for 
one additional round, and in this way accounts for the differences between rounds and 
editions with respect to the number of cases that have to be opened. Our video material 
suggests that the typical contestant generally looks ahead to the bank offer in the next 
game round, rather than to the prize in their own case; the game-show host, for example, 
tends to stress what will happen to the bank offer in the next round should particular 
cases be eliminated and the contestants themselves often comment that they will play 
“just one more round”. The use of other risk measures, such as the standard deviation of 
the remaining prizes, tends to lower the empirical fit, but does not change our 
conclusions regarding the relevance of relative stakes compared to absolute stakes. 
Although the distributions of bank offers and prizes are generally highly skewed, 
skewness does not add significant explanatory power, because it is very strongly 
correlated with the standard deviation in this game. 
To control for the attractiveness of the bank offer, we include the percentage bank 
offer, which is defined as the bank offer divided by the average remaining prize. The 
use of the inverse of the percentage bank offer (which measures the expected return 
from rejecting the current and subsequent bank offers) yields similar results and does 
not change any of our conclusions. 
Our focus is on the effect of absolute and relative stakes. The other variables are 
included as control variables. Fortunately, the control variables are only weakly 
correlated with the stakes variables, so it is not difficult to separate their effect. For 
example, the level of the stakes within a given edition is determined by chance and 
therefore uncorrelated with the contestant characteristics. Since absolute and relative 
stakes are perfectly correlated within each individual edition, only the absolute-stakes 
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variable is included as regressor in the one-sample analyses.14 Using relative stakes in 
those analyses would yield the same results, the only difference being that the absolute-
stakes coefficient is multiplied by the constant term EV0/105. 
To allow for the possibility that the errors of individual contestants are correlated, 
we perform a cluster correction on the standard errors (see, for example, Wooldridge, 
2003). 
Table 2.3 shows the probit estimation results. The contestant characteristics 
generally do not have significant explanatory power or at least not consistently across 
all editions and countries, confirming the results of PVBT (2008). In contrast, game 
characteristics have a significant effect (with a few exceptions in the smaller samples) 
and show a consistent pattern across all editions and countries. Our discussion therefore 
focuses on the game characteristics. 
Panel A shows the results for the Netherlands. As expected for non-satiable and 
risk averse individuals, the “Deal” propensity increases with the generosity of the bank 
offer and the dispersion of the outcomes. The “Deal” propensity also increases with the 
stakes, consistent with increasing relative risk aversion. 
The results for the Dutch small-stake edition are very similar to those for the 
large-stake edition, supporting our assumption that the two versions of DOND are 
indeed comparable after a proper correction for game characteristics. However, for the 
small-stake edition, the coefficient for the absolute-stakes term changes from 0.153 to 
2.179, an increase of roughly a factor of 14. Interestingly, this change is of the same 
order of magnitude as the difference in the initial average prize of the two editions 
(roughly a factor of 12.5). Replacing absolute stakes with relative stakes yields 
comparable coefficients for the two samples: 0.596 for the large-stake sample and 0.689 
for the small-stake sample (not reported in the table). This is a first, strong indication 
that the relative size of the stakes in this game matter more than the absolute size. 
The last three columns show the pooled results. If the stakes are included in 
absolute terms, the empirical fit of the pooled sample (a log-likelihood of -347.5) 
deteriorates significantly relative to the individual samples (LL = -93.6 + -217.7 = 
 
                                                 
14 In fact, for some of the editions analyzed in this study the correlation is marginally below unity due to 
small changes in the initial set of prizes. 
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Table 2.3: Probit regression results within countries. The table displays the results from 
the probit regression analyses of the DOND decisions in our large- and small-stake samples 
from the Netherlands (Panel A), Belgium (B) and Australia (C). The dependent variable is 
the contestant’s decision, with a value of 1 for “Deal” and 0 for “No Deal”. Age is 
measured in years. Gender is a dummy variable with a value of 1 assigned to females. 
Education is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for contestants with bachelor-degree 
level or higher (including students) or equivalent work experience. EV is the current 
average remaining prize in Euros and EV0 is the initial average. BO is the bank offer. Stdev 
measures the standard deviation of the distribution of the average remaining prize in the 
next game round. Australian Dollars are converted into Euros by using a single fixed rate of 
€0.60 per A$. Observations with no bank offer (which occasionally occur when only 
insignificant amounts remain or due to a substituting swap offer) are excluded. The first 
column shows the large-stake results, the second column shows the small-stake results and 
the last three columns show the results for the large- and small-stake samples from one 
country combined. Apart from the maximum likelihood estimates for the regression 
coefficients, the table reports the log-likelihood (LL), the mean log-likelihood (MLL), 
McFadden’s R-squared, and the number of observations. The p-values (within parentheses) 
are corrected for correlation between the responses of a given contestant (contestant-level 
cluster correction). 
 
 Large stakes Small stakes Pooled Pooled Pooled 
A. The Netherlands 
Constant -5.229 (0.000) -4.191 (0.000) -3.600 (0.000) -4.311 (0.000) -4.251 (0.000)
Age 0.021 (0.085) -0.001 (0.890) 0.008 (0.130) 0.014 (0.009) 0.012 (0.042)
Gender 0.057 (0.780) 0.045 (0.740) -0.043 (0.710) -0.002 (0.990) -0.019 (0.870)
Education 0.009 (0.970) -0.255 (0.097) -0.078 (0.490) -0.035 (0.760) -0.068 (0.560)
EV/105 0.153 (0.000) 2.179 (0.000) 0.148 (0.000)  0.057 (0.110)
EV/EV0     0.624 (0.000) 0.538 (0.000)
BO/EV 2.677 (0.000) 1.148 (0.000) 1.390 (0.000) 1.868 (0.000) 1.802 (0.000)
Stdev/EV 3.597 (0.066) 3.345 (0.000) 2.787 (0.000) 2.567 (0.000) 2.690 (0.000)
LL -93.6  -217.7  -347.5  -333.0  -331.3  
MLL -0.321   -0.241   -0.291   -0.278   -0.277   
McFadden R2 0.337  0.448  0.353  0.380  0.383  
No. obs. 292   904   1196   1196   1196   
B. Belgium 
Constant -5.158 (0.001) -4.399 (0.000) -3.692 (0.000) -4.256 (0.000) -4.194 (0.000)
Age 0.006 (0.650) -0.004 (0.730) -0.000 (0.990) 0.005 (0.490) 0.002 (0.810)
Gender -0.204 (0.430) 0.033 (0.860) -0.033 (0.820) -0.139 (0.350) -0.080 (0.590)
Education 0.596 (0.017) 0.340 (0.076) 0.312 (0.043) 0.308 (0.051) 0.324 (0.038)
EV/105 0.848 (0.000) 5.510 (0.000) 0.799 (0.000)  0.387 (0.040)
EV/EV0     0.633 (0.000) 0.482 (0.001)
BO/EV 2.044 (0.018) 0.510 (0.220) 0.389 (0.250) 0.834 (0.064) 0.736 (0.097)
Stdev/EV 4.813 (0.031) 4.260 (0.000) 3.963 (0.000) 3.693 (0.000) 3.855 (0.000)
LL -34.5  -134.2  -181.5  -177.2  -175.5  
MLL -0.303   -0.219   -0.250   -0.244   -0.241   
McFadden R2 0.282  0.460  0.388  0.403  0.408  
No. obs. 114   613   727   727   727   
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
 
 Large stakes Small stakes Pooled Pooled Pooled 
C. Australia 
Constant -4.052 (0.007) -4.119 (0.000) -3.638 (0.000) -4.023 (0.000) -4.032 (0.000)
Age -0.012 (0.786) -0.001 (0.890) -0.001 (0.778) -0.000 (0.959) -0.000 (0.987)
Gender -0.772 (0.321) 0.339 (0.007) 0.261 (0.030) 0.255 (0.033) 0.270 (0.024)
Education -1.415 (0.001) -0.162 (0.160) -0.246 (0.027) -0.213 (0.049) -0.231 (0.038)
EV/105 0.636 (0.000) 2.976 (0.002) 0.478 (0.000)  0.209 (0.175)
EV/EV0     0.342 (0.001) 0.294 (0.010)
BO/EV 1.767 (0.000) 1.845 (0.000) 1.504 (0.000) 1.649 (0.000) 1.665 (0.000)
Stdev/EV 6.439 (0.007) 3.219 (0.000) 3.544 (0.000) 3.494 (0.000) 3.495 (0.000)
LL -27.1  -244.8  -284.7  -278.5  -277.5  
MLL -0.271   -0.246   -0.261   -0.255   -0.254   
McFadden R2 0.384  0.349  0.322  0.337  0.340  
No. obs. 100   993   1093   1093   1093   
 
 
-311.3), reflecting the very different absolute-stakes coefficients in the two samples. 
However, if the stakes are measured in relative terms, the fit of the pooled sample (LL = 
-333.0) is much more comparable to the fit of the individual samples. Including both the 
absolute and the relative-stakes variables hardly improves the explanatory power (LL = 
-331.3) compared to using the relative-stakes variable only. 
To summarize, while the sensitivity of the “Deal” propensity to the absolute level 
of the stakes is much higher in the small-stake edition, the sensitivity to the relative 
level of the stakes is comparable. The contestants respond in a similar way to changes in 
the relative stakes in each sample, even though the absolute stakes differ by a factor of 
12.5. This suggests that the choice behavior in DOND is highly reference dependent. 
Decisions appear not to be based on an evaluation of the absolute amounts that are at 
stake, as we would expect an expected utility maximizer to do, but on the relative size 
of the amounts. A given bank offer or prize appears to be considered as “large” in the 
context of a game where it lies in the upper range of the initial set of prizes, and the 
same amount seems to be evaluated as “small” in a game where it belongs to the lower 
range of prizes. 
Panel B and C show the results for Belgium and Australia, respectively. For both 
pairs of samples from these countries the same pattern arises. The sensitivity for 
absolute stakes is much lower in the large-stake edition than in the small-stake edition 
(0.848 vs. 5.510 for Belgium, and 0.636 vs. 2.976 for Australia), while the sensitivity 
for relative stakes is comparable (0.728 vs. 0.633 for Belgium, and 0.591 vs. 0.341 for 
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Australia; not shown in Table 2.3).15 Note that the relative-stakes coefficients are not 
only comparable within each country, but also across the three countries included in the 
analysis so far. Compared to the relative magnitude of the stakes, the absolute-stakes 
variable hardly provides any contribution to the empirical fit of the pooled samples. 
These findings strengthen our interpretation that decisions are primarily based on the 
relative values of the amounts at stake. 
Various robustness checks did not change our results. For example, we added a 
quadratic stakes term to the regression to analyze if the relationship between deal 
propensity and stakes is non-linear. The linear and quadratic terms combined can give a 
second-order Taylor series approximation to an arbitrary (twice continuously 
differentiable) function. In each sample, the quadratic term is significantly negative, 
suggesting that the deal propensity becomes less sensitive to stakes at higher stakes 
levels. Nonetheless, the main conclusion about the importance of the relative level of 
the stakes remains the same. When the stakes are measured in absolute amounts, the 
differences between the quadratic terms are of the same order of magnitude as the 
differences in the squared initial average prize. Consequently, the empirical fit in the 
pooled samples deteriorates significantly relative to the individual samples if the stakes 
are measured in absolute terms, and is comparable to the fit in the individual samples if 
the stakes are measured in relative terms. Although including a squared stakes term 
improves the empirical fit, the additional term is highly correlated with the linear term 
and the linear term is more important. For the sake of parsimony, we therefore do not 
include the quadratic terms in the reported analyses. 
 
2.4 Evidence from Other Countries and Cross-Country Analyses 
The analyses in the last two sections used data from different editions from the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Australia. Comparing different versions from only one 
country mitigates the potential confounding effects of wealth and culture. However, 
DOND has been aired in many other countries too, including several other developed, 
                                                 
15 The absolute- and relative-stakes coefficients for the Australian small-stake sample are rather small 
compared to the coefficients for the Australian large-stake sample. This is partly attributable to the 
choices of contestant Dean Cartechini, a very lucky contestant in the June 17, 2004 episode, who played 
the game to the end only to discover that he had the top prize of A$200,000 in his case. If we exclude the 
choices of this particular contestant from the regression, the absolute stakes coefficient increases from 
2.976 to 4.009 and the relative stakes coefficient increases from 0.341 to 0.460. 
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Western countries, and it would be interesting to see if we find similar effects of 
absolute and relative stakes. In this section, we will therefore repeat our probit analysis 
for samples from the US, the UK, Germany and Switzerland, and we will also perform 
large, pooled-sample analyses across the ten different editions. Table 2.4 shows 
summary statistics for the four additional editions. 
The US, German and Swiss editions are similar to the Dutch and Belgian large-
stake version and to the two Australian versions analyzed in the previous sections: the 
shows start with 26 cases, last for a maximum of 9 rounds, and the number of cases 
opened in each round is 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1 and 1 respectively; see Figure 2.1.16 The UK 
version is somewhat different, and resembles the small-stake versions from Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Some US, UK and Swiss contestants are offered the opportunity to 
swap their case at some point during the game. We ignore this option, as, in common 
with the Dutch small-stake edition, it is offered only sporadically, does not replace a 
monetary bank offer (apart from a few exceptions in the UK), and is often rejected. 
For the US, we use the same sample as in PVBT (2008), which covers the first 53 
contestants (402 choice observations) after the premiere on December 19, 2005. The 
stakes in the US are relatively large: the regular format has a maximum prize of 
$1,000,000 (€800,000 using €0.80 per $) and an average prize of $131,478 (€105,182). 
In our sample, the average prize is even larger ($142,435), because six games were 
played with higher amounts to mark the beginning and end of a series of episodes. 
We updated the German sample of PVBT with data from the series aired from 
November 2006 to May 2007. This adds an extra 34 contestants and brings the total to 
81 (628 choice observations). Most new episodes were recorded by a friend of the 
authors, and the remainder were kindly provided by Endemol Deutschland. The initial 
stakes across the 81 games amount to €25,335 (€26,347 for the first 20 contestants, 
€25,003 for the other 61). 
DOND was introduced on Swiss TV on September 1, 2004. We obtained the first 
two seasons of 44 and 45 weekly episodes (691 choice observations) from Schweizer 
Fernsehen. The initial average prize in each of the 89 episodes of “Deal or No Deal – 
 
                                                 
16 The first 20 contestants in our sample from Germany actually started with 20 cases. Effectively, their 
games can be analyzed as if the first round was skipped. 
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics for the US, UK, German and Swiss edition. The table 
shows descriptive statistics for our samples from the US, the UK, Germany and 
Switzerland. Definitions are similar to Table 2.1. US Dollars, UK Pounds and Swiss Francs 
are converted into Euros by using single fixed rates of €0.80, €1.50 and €0.65, respectively. 
 
 Mean Stdev Min Median Max
A. US edition (53 contestants) 
Age (years) 34.98 10.03 22.00 33.00 76.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 7.70 1.29 5.00 8.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 80.98 17.57 44.04 83.52 112.00
Offer Accepted (%) 91.43 15.31 49.16 97.83 112.50
Amount Won (€) 98,035.66 95,556.94 4.00 75,200.00 371,200.00
B. UK edition (326 contestants) 
Age (years) 42.42 14.93 19.00 38.00 83.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 5.38 1.23 3.00 5.00 7.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 55.10 20.60 8.00 53.43 120.63
Offer Accepted (%) 72.45 23.56 12.66 74.23 104.00
Amount Won (€) 24,287.14 25,496.60 0.02 19,425.00 180,000.00
C. German edition (81 contestants) 
Age (years) 35.96 9.86 18.00 34.00 62.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.42 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 7.95 1.57 4.00 8.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 85.49 31.51 35.24 81.82 190.40
Offer Accepted (%) 93.17 19.19 51.52 94.08 159.84
Amount Won (€) 20,528.91 23,503.69 0.01 15,000.00 150,000.00
D. Swiss edition (89 contestants) 
Age (years) 40.20 10.06 18.00 40.00 60.00
Gender (female = 1) 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Education (high = 1) 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stop Round 8.20 1.78 4.00 8.00 10.00
Best Offer Rejected (%) 79.25 16.71 35.25 84.05 104.89
Offer Accepted (%) 87.36 14.54 48.75 90.94 108.70
Amount Won (€) 11,413.64 13,634.22 0.03 7,150.00 78,000.00
 
 
Das Risiko” is Fr.26,898 (€17,583 using €0.65 per Fr.) and the largest prize is 
Fr.250,000 (€162,500). 
The UK version started on October 31, 2005 and was normally aired six times a 
week. The game commences with 22 prizes averaging £25,712 (€38,568 using €1.50 per 
£) and includes a top prize of £250,000 (€375,000). Over the maximum number of 6 
rounds, 5, 3, 3, 3, 3 and 3 cases are opened, respectively. Thanks to the frequency with 
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Table 2.5: Probit regression results for the US, UK, German and Swiss edition. The 
table displays the results from the probit regression analyses of the DOND decisions in our 
four samples from the US (first column), the UK (second column), Germany (third column) 
and Switzerland (fourth column). Definitions are similar to Table 2.3. US Dollars, UK 
Pounds and Swiss Francs are converted into Euros by using single fixed rates of €0.80, 
€1.50 and €0.65, respectively. 
 
 US UK Germany Switzerland 
Constant -5.239 (0.000) -4.470 (0.000) -4.867 (0.000) -4.403 (0.000) 
Age -0.006 (0.740) 0.004 (0.220) 0.009 (0.258) 0.002 (0.812) 
Gender -0.228 (0.370) 0.020 (0.850) 0.146 (0.451) -0.465 (0.008) 
Education -0.279 (0.210) -0.263 (0.025) 0.081 (0.679) 0.042 (0.821) 
EV/105 0.515 (0.000) 1.706 (0.000) 2.460 (0.000) 3.336 (0.000) 
EV/EV0       
BO/EV 3.447 (0.000) 2.827 (0.000) 1.545 (0.000) 2.430 (0.000) 
Stdev/EV 3.377 (0.000) 2.166 (0.000) 3.248 (0.000) 2.079 (0.000) 
LL -77.9  -417.6  -128.2  -135.2  
MLL -0.194   -0.252   -0.204   -0.196   
McFadden R2 0.463  0.387  0.386  0.287  
No. obs. 402   1656   628   691   
 
 
which the program was aired and the readiness of Endemol UK to provide us with 
recordings, we have collected a large sample covering all 326 episodes (1656 choice 
observations) up to December 11, 2006. 
Table 2.5 shows the probit estimation results. Again, contestant characteristics are 
generally insignificant, while the game characteristics are highly important in every 
sample. The “Deal” propensity increases with the relative bank offer, with the 
dispersion of the prizes, and with the level of the stakes. 
To facilitate a comparison of the absolute- and relative-stakes coefficients across 
the various editions, Table 2.6 summarizes the results for all samples by listing the 
absolute-stakes and relative-stakes coefficients from each one-sample regression, 
including the earlier regressions for the Netherlands, Belgium and Australia. Clearly, 
the variation in the absolute-stakes coefficients is much larger than the variation in the 
relative-stakes coefficients, consistent with the notion of relative valuation. For 
example, the absolute-stakes coefficient in the Dutch large-stake edition is roughly 36 
times smaller than that in the Belgian small-stake edition; since the absolute stakes 
differ between the two editions by roughly the same factor (34.5), the two relative-
stakes coefficients are almost identical. The sensitivity to the absolute level of the 
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Table 2.6: Overview of absolute- and relative-stakes effects. The table provides an 
overview of the probit regression coefficients for the absolute- and relative-stakes variables 
in multivariate probit regressions of the DOND decisions in the various editions of the 
game show. Age, Gender, Education, BO/EV and Stdev/EV are included as control 
variables. The results for the absolute-stakes variable EV/105 are taken from Table 2.3 and 
Table 2.5. The coefficients for the relative-stakes variable EV/EV0 are obtained by 
substituting the absolute-stakes variable for this variable. Also included for each edition are 
the mean initial average of the prizes in the game ( 0EV ; in Euros), the number of 
contestants (No. cont.) and the number of DOND decisions (No. obs.). Editions are 
arranged in order of initial average prize. 
 
 No. No. Stakes 
Sample EV0 cont. obs. Absolute Relative 
Australia, small 11,467 140 993 2.976 0.341 
Belgium, small 11,492 129 613 5.510 0.633 
Switzerland 17,483 89 691 3.336 0.583 
Germany 25,335 81 628 2.460 0.614 
The Netherlands, small 31,629 204 904 2.179 0.689 
UK 38,568 326 1,656 1.706 0.658 
Belgium, large 85,792 19 114 0.848 0.728 
Australia, large 92,934 18 100 0.636 0.591 
US 113,948 53 402 0.515 0.635 
The Netherlands, large 396,001 56 292 0.153 0.596 
 
 
amounts at stake is clearly negatively related to the initial average prize (EV0), whereas 
the relative-stakes coefficient is roughly equal (≈ 0.6) across all editions. (The results 
for the Australian small-stake edition appear somewhat different from the rest, but, as 
explained in Footnote 15, the low values can be attributed in part to the choices of only 
one single contestant.) 
We conclude with a probit regression analysis for the large sample of editions 
combined. Note that this analysis is based on a very large data set of nearly 6,400 
choices made by more than 1,100 different contestants. The results are presented in 
Table 2.7. If the stakes are included in absolute terms (first column), the empirical fit of 
the pooled sample (a log-likelihood of -1726.0) is clearly worse than the fit of the model 
that includes the stakes in relative terms (second column; LL = -1629.9). This result 
reflects the differences in absolute-stakes coefficients across the samples and the 
similarity of the relative-stakes coefficients that we observed earlier. Including both 
stakes terms substantially improves the fit (last column; LL = -1620.5) compared to the 
absolute-stakes model, whereas the improvement is rather limited compared to the  
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Table 2.7: Probit regression results across countries. The table displays the results from 
the pooled probit regression analyses across the ten different editions of DOND used in this 
study. Definitions are the same as those in Table 2.3. 
 
 All samples All samples All samples 
Constant -3.287 (0.000) -4.069 (0.000) -4.062 (0.000) 
Age 0.001 (0.640) 0.004 (0.063) 0.003 (0.143) 
Gender -0.025 (0.630) -0.011 (0.827) -0.010 (0.839) 
Education -0.098 (0.055) -0.072 (0.180) -0.088 (0.099) 
EV/105 0.208 (0.000)  0.100 (0.001) 
EV/EV0  0.548 (0.000) 0.499 (0.000) 
BO/EV 1.481 (0.000) 1.730 (0.000) 1.735 (0.000) 
Stdev/EV 2.491 (0.000) 2.648 (0.000) 2.687 (0.000) 
LL -1726.0  -1629.9  -1620.5   
MLL -0.270   -0.255   -0.253  
McFadden R2 0.309  0.348  0.351   
No. obs. 6393   6393   6393  
 
 
relative-stakes model, strengthening our interpretation that decisions are primarily 
driven by the relative values of the amounts that are at stake, and to a much lesser extent 
by their absolute monetary values. 
 
2.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The TV game show DOND is a natural laboratory for studying risky choice. This 
chapter examines a unique data set of approximately 6,400 choices from ten different 
editions and six different countries. The editions employ different sets of prizes, and we 
use these differences to separate the effects of the absolute and relative amounts at stake 
on risky choice. In the first part of the analysis, we restrict ourselves to three 
comparisons of a large-stake edition with a small-stake edition from the same country. 
This type of analysis avoids the possible systematic differences between countries that 
may arise when comparing editions from different countries. In the second part of the 
analysis, we combine the data from the ten different editions and six different countries. 
Both types of analysis suggest that the choices in DOND are highly sensitive to the 
context in which they occur, as defined by the initial set of prizes in the game. 
Contestants respond in a similar way to the relative level of stakes, even though the 
absolute level of the stakes differs significantly across the various editions. Amounts 
therefore appear to be primarily evaluated in proportion to a subjective frame of 
reference rather than in terms of their absolute monetary value. 
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In an unreported analysis, we find similar results for DOND samples from 
Hungary, India, Mexico and Thailand. We left these samples out of the original 
analysis, because effects of culture and wealth are likely to confound the results. It is 
however comforting to note that the results are in line with the results presented in this 
study. The estimated coefficients for relative stakes are very similar to those reported 
here for our editions from developed Western countries. Similar results were also found 
in classroom experiments with business and economics students and relatively small 
stakes. 
We hope that our results provide a stimulus for the further development and 
proliferation of reference-dependent choice theory. Our results seem, for example, 
consistent with the use of a subjective reference point that is proportional to the average 
prize at the outset of the game. Unfortunately, testing specific choice theories is 
difficult, among other things, because they involve many degrees of freedom and 
because it is not immediately clear how the known results for static choice problems 
generalize to the type of dynamic problems seen in this game show. 
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Chapter 3: 
Random Task Incentive Systems 
in Risky Choice Experiments17 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the effects of random task incentive systems (RTISs), where 
only one randomly selected task is played for real, in a dynamic risky choice 
experiment. We perform three variations of the experiment: one with one task per 
subject played for real, one with a within-subjects RTIS, and one with a between-
subjects RTIS. In the two RTIS designs, a significantly larger proportion of choices are 
made completely at random. Further, in the within-subjects RTIS design, we find strong 
carry-over effects from outcomes of previously performed tasks. Risk aversion increases 
after unfavorable results in the two most recent tasks and decreases after favorable 
results. The between-subjects design avoids carry-over effects from other tasks, but 
leads to substantially lower risk aversion than the guaranteed-payment design, implying 
that there is a bias. The results suggest that caution is warranted when applying RTISs. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Risky choice experiments commonly use a random task incentive system (RTIS) 
to implement real incentives while avoiding income effects. Early studies that 
implemented an RTIS include Allais (1953), Tversky (1967a, 1967b), Yaari (1965), 
Rosett (1971), Smith (1976), Grether and Plott (1979), and Reilly (1982). It is the only 
incentive system known today that avoids income effects. 
In the most common RTIS, each subject performs a series of tasks, knowing that 
only one of these tasks will be randomly selected at the end to be for real. Although 
there have been several debates about the validity of the method, it has by now been 
                                                 
17 This chapter is based on the paper “Random Task Incentive Systems in Risky Choice Experiments”, 
co-authored by Guido Baltussen, Thierry Post, and Peter P. Wakker. We thank conference participants at 
FUR 2008 Barcelona for useful comments and suggestions, and Nick de Heer for his skillful research 
assistance. The support by Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus Research Institute of Management and Erasmus 
Center for Financial Research is gratefully acknowledged. 
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widely accepted in studies of individual choice in experimental economics (Holt, 1986; 
Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Lee, 2008). 
A second, more radical type of RTIS has been used recently, where not every 
subject is paid. A subset of the subjects is selected randomly, and only for these subjects 
one of their tasks, randomly selected, is for real. A drawback of this procedure is that 
the probability of real play is further reduced, leading to a lower motivation on the part 
of the subjects. In return, however, higher prizes can be awarded to the subjects who do 
play for real, which will improve motivation. Examples of studies in the field of risky 
choice that apply this incentive method are Camerer and Ho (1994), Harrison, Lau and 
Rutström (2007), and Harrison, List and Towe (2007). 
In the latter type of RTIS, there is selection both regarding the tasks and regarding 
the subjects. To investigate the effects of these two elements of the selection process in 
isolation, our study will consider, besides the most typical RTIS, a RTIS where there is 
no selection of tasks. That is, each subject performs only one single task, after which 
some subjects are randomly selected for whom the outcome of their task will be for real. 
We call this design the between-subjects (BS) RTIS, and the other, typical design the 
within-subjects (WS) RTIS. The case where both tasks and subjects are selected is 
called the hybrid RTIS. An example of a BS RTIS from the field of risky choice 
experiments is in Tversky and Kahneman (1981), who use it in a robustness check of a 
hypothetical-stakes experiment. 
Often, experiments use real incentives to motivate subjects. Several studies 
however, particularly those by psychologists, use no monetary incentives at all. 
Evidence on the validity of such thought experiments for measuring risk aversion 
generally indicates that subjects are less risk averse. See, for example, Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999), Holt and Laury (2002), and Rubinstein (2001). 
We analyze the effects of RTISs in the setting of a dynamic risky choice 
experiment that is based on the popular TV game show Deal or No Deal (DOND). This 
show has received substantial attention from researchers. DOND has been widely 
recognized as a natural laboratory for studying risky choice behavior (Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2008). The game is dynamic because it uses multiple game 
rounds and the choice problem in each round depends on the outcomes of earlier 
rounds. Section 3.3 explains the game in more detail. 
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We investigate three different treatments. In the first, basic, treatment each subject 
plays the game once and for real. We will refer to this treatment as the guaranteed-
payment design. In the second treatment, subjects play the game ten times, of which one 
is randomly selected for real payment (WS RTIS design). In the third treatment, each 
subject plays the game once, with a ten percent chance of real payment (BS RTIS 
design). We vary only the incentive system. Other factors, including for example the 
face values of the prizes in the game, are held constant across the treatments. We 
investigate three potential effects that can occur in a RTIS experiment: biased risk 
aversion, increased decision errors, and carry-over effects from outcomes of previously 
performed tasks. The properties of DOND allow us to study the three effects on the 
basis of this one single type of task. To analyze the two former effects, we contrast the 
choices in the two RTIS treatments with those in the guaranteed-payment treatment. 
The carry-over effect appears from comparing the various choices in a WS design. In 
RTIS experiments, payments are individual and independent of other subjects, and 
effects of incentive systems based on team or relative performance (van Dijk, 
Sonnemans and van Winden, 2001) therefore play no role. 
We find a significant frequency of errors in the RTIS treatments that are unrelated 
to the characteristics of the choice problem. Subjects appear to have lapses of 
concentration and/or refrain from efforts to seriously evaluate the decision problem, 
resulting in choices that seem to be completely at random. Furthermore, in the WS 
design, we also observe strong carry-over effects of prior tasks: risk aversion increases 
after unfavorable outcomes in the two most recent previous games, and decreases after 
favorable outcomes. On average, risk aversion in the WS RTIS experiment is not 
significantly different from that in the guaranteed-payment design. The BS design is 
based on one task per subject and therefore avoids carry-over effects from prior tasks 
altogether. However, in this design, risk aversion is substantially lower than in the 
guaranteed-payment treatment, suggesting a serious bias. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides background and 
motivation. In Section 3.3, we describe the game of DOND and other aspects of our 
experiments. Section 3.4 presents results, Section 3.5 discusses these results, and 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
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3.2 Background and Motivation 
RTISs are known under several other names, including “random lottery incentive 
system” (Starmer and Sugden, 1991, and several other papers), “random lottery 
selection method” (Holt, 1986), “random problem selection procedure” (Beattie and 
Loomes, 1997), and “random round payoff mechanism” (Lee, 2008). The different 
names apply to particular types of experiments (risky choice or social dilemma), 
rewards (lotteries or outcomes) or tasks (composite or single-choice) only. Clearly, 
there is no convention about the name of the method. We use “random task incentive 
system”, because this name describes the method for any type of experiment, reward 
and task. 
First, we will discuss whether RTISs influence subjects’ degree of risk aversion. 
Holt (1986) raised a serious concern against WS RTISs that will hold at least in theory. 
Subjects may not perceive each choice in the experiment in isolation. Rather, they may 
perceive the whole experiment as a meta-lottery, entailing a probability distribution over 
the different choices and their resulting outcomes. Such a perception may lead to 
distortions if the subjects violate the independence condition of expected utility. 
Violations of the latter condition have been widely documented (Allais, 1953; Starmer, 
2000). Isolation entails that subjects, to the contrary, take each choice in the experiment 
for real and as the only real, leading to proper experimental measurements. 
Milder forms of the problem of reduction are also conceivable, where subjects do 
not fully integrate all choices and the RTIS lottery but nevertheless the choices do affect 
each other, leading to some distortions still (partial reduction). Cubitt, Starmer and 
Sugden (1998a) also argue that there can be differences between subjects in the way 
they treat the experiment, and that even if most subjects may treat each task in isolation, 
a minority may do reduce the whole experiment to a single problem. 
The validity of the WS RTIS method has been empirically analyzed in several 
studies. In a cleverly designed experiment based on simple, pairwise decision problems, 
Starmer and Sugden (1991) find isolation verified. However, in a direct comparison of 
the choices in a RTIS treatment with those in a guaranteed-payment sample they find a 
marginally significant difference. This difference is not confirmed in later studies: in 
further investigations with more subjects, Beattie and Loomes (1997), Cubitt, Starmer 
and Sugden (1998a), and Laury (2006) conclude that, for simple, pairwise decisions, 
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there is no evidence of reduction or different risk aversion in RTIS tasks than in tasks 
with guaranteed payment. Camerer (1989) also finds that WS RTISs elicit true 
preferences. Virtually every subject in his experiment held on to her earlier choice when 
she was allowed to change her decision after the gamble to be played for real had been 
determined. Hey and Lee (2005a, 2005b) compare the empirical fit of various 
preference specifications under reduction with the fit under isolation, and conclude in 
favor of isolation.18 All in all, the afore-mentioned studies are supportive of WS RTIS 
for simple binary choices. 
In a pure BS experiment, each subject performs only one single task. In his lecture 
for the Nobel Foundation, Kahneman (2002) argues for the use of this design to study 
preferences. When a RTIS is employed in a BS experiment, only a fraction of the 
subjects are paid for their task. The concern of Holt (1986) also applies to BS RTISs, 
and biased risk preferences may result if subjects integrate the choice problem they face 
with the RTIS lottery. Relative to the WS design, the BS design may be more 
susceptible to reduction. Reduction now only requires straightforward multiplication of 
the probabilities of one task with the probability of real payment and no other tasks have 
to be taken into account. There have not been many investigations into the performance 
of the BS RTIS for risky choices. The only test we are aware of is in Cubitt, Starmer 
and Sugden (1998b). Using a simple binary choice problem, they find a marginally 
significant difference, with lower risk aversion in the RTIS treatment. 
In our experiments, we hold the face values of the prizes constant and only vary 
the incentive system that is used. Because payment of the outcome of a task is not sure 
in the RTIS designs, a subject’s expected reward for solving a decision problem is 
smaller than her reward in the case of guaranteed payment. Besides possibly biased risk 
attitudes, another effect might therefore occur in our RTIS treatments: when the benefits 
of incurring decision costs are smaller, subjects may be less motivated to consider 
choice problems profoundly, resulting in more choices that are driven by errors (for 
theoretical models and literature surveys, see Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, Smith and 
                                                 
18 The two papers of Hey and Lee differ mainly in the assumptions about the range of tasks that subjects 
combine into one composite gamble if reduction would occur. In the first paper they assume that subjects 
are only aware of previous tasks and the choices they made so far, and that subjects therefore only take 
those previous decisions into account when making their current decision. In the second paper they 
assume that subjects are aware of all tasks and therefore that subjects can also take future decisions into 
account. 
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Walker, 1993, and Wilcox, 1993). For tasks with, for example, a one-in-ten chance of 
being selected, the expected reward is ten times smaller when the nominal stakes are 
held constant, whereas subjects’ costs of discovering optimal choices are not affected. 
Most prior investigations of RTISs used simple choice problems that require little 
mental effort, and therefore they may have avoided the potential effects of reward 
dilution. Many risky choice problems (including the dynamic choice problems used in 
our experiment) are however cognitively more demanding and therefore increase the 
importance of incentives as a means to raise subjects’ willingness to incur decision costs 
and reduce errors. 
In experiments, Wilcox (1993) found that the probability of task selection (i.e., the 
strength of incentives) in a WS RTIS design is not important if choices concern simple, 
one-stage lotteries. For more complex two-stage lotteries (that are distributionally 
equivalent to the one-stage lotteries), an increased probability did, on the contrary, 
improve decisions. Apparently, the higher expected payoff per task encourages subjects 
to spend more efforts. Moffatt (2005) also confirms that higher incentives bring about 
an increase in efforts and that subjects are discouraged by complex tasks. 
Unfortunately, the effects of decision errors do not always cancel out in a large 
sample. For example, if the least risky alternative is optimal for a given subject, errors 
can only increase observed risk aversion. Harrison (1989, 1994) raises concerns that 
diluted rewards may even have resulted in inaccurate inferences in the literature about 
the (in)validity of expected utility theory. 
Further, if reward dilution is an issue in RTIS experiments, the effect may not be 
constant across the different tasks of a WS design. With every task, subjects gain 
experience in making decisions, and, with experience, decision costs decrease, resulting 
in fewer errors (Smith and Walker, 1993). Subjects also become more familiar with the 
software and/or devices, further decreasing the likelihood of errors. On the other hand, 
subjects in experiments with repeated tasks may become bored, resulting in reduced 
concentration and increased error variance. 
Prior analyses of the validity of RTISs almost exclusively concerned static choice 
problems, in which each task requires the subjects to choose between two simple 
lotteries. Many actual choice problems are, however, dynamic, consisting of multiple 
sub-problems with intermediate decisions and outcomes. In an experimental setting 
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where each subject performs a series of dynamic choice tasks and where each task is 
paid for real, outcomes of prior tasks may distort the following choices because of an 
income effect (see, for example, Cox and Epstein, 1989). In this respect, WS RTIS has 
an additional advantage over using real monetary rewards for each task. Because only 
one task is randomly chosen at the end of the experiment, there is no accumulation of 
payoffs from the different tasks, implying that potential income effects are eschewed. 
Modern reference-dependent decision theories such as prospect theory suggest that 
outcomes of earlier tasks may generate a reference-point effect. Thaler and Johnson 
(1990) show that risk aversion indeed depends on previous gains and losses. Also, 
changes in the expected value of a subject’s payment from the experiment resulting 
from favorable or unfavorable earlier tasks may change a subject’s risk aversion 
(Grether and Plott, 1979, p.630). Lee (2008) finds that income effects are present in his 
guaranteed-payment design, and absent in his treatment that employs a WS RTIS. 
However, Lee required subjects to perform two different types of tasks in each of ten 
subsequent rounds of his experiment, and only analyzed the impact of the incentive 
method used for the second type of tasks on decisions in the first type. Thus, he did not 
investigate potential correlation between prior outcomes and decisions in one given and 
repeated type of task. Whether or not prior intermediate outcomes in a WS RTIS 
experiment affect choice behavior will be examined in our study. 
We examine the effects of RTISs for risky choices. Various other studies analyze 
this incentive method in other fields. Bolle (1990) and Sefton (1992) analyze the BS 
RTIS. Bolle considers ultimatum games, and finds that behavior in the BS RTIS 
treatment is not different from real tasks. Sefton, on the contrary, finds that a BS RTIS 
does affect behavior in experiments with dictator games. Papers analyzing hybrid RTISs 
in other fields than risky choice are Armantier (2006), Harrison, Lau and Williams 
(2002), and Stahl and Haruvy (2006). Armantier performs an ultimatum-game 
experiment and finds that behavior is not different from behavior in a WS RTIS design. 
Harrison, Lau and Williams conduct an experiment designed to elicit discount rates and 
find no effect of the magnitude of the probability of selection across subjects. For 
dictator experiments, Stahl and Haruvy find that a hybrid RTIS leads to significant 
differences. 
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3.3 The Experiment 
Our experiment mimics the choice problems in the TV game show Deal or No 
Deal (DOND). Other studies using experiments based on this TV show include 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008), Deck, Lee, Reyes and Rosen (2008), and 
Post, Van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008). 
In every game round of DOND, the subject has to choose between a sure 
alternative and a risky lottery with known probabilities. DOND requires no special 
skills or knowledge. At the start of a game, the contestant chooses one case out of a total 
of 26 numbered cases, each hiding one out of 26 randomly distributed amounts.19 The 
contestant does not know the content of the chosen case. Next, she has to select 6 of the 
other 25 cases to be opened, revealing their prizes, and revealing that these prizes are 
not in the case chosen by the contestant. Then, the banker specifies a price for which he 
is willing to buy the contestant’s case. If the contestant decides “No Deal”, she enters 
the second round and has to open 5 additional cases, followed by a new bank offer. The 
game continues this way until the contestant either accepts an offer, or rejects all offers 
and receives the contents of her own case. The maximum number of game rounds to be 
played is 9, and the number of cases to be opened in each round is 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 
and 1, reducing the number of remaining cases from 26 to 20, 15, 11, 8, 6, 5, 4, 3, and, 
finally, 2. 
Our experiment uses the 26 prizes of the original Dutch edition, scaled down by a 
factor of 10,000, with the lowest amounts rounded up to one cent. The resulting set of 
prizes is: €0.01 (9 times); €0.05; €0.10; €0.25; €0.50; €0.75; €1; €2.50; €5; €7.50; €10; 
€20; €30; €40; €50; €100; €250; €500. The distribution of prizes is clearly positively 
skewed, and has a median of €0.63 and a mean of €39.14. 
In the TV episodes, the bank offer starts from a small fraction of the average 
remaining prize in the early game rounds and approaches the average remaining prize in 
the last few game rounds. Although the bank offers can be predicted accurately (Post et 
al., 2008), we eliminate any remaining ambiguity by fixing the percentage bank offer in 
                                                 
19 Deal or No Deal is aired in dozens of countries, sometimes under a different name. There are many 
editions of the show, each with its own set of prizes, but the basic structure and the game rules are always 
similar. Some editions use a different number of cases and game rounds (for example, 22 cases and 6 
game rounds in the UK). Baltussen, Post and Van den Assem (2007) includes descriptions and analyses 
of ten different editions. 
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each game round and by including these percentages in the instructions handed out to 
the subjects. The percentages for round 1 to 9 are 15, 30, 45, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100 and 
100, respectively. The resulting monetary offers are rounded to the nearest cent. 
We consider three variations to the same experiment that differ only in the 
incentive system used. The first experiment uses guaranteed payment. Each subject 
plays the game once and for real. In the second, or WS RTIS treatment, subjects play 
the game ten times. At the end of this treatment, one out of the ten different outcomes is 
randomly selected for real payment. In the third, or BS RTIS treatment, subjects play 
the game once with a ten percent chance of real payment. 
The different treatments all draw from the same student population. For each 
experiment we randomly selected first-year Economics students at the Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam. Students were not allowed to participate in more than one 
treatment. Given the random allocation of subjects to the different subject pools and the 
homogeneous population of first-year economics students, the different groups are 
likely to be very similar. 
A research assistant developed computer software that generates random 
scenarios, displays the game situations, provides a user interface, and stores the game 
situations and choices of the subjects. All treatments of the experiment were conducted 
in a computerized laboratory and run in sessions with about 20 students sitting behind 
20 computer terminals simultaneously. To mitigate the ability to see what other subjects 
are doing and to provide a quiet environment, subjects were separated from each other 
with at least one unoccupied computer in between them. 
Before the experiment actually started, subjects were given ample time to read the 
instructions and they were offered the opportunity to pose questions (we allowed 
subjects to consult the instructions during the experiment). We next explained the 
relevant payment procedure. In the case of an RTIS treatment, we explained that 
choices were to be made as if payment would be for sure with each task. At the end of 
each session, the relevant payment procedure was carried out. In both RTIS treatments, 
a ten-sided die was thrown individually by each subject to determine her payment. The 
instructions of the WS RTIS treatment are in the appendix. The instructions to the other 
two treatments are similar, apart from the details about the number of games to be 
played and the incentive scheme. 
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3.4 Results 
A total of 97 subjects participated in the guaranteed-payment treatment, 100 
participated in the BS RTIS treatment, and 88 participated in the WS RTIS treatment. In 
the analyses below, we removed all games that ended up with trivial choice problems 
involving prizes of one cent only. 
 
Analysis of the Stop Round 
A rough way to compare the risk aversion across the different treatments is 
obtained by comparing the round in which contestants accepted a bank offer (“Deal”). 
After all, the bank offer becomes increasingly attractive as the game progresses, and 
therefore the longer a subject continues to play, the less risk averse she is likely to be. 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of the stop round for the three treatments (Panel A), 
including separate statistics for each of the ten successive games of the WS treatment 
(Panel B). For subjects who rejected all offers and played the game until the end, we set 
the stop round equal to 10. Figure 3.1 shows histograms of the stop round in the 
guaranteed-payment, WS, and BS design, respectively. 
To investigate the effects of the various RTIS designs on the degree of risk 
aversion, we compare the choices in the two RTIS treatments with those in the 
guaranteed-payment treatment. 
The averages of the stop round in the WS and guaranteed-payment treatment are 
roughly similar. Measured across the ten different games in the WS treatment, the 
average subject accepts a bank offer (“Deal”) in round 7.41, compared to 7.87 in the 
single-task design with guaranteed payment. Using a two-sided independent t-test 
shows that the difference is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level 
(t112.5 = 1.794, p = 0.076). Arguably, the decisions in the last nine games of the WS 
design may be contaminated by carry-over effects from the outcomes of earlier games, 
and/or affected by more familiarity with the task or boredom. If we drop the last nine 
games from the comparison and use the first game only, the difference (7.13 vs. 7.87) is 
larger but still statistically insignificant (t153.5 = 1.931, p = 0.055). (The lowest average 
stop round is recorded for the first game, but the average of this game is not 
significantly different from the rest.) Strictly speaking, this first analysis of the WS 
RTIS design yields no statistically significant evidence of biasedness. 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of the stop round. The table shows summary statistics of 
the stop round for the various treatments (Panel A), separate statistics for the ten successive 
games in the WS treatment (Panel B), and separate statistics for games in the WS treatment 
subdivided on the basis of the outcome of a prior task (Panel C). The stop round is the 
round number in which the bank offer is accepted (“Deal”), or 10 for subjects who rejected 
all offers. In the guaranteed-payment treatment (Guaranteed), subjects play the game once 
and for real. In the between-subjects RTIS treatment (BS RTIS), subjects play the game 
once with a ten percent chance of real payment. In the within-subjects RTIS treatment (WS 
RTIS), subjects play the game ten times with a random selection of one of the ten outcomes 
for real payment. Shown are the mean, the standard deviation (Stdev), the 25th percentile 
(P25), the median, the 75th percentile (P75) and the number of observations (No. obs.). 
 
 Mean Stdev P25 Median P75 No. obs. 
A. Overall 
Guaranteed 7.87 2.29 6.00 8.00 10.00 91 
BS RTIS 8.61 1.84 8.00 9.00 10.00 94 
WS RTIS 7.41 2.35 6.00 8.00 10.00 808 
B. WS RTIS conditional on the task number 
Game 1 7.13 2.64 5.00 8.00 9.00 78 
Game 2 7.33 2.50 5.00 8.00 10.00 82 
Game 3 7.37 2.31 6.00 7.50 10.00 76 
Game 4 7.36 2.37 6.00 8.00 10.00 80 
Game 5 7.28 2.41 5.00 8.00 10.00 78 
Game 6 7.31 2.28 5.50 8.00 9.00 84 
Game 7 7.81 2.38 7.00 8.00 10.00 80 
Game 8 7.77 2.14 6.00 8.00 10.00 82 
Game 9 7.35 2.18 6.00 8.00 9.00 83 
Game 10 7.41 2.29 6.00 8.00 9.00 85 
C. WS RTIS conditional on the outcome of a prior task 
EV-1 ≤ 39.14 7.27 2.31 5.00 8.00 9.00 376 
EV-1 > 39.14 7.66 2.34 6.00 8.00 10.00 291 
EV-2 ≤ 39.14 7.36 2.29 6.00 8.00 9.00 327 
EV-2 > 39.14 7.68 2.29 6.00 8.00 10.00 265 
EV-3 ≤ 39.14 7.48 2.29 6.00 8.00 10.00 288 
EV-3 > 39.14 7.45 2.37 6.00 8.00 10.00 232 
EV-4 ≤ 39.14 7.49 2.32 6.00 8.00 10.00 240 
EV-4 > 39.14 7.39 2.27 6.00 8.00 9.00 207 
 
 
The BS design, to the contrary, does seem to yield significantly biased measure-
ments of risk aversion. Subjects in the BS design choose to play longer: on average they 
accept a bank offer (“Deal”) in round 8.61, compared to 7.87 for the treatment with 
guaranteed payment (t172.5 = 2.416, p = 0.017). Nearly two-thirds of the subjects display 
risk-seeking behavior by rejecting actuarially fair offers. This rough way of analyzing 
suggests that the BS design generates a lower degree of risk aversion than the 
guaranteed-payment experiment. 
102
 102
A. Guaranteed-payment treatment 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
 
B. Within-subjects RTIS treatment 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
 
C. Between-subjects RTIS treatment 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Histograms of the stop round. The figure shows histograms of the stop round 
in the guaranteed-payment treatment (Panel A), in the WS RTIS treatment (Panel B) and in 
the BS RTIS treatment (Panel C). The stop round is the round number in which the bank 
offer is accepted (“Deal”), or 10 for subjects who rejected all offers. In the guaranteed-
payment treatment, subjects play the game once and for real. In the WS RTIS treatment, 
subjects play the game ten times with a random selection of one of the ten outcomes for real 
payment. In the BS RTIS treatment, subjects play the game once with a ten percent chance 
of real payment. 
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The above analyses of the average stop round do not correct for the potential 
influence of errors. Errors are likely to have an asymmetric effect in our experiment and 
to reduce the average stop round. Erroneous “Deal” decisions immediately end the 
game, whereas erroneous “No Deal” decisions may lead to only one extra round 
because the subject can stop the round after. If errors are more likely to occur in a RTIS 
design, this may bias our comparison of the average stop round. For the BS design, 
controlling for an asymmetric effect of errors would aggravate the difference with the 
guaranteed-payment design. For the WS design, however, doing so would reduce the 
difference. The histograms (Figure 3.1) do indeed yield some indications of increased 
errors in the treatments with a RTIS. The dispersion of the stop round seems to be larger 
in both the WS and the BS design. Some decisions appear to be made without any 
regard to the attractiveness of the alternative choice option. Accepting, for example, a 
bank offer of 15 or 30 percent (in round 1 and 2, respectively) of the mean of the 
remaining prizes implies an implausible degree of risk aversion if we would assume that 
this decision is really carefully considered. In the probit regression analyses of the next 
paragraph we will analyze the likelihood and effect of increased errors more thoroughly. 
To obtain a first indication of whether subjects’ choices are dependent on the 
outcomes of previous tasks, we compare the stop round of tasks preceded by tasks that 
unfolded favorably with those that unfolded less favorably. To classify the outcomes of 
prior tasks, we focus on the average remaining prize in the last game round (or the prize 
in the subject’s own briefcase if she rejected all bank offers), and we use the statistical 
average of the prizes present at the start of each game (€39.14) to create a division into 
“good” and “bad” outcomes. 
Panel C of Table 3.1 presents the results. The outcome of the latest prior task 
appears to have a significant influence on a subject’s choices in the current task. When 
the previous task ended with stakes below €39.14, the average stop round is 7.27, 
whereas the average stop round after a previous task that ended with larger stakes is 
7.66. The difference is significant (t619.6 = 2.106, p = 0.036). The sign of the effect of the 
penultimate prior task is similar, but the effect is weaker and only marginally significant 
(7.36 versus 7.68; t564.9 = 1.669, p = 0.096). The outcomes of games played more than 
two games earlier do not seem to have any effect on choice behavior in the current 
game. 
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Our approach to classify subjects into groups characterized by favorable and 
unfavorable prior outcomes may also pick up differences in risk aversion across 
subjects. More adventurous subjects play longer, and, due to the skewness of the prizes, 
subjects who play longer are more likely to end up with below-average stakes. 
However, based on this argument, we would expect subjects with below-average prior 
outcomes to take more risk, i.e., play more game rounds, which is opposite to what we 
observe. 
To summarize, the preliminary stop-round analysis suggests that the average 
degree of risk aversion in the WS design is roughly unaffected, but differences in risk 
aversion seem to be related to the outcomes of preceding tasks. Furthermore, errors 
appear to occur more frequently. The alternative BS design is likely to be biased 
towards lower risk aversion, and appears to suffer from a similar increase in errors. The 
next subsection presents a more sophisticated analysis of the effects of RTISs, and 
confirms these findings. 
 
Probit Regression Analysis 
An analysis of the stop round is crude and does not control for differences 
between the various choice problems such as differences in the amounts at stake. In this 
subsection, we use probit regression analysis to explain the DOND choices in the 
various samples, while correcting for the characteristics of the choice problems. The 
dependent variable is the subject’s decision, with a value of 1 for “Deal” and 0 for “No 
Deal”. We estimate two regression models. Both models use the dummy variables DWS 
and DBS to measure the effects of the different treatments. In the first model, we try to 
explain the various choices using the following set of variables: 
 
- DWS: dummy variable indicating that the choice is made in the WS treatment 
(1 = WS RTIS); 
- DBS: dummy variable indicating that the choice is made in the BS treatment 
(1 = BS RTIS); 
- EV/100: stakes, measured as the current average remaining prize divided by 
100 Euros; 
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- EV/BO: expected relative return (+1) from rejecting the current and subsequent 
bank offers, or the average remaining prize divided by the bank offer; 
- Stdev/EV: standard deviation ratio, or standard deviation of the distribution of 
the average remaining prize in the next round divided by the average remaining 
prize. 
 
The stakes are divided by 100 Euros to obtain more convenient regression 
coefficients. To control for the attractiveness of the bank offer, we use the expected 
return from rejecting the current and subsequent bank offers. The standard deviation 
ratio measures the risk of continuing to play (“No Deal”) for one additional round. To 
allow for the possibility that the errors of individual subjects are correlated, we perform 
a cluster correction on the standard errors (Wooldridge, 2003). In order to avoid 
confounding effects of outcomes of prior tasks, we only use the first game of the WS 
design. The sample used for the regression consists of a total of 1977 choice 
observations, of which 677 observations are from the guaranteed-payment treatment, 
766 from the BS treatment and 534 from the WS treatment. 
The first column of Table 3.2 shows the probit estimation results. As expected for 
non-satiable and risk averse individuals, the “Deal” propensity increases with the 
generosity of the bank offer and with the dispersion of the outcomes. The “Deal” 
propensity also increases with the stakes, consistent with increasing relative risk 
aversion. 
The WS dummy is significantly larger than zero (z = 2.551, p = 0.011), indicating 
a higher deal propensity in this treatment than in the guaranteed-payment treatment. The 
BS dummy is negative, but statistically only marginally significant (z = -1.676, 
p = 0.094). Although the signs of the treatment effects are similar to the preliminary 
findings in the stop-round analysis, the statistical significance has now been reversed. 
The above analysis does not account for the possible effects of tremble, or the 
subject losing concentration and choosing completely at random. Such errors would 
introduce a relatively large number of “Deals” in the early game rounds when “Deals” 
cannot reasonably be explained by risk aversion or errors in weighing the attractiveness 
of “Deal” and “No Deal” against each other, because the bank offers are very 
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Table 3.2: Probit regression results: treatment effects. The table displays the results 
from the probit regression analyses of the DOND decisions in the three different treatments. 
In the guaranteed-payment treatment, subjects play the game once and for real. In the BS 
RTIS treatment, subjects play the game once with a ten percent chance of real payment. In 
the WS RTIS treatment, subjects play the game ten times with a random selection of one of 
the ten outcomes for real payment. The dependent variable is the contestant’s decision, with 
a value of 1 for “Deal” and 0 for “No Deal”. EV is the current average remaining prize in 
Euros. BO is the bank offer. Stdev measures the standard deviation of the distribution of the 
average remaining prize in the next game round. DWS (DBS) is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 for observations from the WS (BS) RTIS treatment. Tremble is the estimated 
probability that a choice is made at random. Apart from the maximum likelihood estimates 
for the regression coefficients, the table reports the log-likelihood (LL), the mean log-
likelihood (MLL), McFadden’s R-squared, and the number of observations (No. obs.). The 
p-values (within parentheses) for the regression coefficients are corrected for correlation 
between the responses of a given subject (subject-level cluster correction). The p-values for 
the tremble probabilities are based on likelihood ratio tests. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -2.284 (0.000) -1.843 (0.000)
DWS 0.288 (0.011) 0.230 (0.104)
DBS -0.184 (0.094) -0.258 (0.030)
EV/100 0.753 (0.000) 0.767 (0.000)
EV/BO -0.244 (0.002) -0.496 (0.001)
Stdev/EV 1.964 (0.000) 1.801 (0.000)
Tremble: Constant  0.000 (1.000)
 DWS  0.027 (0.003)
 DBS  0.009 (0.007)
LL -458.2  -453.4  
MLL -0.232  -0.229  
McFadden R2 0.213  0.221  
No. obs. 1977  1977  
 
 
conservative in those rounds. The relatively large number of early “Deals” in the 
preliminary analysis of the stop round indeed suggests that tremble is relevant in this 
experiment. 
For discussions of the interpretation and modeling of stochastic elements in risky 
choice experiments we refer to Harless and Camerer (1994), Hey (1995), Hey and Orme 
(1994), Loomes and Sugden (1995), Luce and Suppes (1965), and Wilcox (2008). 
To account for tremble, we extend our probit model by adding a tremble 
probability (Harless and Camerer, 1994). For a discussion of the method of including a 
tremble probability in a binary choice model, see Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002) 
and Moffatt and Peters (2001). We allow for different tremble probabilities in the three 
treatments by modeling the tremble probability, ω, as ω = ω0 + ω1 DWS + ω2 DBS. The 
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constant ω0 represents the tremble probability in the guaranteed-payment design, and 
the parameters ω1 and ω2 represent the deviations of the tremble probabilities for the 
WS and BS design, respectively. Following the recommendation of Moffatt and Peters, 
we calculate the p-values for the tremble probabilities on the basis of likelihood ratio 
tests. Since the tremble parameter is restricted to be nonnegative, a test for tremble is 
one-sided, and the restricted p-value is obtained by dividing the unrestricted p-value by 
a value of two. 
The second column of Table 3.2 presents the results of this second model. The 
tremble probability in the guaranteed-payment design is virtually zero (4.83⋅10-7). In 
both RTIS treatments, however, the presence of a tremble probability is statistically 
significant. In the WS treatment, the tremble probability equals 2.7 percent 
(LR1 = 7.653, p = 0.003), implying that about 14 of the 534 choices in this design can be 
labeled as random decisions. In the BS design, the tremble probability is smaller, 0.9 
percent (LR1 = 6.115, p = 0.007), and corresponds with 7 out of 766 choices. The 
difference between the tremble probabilities in the RTIS treatments is statistically 
significant (LR1 = 3.078, p = 0.040). Adding the three tremble probabilities significantly 
improves the fit of the regression model. A likelihood ratio test yields a p-value of 0.011 
(LR3 = 9.622) for their combined effect. 
Interestingly, after correcting for trembles, the WS dummy is no longer 
significantly larger than zero (z = 1.624, p = 0.104), indicating unbiased risk aversion in 
this treatment. The BS dummy on the other hand gains statistical significance and is 
now significantly negative (z = -2.169, p = 0.030), implying that this RTIS stimulates 
less risk averse choices. (Note that the absolute values of both coefficients are roughly 
equal, suggesting opposite biases of similar strength. Statistical inference for the WS 
dummy seems to be affected by overlap in the effects of increasing the dummy 
coefficient and increasing the tremble probability. Both yield a decrease in the predicted 
stop round.) Clearly, correcting for the asymmetric impact of errors is important in our 
experimental analysis. 
We also estimated a model that allows for differences in the standard noise term 
between the different treatments, but found no significant improvement of the fit. The 
standard noise term represents errors in weighing the attractiveness of “Deal” and “No 
Deal” against each other and particularly helps to understand decision errors that occur 
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when the subject is almost indifferent between the two choices. It can explain for 
example why a subject stops in game round 6 or 8 when stopping in round 7 would be 
optimal. Tremble helps to understand why a moderately risk averse subject would 
sometimes stop in the early game rounds when the bank offers are very conservative. In 
our experiments, the RTIS seems to generate additional tremble rather than standard 
noise. The loss of concentration arguably reflects the lower expected monetary reward 
per trial in the RTIS treatments compared to guaranteed payment. 
A typical feature of dynamic choice problems is that intermediate outcomes have 
to be shown. An experiment that uses a WS RTIS consists of multiple tasks, and, as 
discussed in Section 3.2, intermediate outcomes of earlier tasks may influence a 
subject’s choices in a given task. (In our experiment, the information available to 
subjects is not limited to intermediate outcomes. Also the final outcome of a prior task 
is known.) The preliminary analysis of the stop round indeed yielded some indications 
of such an effect. Using choice data from the WS treatment, we will further analyze 
whether carry-over effects occur between subsequent tasks. We therefore expand the 
probit regression model with variables that capture the outcomes of previous tasks. 
To quantify the outcome of a prior task, we employ a proxy for the winnings. 
Using the actual winnings (the accepted bank offer) would introduce a bias in the 
regression coefficients, because this variable picks up heterogeneity in risk attitudes 
between subjects: more risk averse subjects are more likely to say “Deal” in a given 
round of the current game, and, at the same time, more risk averse subjects have won 
smaller amounts in prior games because they have accepted lower percentage bank 
offers. To avoid spurious correlation, we quantify a subject’s winnings in the kth 
preceding game by the average remaining prize in the last game round (or the prize in 
the subject’s own briefcase if she rejected all bank offers), EV-k. To obtain convenient 
coefficients, we divide this variable by 100 Euros. We include the outcomes of the four 
most recent prior tasks, i.e., k = 1,···,4. Missing values in the case of early tasks are set 
equal to the sample average. (We also ran the regression on a smaller sample that 
excludes the observations with missing values for prior outcomes. The results are 
similar.) 
The first column of Table 3.3 presents the probit regression results. The outcomes 
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Table 3.3: Probit regression results: carry-over and tremble effects across tasks. The 
table displays the results from the probit regression analyses of the DOND decisions in the 
ten different games of the WS RTIS treatment. EV-k (k = 1,2,3,4) is the average remaining 
prize in the last round of the kth game preceding the current game. Missing values for this 
variable are set equal to the sample average. Model 1 assumes a constant tremble 
probability across the different tasks, and Model 2 assumes a log-linear pattern. Other 
definitions are similar to Table 3.2. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -1.182 (0.000) -1.170 (0.000) 
EV/100 0.812 (0.000) 0.805 (0.000) 
EV/BO -0.613 (0.000) -0.616 (0.005) 
Stdev/EV 1.610 (0.000) 1.594 (0.000) 
EV-1/100 -0.204 (0.001) -0.200 (0.001) 
EV-2/100 -0.197 (0.001) -0.193 (0.001) 
EV-3/100 -0.052 (0.390) -0.053 (0.384) 
EV-4/100 -0.029 (0.683) -0.025 (0.720) 
Tremble: Constant 0.011 (0.000) 0.028 (0.000) 
 Ln(Task)  -0.011 (0.029) 
LL -1531.2  -1529.4  
MLL -0.266  -0.266  
McFadden R2 0.200  0.201  
No. obs. 5756  5756  
 
 
of the two most recent tasks, EV-1 and EV-2, strongly influence the “Deal” propensity in 
the current task: the larger the prior winnings, the less a subject is inclined to accept the 
sure alternative, i.e., the more risk she takes. The effects of the other two lags are 
economically and statistically insignificant. 
Note that the tremble probability (1.1 percent) is again significant (LR1 = 20.887, 
p = 0.000), but clearly smaller than the tremble probability estimated for the first task 
(2.7 percent, see Table 3.2). Because the tremble probability is now estimated across the 
ten different tasks, this difference suggests that the likelihood of trembles decreases 
during the experiment. To further investigate this possibility, we decompose the tremble 
probability into a constant that represents the tremble in the first task, and a term that 
varies log-linearly with the task number, i.e., ω = ω0 + ω1 log(Task). Column 2 shows 
the estimation results. The log-linear term is negative and significant (LR1 = 3.608, 
p = 0.029), confirming a decreasing pattern of the tremble probability. The constant (2.8 
percent) is almost equal to the tremble probability estimated for the first task separately 
(2.7 percent). If we replace the log-linear term by a linear term, i.e., ω = ω0 + ω1 (Task), 
the significance of the linear component deteriorates (LR1 = 2.711, p = 0.050; 
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untabulated), suggesting that the largest effect of gaining experience occurs during the 
first few tasks. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Our results suggest that the likelihood of random choice is larger in the RTIS 
designs than in the guaranteed-payment design. We find that both the WS and the BS 
RTIS treatment yield decisions that can be described as trembles, or errors of which the 
likelihood is independent of the characteristics of the decision problem. Not correcting 
for these errors would increase the estimated degree of risk aversion in our experiment. 
Of course, the trembles in the RTIS treatments are not likely to be a consequence of 
RTIS per se, and they will probably also emerge if we would decimate the prizes in our 
guaranteed-payment design. The tremble probabilities in the WS and BS design are 
significantly different and estimated to be about three and one percent, respectively. 
This difference may result from the different number of tasks that subjects face. In the 
single task of the BS design, a subject’s performance depends on that one task only. The 
WS design consists of a much larger number of tasks, which may weaken a subject’s 
attention, and subjects may also regard the first few tasks as learning opportunities. If 
we look at the tremble probability across the series of repetitions of the task, then we 
find that the probability decreases with the number of tasks performed. Apparently, the 
frequency of trembles is negatively related to subjects’ decision-making experience, a 
conclusion that confirms the prediction of Smith and Walker (1993, p.251), and earlier 
findings of Moffatt and Peters (2001), and Loomes, Moffatt and Peters (2002). The 
effect of boredom from repetition would work in the opposite direction, but seems to be 
absent or mitigated due to the popularity of the game and/or the random course and 
therefore different properties of each task. 
Consistent with the findings of most earlier investigations of the WS RTIS, the 
general level of risk-aversion in our WS design appears to be roughly similar to that in 
our guaranteed-payment design. Only at marginal levels of significance, our analyses 
show signs of a bias in the direction of increased risk aversion. In contrast, the BS 
treatment yields results that are significantly biased towards less risk averse behavior. 
Subjects in this design play the game longer, and the probit analysis also shows that 
subjects display less risk averse behavior. Reduction can affect behavior if 
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independence is violated, especially if reduction strongly affects the probabilities. In a 
BS design, integration of the choice problem and the RTIS lottery would be relatively 
easy, because only one choice problem is involved and the reduction of each alternative 
requires only straightforward multiplication of the probabilities in the choice problem 
with the probability of payout. With a payout ratio of 10 percent, a 50 percent chance at 
€100 would be perceived as a 5% gamble at €100. Since small probabilities tend to be 
overweighed, this generally has the effect of encouraging risk taking in BS RTIS 
experiments. In a WS design, reduction is substantially more complex. It is unlikely that 
the average subject could perform this complex task by heart in a few seconds. It seems 
more likely that the complexity of the meta-lottery introduces a sense of ambiguity in a 
WS design, and that this ambiguity explains the weak indication of increased risk 
aversion in our results. 
Subjects in our WS treatment are clearly influenced by the outcomes of prior 
tasks: a substantial part of the variation in risk attitudes across subjects and tasks in our 
WS treatment can be explained by the outcomes of the two most recent previous games. 
The larger the winnings in those earlier tasks, the lower a subject’s aversion to risk. A 
possible explanation for these cross-task contamination effects can be found in the work 
of Thaler and Johnson (1990). Thaler and Johnson show that subjects display less risk 
aversion after previous losses when they have a chance to break even, the so-called 
“break-even effect”, and higher risk aversion when they cannot break even. Subjects in 
our experiment cannot recover from the unfavorable outcome of a previous game, and 
they will have to accept the possibility that this unfavorable outcome is selected for 
payout. Thus, the higher risk aversion after unfavorable outcomes in earlier games 
seems consistent with the results of Thaler and Johnson. Similarly, Thaler and Johnson 
also show that subjects display a relatively low degree of risk aversion after gains when 
these gains cannot be entirely lost, the so-called “house-money effect”. The low risk 
aversion that we observed after favorable outcomes in previous games is consistent with 
this phenomenon. Alternatively, one could argue that the cross-task contamination that 
we observe can be regarded as an income effect. However, income effects cannot 
explain why only the last two previous games affect decisions in the current game, since 
a subject’s expected income from the experiment is determined by the outcomes of 
every game. 
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In a WS experiment with static choice problems, carry-over effects from 
outcomes of previously performed tasks can easily be avoided by simply postponing the 
presentation of outcomes until all tasks have been completed. Intermediate outcomes 
are, however, an inevitable feature of dynamic choice problems. Subjects in our DOND 
experiment, for example, need to know at any stage of the game which prizes are 
eliminated and which prizes remain. Our results indicate that the effects of prior tasks 
are short-lived. A researcher who wants to analyze dynamic risky choice in a WS design 
may therefore attempt to avoid carry-over effects by, for example, interposing dummy 
tasks between the tasks of interest. 
We did not explicitly analyze a design that combines the WS and the BS variant 
of the RTIS. In such a hybrid design, one of each subject’s tasks is randomly selected 
and a subset of the contestants is then randomly selected for real payment. Assuming 
that the same number of tasks is performed, the costs of the hybrid design are only a 
fraction of the costs of the WS design. Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2007, footnote 16) 
deal briefly with a comparison of risky choices in a hybrid and a WS scheme, and find 
that the two designs yield no differences in revealed risk preferences for simple pairwise 
static choice problems. Abdellaoui, Baillon and Wakker (2007) interviewed subjects in 
a pilot study and asked which RTIS motivates them better: one large prize for one 
subject in a hybrid design or one moderate prize per subject in a WS design, holding the 
total prize pool constant. The majority pointed out that the hybrid design motivates them 
best, which is why the authors chose this design even though they could also have 
implemented the WS design. Future research may further analyze the hybrid RTIS. 
Based on our results, it seems likely that the hybrid design suffers from the same path-
dependence as the WS design, from a similar bias towards lower risk aversion as the BS 
design, and from the higher frequency of trembles we observed in both the WS and the 
BS design. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
When we compare RTIS treatments with a guaranteed-payment treatment and 
hold the face values of the prizes constant, a BS RTIS design generates downwardly 
biased measurements of risk aversion and increases the likelihood of decision errors. 
The increased errors are likely to reflect lapses of concentration, caused by the less 
113
 113
favorable tradeoff between the cost and benefits of decision efforts. Of course, the 
advantages of using a guaranteed-payment approach in single choice designs should be 
balanced against the smaller number of choice observations that can be obtained with a 
given budget. Experimentalists who consider using the WS RTIS to study dynamic 
risky choice problems should be aware of possible carry-over effects from showing 
intermediate outcomes of previous tasks. Risk aversion increases after recent 
unfavorable results and decreases after recent favorable results. Like the BS design, the 
WS RTIS also seems to generate more trembles than a guaranteed-payment design. 
Still, after controlling for the effect of such errors, the WS RTIS delivers measurements 
of risk aversion that are comparable to using a single-task design with guaranteed 
payment. Our results call for caution when applying RTISs in dynamic designs. 
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 Appendix: Instructions to the Within-Subjects RTIS Experiment 
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Conclusions 
 
The TV game show Deal or No Deal (DOND) is a natural laboratory for studying 
risky choice. In this game show we observe, on average, what might be called 
“moderate” levels of risk aversion. Even when hundreds of thousands of Euros are at 
stake, many contestants are rejecting offers in excess of 75 percent of the expected 
value. In an expected utility of wealth framework, this level of risk aversion for large 
stakes is hard to reconcile with the same moderate level of risk aversion found in small-
stake experiments – both ours, and those conducted by other experimentalists. Although 
risk aversion is moderate on average, the offers people accept vary greatly among the 
contestants; some demonstrate strong risk aversion by stopping in the early game rounds 
and accepting relatively conservative bank offers, while others exhibit clear risk-seeking 
behavior by rejecting offers above the average remaining prize and thus deliberately 
entering “unfair gambles”. While some of this variation is undoubtedly due to 
differences in individual risk attitudes, a considerable part of the variation can be 
explained by the outcomes experienced by the contestants in the previous rounds of the 
game. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, we estimate structural choice models. For each of 
the three editions of DOND analyzed in this chapter, we find that a simple version of 
prospect theory with a sticky reference point explains the “Deal or No Deal” decisions 
substantially better than expected utility theory. In the second chapter, we do not limit 
ourselves to investigating contestants’ choice behavior within editions, and also look 
across editions. Using probit regression analysis and a very large data set of nearly 
6,400 choices made by more than 1,100 different contestants in ten different editions, 
we find that contestants respond in a similar way to the relative level of the stakes, even 
though the absolute level differs significantly across the various editions. Differences in 
the stakes across the various editions have only a weak effect. 
Our main finding in the first two chapters is the important role of reference-
dependence and path-dependence, phenomena that are often ignored in implementations 
of expected utility theory. The context of earlier game situations or choice problems 
appears to be a key determinant of the framing of a given choice problem. Amounts are 
likely to be considered as “large” in the context of a game where they lie above prior 
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expectations, but the same amounts are evaluated as “small” in a game where they lie 
below prior expectations. For contestants who expected to win hundreds of thousands, 
an amount of €10,000 probably seems “small”; the same amount is likely to appear 
much “larger” when thousands or tens of thousands were expected. We hope that the 
results provide a stimulus for the further development and proliferation of reference-
dependent choice theory. 
In the third chapter, we analyze the effects of the random task incentive systems 
(RTISs) in risky choice experiments that mimic the game of DOND. When we compare 
our two RTIS treatments with our guaranteed-payment treatment and hold the face 
values of the prizes constant, we find that applying a RTIS in a between-subjects design 
generates downwardly biased measurements of risk aversion and increases the 
likelihood of decision errors. The increased errors are likely to reflect lapses of 
concentration, caused by the less favorable tradeoff between the cost and benefits of 
decision efforts. Experimentalists who consider using a RTIS in a within-subjects 
design should be aware of possible carry-over effects from showing intermediate 
outcomes of previous tasks. Risk aversion increases after recent unfavorable results and 
decreases after recent favorable results. Like the BS design, the within-subjects RTIS 
also seems to generate more trembles than a guaranteed-payment design. Still, after 
controlling for the effect of such errors, the within-subjects design delivers 
measurements of risk aversion that are comparable to using a single-choice design with 
guaranteed payment. The results of the third chapter call for caution when applying 
RTISs. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Summary in Dutch 
 
Het tv-spelprogramma Deal or No Deal (DOND) – in Nederland ook bekend 
onder de naam Miljoenenjacht – werd in 2006 in 46 landen uitgezonden en is daarmee 
één van de succesvolste televisieprogramma’s van producent Endemol. Ook voor 
economen is DOND interessant, omdat het spelprogramma kan worden beschouwd als 
een uniek natuurlijk experiment dat de mogelijkheid biedt individueel risicogedrag te 
analyseren in een situatie waarin grote geldbedragen op het spel staan. 
In de meeste landen zijn de spelregels vergelijkbaar. DOND wordt gespeeld over 
meerdere rondes, en begint met enkele tientallen koffers (of dozen) waarover evenveel 
prijzen willekeurig zijn verdeeld. De samenstelling van de verzameling geldprijzen is 
bekend, maar uiteraard is niet zichtbaar welke prijs zich in welke koffer bevindt. De 
kandidaat kiest één van de koffers, en mag zich daarmee eigenaar noemen van de 
vooralsnog onbekende inhoud. Aan het begin van iedere spelronde wijst de kandidaat 
een gegeven aantal van de overige koffers aan, die vervolgens worden geopend. 
Zodoende komt de kandidaat er stap-voor-stap achter welke prijzen zich niet in zijn of 
haar eigen koffer bevinden. Aan het einde van iedere ronde doet een “bankier” een bod 
op de koffer van de kandidaat. Dit bod is vooral gerelateerd aan het gemiddelde van de 
resterende prijzen, en de aantrekkelijkheid van het bod loopt op naarmate het spel 
vordert. Als de kandidaat het bod accepteert, “Deal”, dan is het spel afgelopen. Als de 
kandidaat het bod weigert, “No Deal”, dan gaat hij of zij verder naar de volgende ronde 
en moet er wederom een aantal koffers worden geopend. Het spel gaat op deze wijze 
door, totdat de kandidaat ofwel een bankbod accepteert, ofwel alle andere koffers heeft 
geopend en de inhoud van zijn of haar eigen koffer ontvangt. 
In dit proefschrift analyseren we het risicogedrag van kandidaten in 
televisieafleveringen en van studenten die het spel spelen achter de computer of voorin 
de collegezaal. De vraag hoe mensen zich gedragen in situaties van risico raakt aan de 
basis van praktisch iedere discipline binnen de economische wetenschap. Er bestaat 
momenteel een breed scala aan theorieën op dit gebied. Bekende voorbeelden zijn de 
normatieve verwachte-nutstheorie van Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) en de 
beschrijvende prospect theory van Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Het empirisch 
128
 128
toetsen van dergelijke theorieën is echter niet eenvoudig gebleken. De eerste 
onderzoeken waren meestal gebaseerd op gedachte-experimenten of antwoorden op 
hypothetische vragen. Met de opkomst van de experimentele economie nam de 
populariteit van experimenten met echte geldbedragen toe, maar door beperkte 
onderzoeksbudgetten bleven de gehanteerde bedragen klein. Buiten het 
onderzoekslaboratorium wordt empirisch onderzoek vaak gehinderd door wat men wel 
het joint hypothesis probleem noemt. Het ondubbelzinnig waarnemen van de 
risicohouding is niet mogelijk, omdat de mensen waarvan het gedrag wordt bestudeerd 
niet weten wat de werkelijke kansverdeling is (een situatie die men vaak omschrijft als 
een situatie van onzekerheid, in plaats van risico), en omdat de ideeën die zij hebben 
over de kansverdeling niet bekend zijn bij de onderzoeker. 
Ondanks de nog maar korte historie van DOND wordt de spelshow nu al in brede 
academische kring erkend als een “natuurlijk onderzoekslaboratorium” voor de analyse 
van risicogedrag. Wij ontdekten DOND en de mogelijkheden die de show biedt toen 
deze aan de vooravond stond van een internationale doorbraak. De show is ontwikkeld 
door Endemol, een Nederlandse programmamaker, en in Nederland voor het eerst 
uitgezonden. De allereerste uitzending was in december 2002. In 2003 werd het concept 
succesvol geëxporteerd naar Australië. In de daaropvolgende jaren werd DOND 
gelanceerd in vele tientallen andere landen. In 2006 verscheen de show reeds in 46 
verschillende landen op nationale tv-zenders. De geldbedragen die op het spel staan in 
DOND zijn zeer groot en variëren sterk: in een aflevering kan een kandidaat naar huis 
gaan als multimiljonair, maar ook met vrijwel lege handen. De analyse van risicogedrag 
aan de hand van televisieshows is niet nieuw, maar anders dan bij andere shows gaat het 
bij DOND om zeer simpele ja/nee beslissingen (“Deal” of “No Deal”). Deze 
beslissingen vereisen nauwelijks of geen vaardigheden, kennis of strategie, en de 
verdeling van kansen en uitkomsten is eenvoudig en met nagenoeg volledige zekerheid 
bekend. Bovendien bestaat het spel uit meerdere rondes, waardoor DOND interessant 
kan zijn voor de analyse van padafhankelijkheid in risicogedrag, of, anders gezegd, van 
de invloed van voorafgaande uitkomsten op de risicohouding. 
Natuurlijk kan het gedrag van deelnemers aan spelshows niet altijd worden 
gegeneraliseerd naar de beslissingen die men maakt in het alledaagse leven. Waar de 
deelnemers aan televisiespelletjes beslissingen moeten nemen in een tijdsbestek van 
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enkele minuten en voor het oog van de camera en miljoenen televisiekijkers, worden 
veel beslissingen in het dagelijks leven die betrekking hebben op grote bedragen zelden 
gehaast of in het licht van schijnwerpers genomen. Toch zijn wij er van overtuigd dat de 
keuzes in deze bijzondere spelshow de moeite van het bestuderen waard zijn, omdat de 
keuzeproblemen als gezegd eenvoudig en duidelijk geformuleerd zijn en omdat de 
geldbedragen enorm groot zijn. Bovendien hebben kandidaten voorafgaand aan de show 
onbeperkt de tijd gehad om zich af te vragen wat men zou doen in verschillende 
situaties, en tijdens de show wordt hen regelmatig en uitgebreid de mogelijkheid 
geboden om de keuzes te overleggen met één of meerdere vrienden of familieleden die 
in de studio aanwezig zijn. Zo bezien lijken de keuzes meer weloverwogen dan men op 
het eerste gezicht zou denken. Het heeft er zelfs schijn van dat kandidaten beter 
nadenken over hun keuzes tijdens de show dan over andere financiële beslissingen die 
ze nemen in hun leven, bijvoorbeeld bij het selecteren van een hypotheek, het beleggen 
van hun vermogen, of het afsluiten van verzekeringen. 
In hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift analyseren we het risicogedrag van 151 
kandidaten uit Nederland (51), Duitsland (47) en Amerika (53), en van 80 studenten die 
deelnamen aan een DOND-experiment in een collegezaal. Eén van de analyses die we 
uitvoeren betreft de schatting van structurele keuze-modellen aan de hand van 
maximum-likelihood methodologie. Voor iedere steekproef vinden we dat een 
eenvoudige implementatie van prospect theory de keuzes van de deelnemers duidelijk 
beter verklaart dan verwachte-nutstheorie. De grootste verliezers en de grootste 
winnaars blijken een abnormaal lage risicoaversie te hebben. Deze constatering komt 
overeen met de zogenaamde break-even en house-money effecten die zich voor doen 
wanneer een referentiepunt gehanteerd wordt dat zich traag aanpast aan nieuwe situaties 
en blijft hangen bij oude verwachtingen. Hoewel kandidaten bij DOND nooit armer de 
studio uit komen dan zij erin gaan, kunnen ze wel degelijk substantiële “papieren” 
verliezen lijden wanneer de dozen of koffertjes met grote bedragen afvallen (waardoor 
de verwachte spelopbrengst daalt). Wat wij laten zien, is dat dergelijke verliezen hun 
navolgende keuzes beïnvloeden. Veel verliezers gedragen zich zelfs risicozoekend door 
bankbiedingen te weigeren die de gemiddelde resterende prijs overstijgen. De resultaten 
wijzen in de richting van referentie-afhankelijke beslissingstheorieën als prospect 
theory, en geven aan dat padafhankelijkheid relevant is, zelfs wanneer grote, echte 
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geldbedragen op het spel staan. Dit eerste hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op het artikel Deal or 
No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show, dat mede 
geschreven is door Thierry Post, Guido Baltussen en Richard H. Thaler, en gepubliceerd 
is in de American Economic Review. 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken we hoe het risicogedrag in DOND af hangt van de 
context, in de zin van de grootte van de prijzen waarmee het spel begint. We maken in 
dit hoofdstuk gebruik van een grotere dataset, die bestaat uit tien edities die onderling 
sterk verschillen in de grootte van de prijzen. De tien edities zijn afkomstig uit zeven 
verschillende landen en vertegenwoordigen gezamenlijk ongeveer 6.400 keuzes die 
gemaakt zijn door ongeveer 1.100 verschillende kandidaten. Deze grote dataset en de 
verschillen in de grootte van de prijzen waarmee het spel begint maken het mogelijk om 
framing effecten te analyseren door vergelijkingen te maken tussen edities, en 
verminderen daarnaast de noodzaak om volledig gespecificeerde structurele modellen te 
schatten zoals in hoofdstuk 1. Aan de hand van probit regressie analyse vergelijken we 
hoe de absolute en relatieve groottes van de bedragen die op het spel staan van invloed 
zijn op het risicogedrag. Onze analyses binnen en tussen de verschillende edities 
wekken de indruk dat risicogedrag zeer gevoelig is voor de context van het 
keuzeprobleem. Beslissingen worden voornamelijk gedreven door de relatieve grootte 
van de geldbedragen, en niet of nauwelijks door de absolute grootte. Voor een gegeven 
editie van DOND hebben veranderingen in de bedragen die op het spel staan een sterk 
effect op de risicohouding en het keuzegedrag, terwijl verschillen in de bedragen bij de 
start van het spel nauwelijks van invloed zijn. Onze resultaten geven aan dat bedragen 
vooral worden geëvalueerd in verhouding tot een subjectief referentiekader in plaats van 
in termen van de absolute waarde. Dit hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op het artikel Risky 
Choice and the Relative Size of Stakes, dat mede is geschreven door Guido Baltussen en 
Thierry Post. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk betreft een onderzoek naar de effecten van Random Task 
Incentive Systems (RTISs). Een RTIS is een beloningsmethode die vaak wordt 
gehanteerd bij economische experimenten, waarbij slechts één willekeurig geselecteerde 
taak voor echt geld wordt gespeeld. De laboratoriumexperimenten in dit hoofdstuk 
imiteren het DOND spel. We voeren drie varianten uit van het experiment, waarbij 
alleen de beloningsmethode verschilt. In de eerste variant speelt iedere deelnemer het 
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spel één keer en voor echt geld. In de tweede variant speelt iedere deelnemer het spel 
tien keer en wordt willekeurig één van de tien uitkomsten geselecteerd en uitbetaald. In 
de derde variant speelt iedere deelnemer één keer, en heeft hij of zij een kans van tien 
procent dat de uitkomst ook daadwerkelijk wordt uitbetaald. We onderzoeken drie 
mogelijke effecten die kunnen optreden in een RTIS experiment: een vertekend niveau 
van risicoaversie, frequentere beslissingsfouten, en beïnvloeding van keuzes door 
uitkomsten van voorafgaande taken. De kenmerken van DOND maken het mogelijk om 
de drie verschillende effecten te onderzoeken op basis van één en dezelfde taak. Onze 
resultaten geven aan dat voorzichtigheid betracht dient te worden bij het gebruik van 
RTISs. We constateren dat er sprake is van een significante frequentie van fouten die 
ongerelateerd zijn aan de karakteristieken van het keuzeprobleem. Deelnemers lijken 
last te hebben van concentratieverlies en/of af te zien van de inspanningen die nodig zijn 
om het probleem serieus te overdenken, waardoor keuzes gemaakt worden die volstrekt 
willekeurig zijn. Daarnaast blijkt dat deelnemers in de variant waarbij één van de tien 
taken voor betaling wordt geselecteerd, sterk worden beïnvloed door de uitkomsten van 
voorafgaande taken: hun risicoaversie is hoger na onaantrekkelijke recente uitkomsten 
en lager na aantrekkelijke recente uitkomsten. Gemiddeld genomen is de mate van 
risicoaversie niet significant anders dan bij de variant met één taak en gegarandeerde 
betaling. De methode waarbij de deelnemer één taak uitvoert en een kans heeft van tien 
procent op uitbetaling omzeilt uiteraard beïnvloeding door uitkomsten van vooraf-
gaande taken, maar bij deze variant is de mate van risicoaversie aanmerkelijk lager dan 
in het geval van zekere uitbetaling, wat wijst op een serieuze vertekening. Dit laatste 
hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op het artikel Random Task Incentive Systems in Risky Choice 
Experiments, mede geschreven door Guido Baltussen, Thierry Post en Peter P. Wakker. 
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l)DEAL OR NO DEAL? DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK IN A LARGE-STAKE TV GAME
SHOW AND RELATED EXPERIMENTS
Risky choice is fundamental to virtually every branch of economics. Unfortunately,
empirical testing of theories developed in this field has proven to be difficult because of
limited budgets in experiments and joint hypothesis problems outside the laboratory.
The first two chapters of this thesis analyze the risky choices of contestants in a TV game
show named “Deal or No Deal” (DOND). DOND provides a unique opportunity to study risk
behavior, because it is characterized by very large and wide-ranging stakes, by a sim ple
probability distribution, and by stop-go decisions that require minimal skill or strate gy.
The results are hard to reconcile with expected utility theory and point to reference-depen -
dent alternatives such as prospect theory. The first chapter uses editions from the
Netherlands, Germany and the US. In each sample, the choices of contestants can be
explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aver sion
decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or
surpassed by favorable outcomes. The second chapter not only studies risk behavior in
individual editions, but also compares across editions. We demonstrate that risky choice is
highly sensitive to the context, as defined by the initial prizes in the game. Even though
the initial stakes of the various editions are widely different, contestants respond in a
similar way to the stakes relative to their initial level.
The third chapter of this thesis analyzes random task incentive systems (RTISs), using
experiments that mimic DOND. RTISs are commonly applied in economic experiments to
implement real incentives when research budgets are limited and to avoid income effects.
We find that caution is warranted when applying RTISs.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are RSM Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Econo mics.
ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy
of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the manage -
ment of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm relations, and its busi ness
processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
advanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research
programmes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity
is united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
Erim - 08 omslag vd Assem:Erim omslag vd Assem  18-08-2008  11:52  Pagina 1  B&T28395 - Erim Omslag vd Assem 18aug08
